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INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act' as a radical measure to redis-
tribute political power.2 This congressional intention should not be surprising,
for at heart the struggle for voting rights has always been a battle for political
power. Throughout this struggle, those who hold the reins of power have
shared it only reluctantly, while consistently devising new, devious ways to
remain in control.4 Indeed, a long line of voting rights cases attests to the
1. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988).
2. Pamela S. Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing: Single-Member Offices and the Voting Rights Act, 77
VA. L. REV. 1, 39 (1991) ("Voting Rights Act was intended to bring about a radical realignment of political
control"). President Johnson heralded the passage of the Voting Rights Act as a "triumph for freedom as
huge as any ever won on any battlefield." SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON S. 1992, S. REP.
No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 181.
3. For a riveting account of the voting rights struggle, see JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO
FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICANS (1967); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF
JIM CROW (2d rev. ed. 1966).
4. According to one commentator, "the focus of discrimination shifted [from preventing blacks from
registering] to preventing blacks from using their eligibility to gain any significant political power." Armand
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intransigent, enduring nature of white resistance and illustrates the multiplicity
of tactics politicians have employed to prevent blacks5 from gaining some
measure of political authority.6
For most of this country's history, blacks were denied the right to cast a
ballot.7 Once blacks gained the formal right to vote, however, the "white
primary" and other disfranchising devices rendered it meaningless.8 After these
blatant devices were invalidated by the Supreme Court,9 many cities and
counties embraced new rules for elections intended to deny blacks any opportu-
nity to prevail in election contests.10 Other municipalities sought to become
white enclaves by fencing out black residents with artfully drawn jurisdictional
boundaries." Finally, if black candidates did somehow succeed in winning
elected office, whites sought as a last resort to render those offices politically
impotent.1
2
Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 523, 552-53 (1973). See also
Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 389 (1971) ("The history of white domination in the South has been
one of adaptiveness, and the passage of the Voting Rights Act and the increased black registration that
followed has resulted in new methods to maintain white control of the political process." (quoting director
of United States Civil Rights Commission)).
5. In this article, I most often use the term "black," rather than the more general term "minority." The
exclusive use of the term "minority" is unsatisfactory because it fails to convey the specific, historical
discrimination against blacks and other people of color in the American political process. Although the Act
extends rights to all racial minorities, as well as to non-English speakers or "language minorities," see David
H. Hunter, The 1975 Voting Rights Act and Language Minorities, 25 CATH. U. L REV. 250 (1976), I use
the term "black" for several reasons. Local legislative delegations are most active in Southern states, where
blacks are the largest racial minority group. Moreover, though "people of color" is more inclusive and might
best capture the full range of protected groups, it is a cumbersome term to use in conjunction with "voter,"
and is a term found nowhere in the voting rights case law. However, by using the term "black," I do not
mean to minimize the importance of the Act to members of other racial minority groups, or to suggest that
the issues for all such groups are identical.
6. For an excellent history of voting discrimination, see generally Derfner, supra note 4.
7. J. Morgan Kousser, The Undermining of the First Reconstruction, in MINORITY VOTE DILtrrION
(Chandler Davidson ed., 1984).
8. See generally id. (describing literacy and property tests, poll taxes, and the white primary). Under
the white primary system, only whites were permitted to vote in the Democratic primary. Id. at 33 & n.24.
Because victory in the primary was tantamount to election, the fact that blacks could vote in the general
election was a hollow right. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461,484 (1953) (Clark, J., concurring) (Democratic
primary was "locus of effective political choice").
9. See infra notes 197-202 and accompanying text.
10. Chandler Davidson & George Korbel, At-Large Elections and Minority Group Representation, in
MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 7, at 70-71 (describing changes in methods of election in southern
cities in the 1940's and 1950's). It is no accident that a number of jurisdictions changed their election
systems shortly after the white primary was abolished. Although these moves were cloaked in the garb of
"good government," they often were thinly-veiled efforts to forestall the election of black candidates. Id.
at 67-71. Ironically, the disfranchisement of black voters around the turn of the century through literacy
tests, poll taxes, and other devices, was also heralded as a political "reform." See WOODWARD, supra note
3, at 83.
II. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). In Gomillion, the city of Tuskegee, Alabama
redrew its boundaries to exclude nearly every black resident from the city limits. The Court characterized
this ploy as voting discrimination "cloaked in the garb of realignment of political subdivisions," id. at 345,
accomplished "by fencing Negro citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal
vote," id. at 341.
12. See, e.g., Hardy v. Wallace, 603 F. Supp. 174 (N.D. Ala. 1985) (Alabama statute depriving black-
controlled legislative delegation of certain powers and duties held subject to preclearance by Justice
Department under Voting Rights Act).
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More than twenty-five years after the passage of the Voting Rights Act
("the Act"), and despite the fact that the political landscape has changed in
13important ways, significant barriers to full political participation for blacks
still remain. These impediments have endured in the face of aggressive legisla-
tive and judicial action. The United States Congress has amended section 2 of
the Act 14 to emphasize that election systems that "result" in discrimination
against racial minorities violate the Act, regardless of whether such devices
were intended to discriminate. The amendment of section 2 has spawned
successful challenges to discriminatory election practices in jurisdictions in
every part of the United States, 5 resulting in increased electoral success for
minority-supported candidates. Recently, the Supreme Court has held that
elections for candidates subject to popular election, including judges, must
comply with the Act. 6
Politics may no longer be a "whites only" club,17 but racial politicking
still persists. As the more blatant barriers to full participation in the political
process are removed, the challenge is to ensure that blacks are afforded the
opportunity not only to vote, but also to govern. This goal has become more
elusive because the Supreme Court, in Presley v. Etowah County Commis-
sion,'8 promulgated a bright-line distinction between "voting" and "gover-
nance" for determining the scope of section 5 of the Act.19 Because Presley
13. Laughlin McDonald, The Quiet Revolution in Minority Voting Rights, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1249,
1250-52 (1989). One commentator has described this period as involving "wide-ranging federal regulation
of the state political process." Daniel R. Ortiz, Federalism, Reapportionment, and Incumbency: Leading
the Legislature to Police Itself, 4 J.L. & POL. 653, 654 (1988).
14. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2, 96 Stat. 131, 131-32 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988)). For the text of amended section 2, see infra note 27.
15. See Katherine I. Butler & Richard Murray, Minority Vote Dilution Suits and the Problem of Two
Minority Groups: Can a "Rainbow Coalition" Claim the Protection of the Voting Rights Act, 21 PAc. L.J.
619, 621 (1990) (plaintiffs victorious in "overwhelming majority" of cases decided under section 2). Prior
to the amendment of section 2, most voting rights litigation was concentrated in the South; today, these
lawsuits span the country. See, e.g., Buckanaga v. Sisseton Indep. Sch. Dist., 804 F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1986)
(lawsuit challenging at-large elections for South Dakota school district); Ketehum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398
(7th Cir. 1984) (challenge to racial gerrymander of Chicago city council wards), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1135
(1985); Windy Boy v. County of Big Horn, 647 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Mont. 1986) (dilution challenge to at-
large elections); Campaign for a Progressive Bronx v. Black, 631 F. Supp. 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (lawsuit
by Hispanic voters challenging registration procedures).
16. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen. of Tex., 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991) (rejecting exception
for "single-member offices" under section 2); Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354 (1991) (judicial elections
cognizable under section 2); Clark v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2096 (1991) (judicial elections cognizable under
section 5).
17. Prior to the reapportionment revolution, the typical southern legislature was "chiefly a body of
Democratic, small-town or rural white men, a majority of whom represent a minority of the white population
of the state." ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND
PoLTmcs 574 (1968) (quoting H.C. Nixon, The Southern Legislature and Legislation, 10 J. POL. 410, 412
(1948)).
18. 112 S. Ct. 820, 832 (1992).
19. 1 share the widespread outrage that greeted the Presley opinion. In newspaper interviews, Professor
Pamela Karlan's position was that "the ruling gives white elected officials a 'green light' to find a way to
avoid sharing power with minority voters." Ruth Marcus, CourtRelaxes VotingActRestraints, WASH. POST,
Jan. 28, 1992, at A6. Professor Lani Guinier stated that the opinion reflects "a very formal and shallow view
of the right to vote." Linda Greenhouse, In Retreat, Supreme Court Limits Scope of '65 Voting Rights Act,
[Vol. 102: 105
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has made it more difficult to challenge the allocation of power among different
levels of government or betveen various government officials, safeguarding the
right to vote at other stages of the political process has become even more
important.
In this Article, I examine a group of powerful actors in the political
process-local legislative delegations in state legislatures2W that have largely
escaped scrutiny under the Voting Rights Act. 21 Local legislative delega-
tions-sometimes referred to as legislative delegations, local delegations, or
county delegations-are deliberative bodies composed of those state legislators
elected from the legislative districts in the county.22 I focus on delegations in
Southern legislatures because the substantial decisionmaking powers conferred
on Southern delegations make them especially influential.' Because of their
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1992, at Al. See also Nat Hentoff, Clarence Thomas Joins the Wrecking Crew, WASH.
POST, Feb. 15, 1992, at A27 (editorial describing case as "subversion of the Voting Rights Ace'). The Court
ignored earlier cases that conceived of the right to vote as part of an extended political process, see Terry
v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461,469 (1953); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), as well as administrative
and judicial precedent under section 5, see infra notes 249-57 and accompanying text. As the dissent in
Presley noted at the outset, "this is a case in which a few pages of history are far more illuminating than
volumes of logic and hours of speculation about hypothetical line-drawing problems." 112 S. Ct. at 832-33
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
20. This Article explores an aspect of the political process that has received little scholarly attention.
Although delegations undertake many legislative responsibilities, see infra notes 34-36, 97-124 and
accompanying text, legislative delegations have received only passing reference in standard texts on state
and local government. See, e.g., I CHESTER J. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW (1991). With one
exception, JAMES L. UNDERWOOD, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA, VOL. II: THE JOURNEY
TOWARD LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (1989) (surveying South Carolina), the few published pieces in this
area merely describe particular delegations, see Manning J. Dauer, Multi-Member Districts in Dade County:
A Study of a Problem and a Delegation, 28 J. POL 617 (1966); David R. Derge, Metropolitan and Outstate
Alignments in Illinois and Missouri Legislative Delegations, 52 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1051 (1958). Perhaps
this scholarly neglect derives from the fascination, or even the fixation, that many political scientists have
with the United States Congress, see Lyn Ragsdale, Legislative Elections and Electoral Responsiveness,
in HANDBOOK OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH 57 (Gerhard Loewenberg et al. eds., 1985) [hereinafter HAND-
BOOK], which leads these scholars to neglect the fertile field of local politics. In writing about delegations,
I relied on both daily newspapers in Southern towns and interviews with local legislators and voters-two
rich sources of information on local politics.
21. A recent lawsuit, Blanton v. Campbell, No. 2-91-3635-1 (D.S.C. amended complaint filed Dec.
12, 1991), challenges the delegation system in South Carolina for reasons similar to some of those in this
article. The federal district court has not yet ruled on the merits of the case. For a further discussion of
Blanton, see infra notes 361-62, 461-464 and accompanying text.
22. Robert L Morlan, Local Governments: An Embarrassment ofRiches, in THE 50 STATES AND THEIR
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 505,515 (James W. Fesler ed., 1967) [hereinafter 50 STATES]; see also GA. H. REP.
R. 11. Counties are not the only political subdivisions represented by delegations. Some cities also have
a legislative delegation that is a subset of the larger county delegation, including as members those
legislators whose districts overlap with city boundaries. Cf. GA. H. REP. R. I1 (legislator eligible to vote
if district "wholly or partially located within a political subdivision"). For an analysis recognizing city
delegations as entities distinct from county delegations, see Jon C. Teaford, Special Legislation and the
Cities, 1865-1900, 23 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 189, 207 (1979). See also infra notes 153-54 and accompanying
text (comparing composition of delegations from Richmond County, Georgia and City of Augusta). For the
sake of simplicity, and because both groups perform the same function, I refer to both types of delegations
as legislative delegations.
23. See infra Part I(C)(1). In the nineteenth century, legislative delegations exercised broad authority
in a number of states. Teaford, supra note 22. Although in some states the powers of delegations have
diminished with the advent of home rule, UNDERWOOD, supra, note 20, at 199-200, 241, legislative delega-
tions remain active in a number of southern states, including Alabama, see JAMES D. THOMAS & WILLIAM
H. STEWART, ALABAMA GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 147-150 (1988); Florida, see Committee on Communi-
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extensive authority, delegations can have, and indeed have had, an especially
adverse impact on minority voters. I conclude that a state's method of electing
delegations should be cognizable under the Act.'
I use delegations as a lens for examining questions of voting power and
the multiple ways in which politicians can manipulate and curtail it.25 These
forms of manipulation are particularly significant in light of the current legisla-
tive reapportionments resulting from the 1990 census. The evidence establishes
that legislatures have used reapportionment to discriminate against black voters
by diminishing their influence in selecting the members of legislative delega-
tions and by restricting the number of their chosen legislators who serve on
those bodies. 26 This pervasive discrimination effectively undermines many of
the apparent gains black voters have made in electing black representatives to
local governing bodies.
At the outset, I should note that my analysis of legislative delegations does
not rely upon distinctions between sections 227 and 5,' the two provisions
ty Affairs, Florida House of Representatives, Local Bill Policies and Procedures Manual (Dec. 2, 1991) (on
file with author); Georgia, see EDWIN L. JACKSON & MARY E. STAKES, HANDBOOK FOR GEORGIA LEGISLA-
TORS 86-90 (10th ed. 1988); Mississippi, see United States v. Mississippi, 444 U.S. 1050, 1057 n.6 (1980)
(mem.) (Marshall, J., dissenting), affg 490 F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C. 1979); North Carolina, see MICHAEL
CROWELL, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA: A HANDBOOK FOR LEGISLATORS 38-41 (5th
ed. 1985); and South Carolina, see UNDERWOOD, supra note 20, at 199-200, 245. As a result, I focus on
the way delegations operate in several Southern states-with a particular emphasis on Alabama, Georgia
and South Carolina-to provide an overview of this phenomenon. In any event, a nationwide analysis of
delegations would pose insurmountable difficulties because of the paucity of readily available information.
See supra note 20.
24. In voting rights terminology, "method of election" means the particular electoral mechanism by
which a jurisdiction elects its officials-whether on an at-large basis, from districts, or by another variation.
The method of election is simply one means of identifying the electorate that votes for a given office, see
Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820,828 (1992), and the term is also used to describe voting
rules such as numbered place, majority vote, anti-single shot voting, and staggered term requirements. Here,
I use the term to suggest that the means used to select delegations is a method of election in much the same
way as are procedures used to elect formally constituted governing bodies. I also use the terms "structure"
and "composition" when referring to methods of delegation selection.
25. My approach differs from a traditional doctrinal perspective that seeks to understand law exclusively
through judicial opinions. As Professor Fischer notes with respect to the study of history, a synthesis of
styles conveys the most powerful account of events. DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, ALBION'S SEED vli-xi (1989)
(comparative study of the use of narrative and political history). As a former voting rights attorney, I found
that approaching theory "from the ground up" helped reveal both the richness and the failings of legal
doctrine, as well as the way it works at its most basic level. As a clinical teacher, I encourage my students
to take the same approach when representing clients. As scholarship, this approach follows in the footsteps
of feminists and others who believe that law is best understood in context. See, e.g., Katherine T. Bartlett,
Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 849-863 (1990) (explaining feminist practical reasoning);
Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 195-97
(1989-90) (describing relationship between feminist theory and feminist method).
26. See infra Part II(A)(3).
27. Section 2, Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988). Section 2 provides:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall
be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial
or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or
color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title [section
4(f)(2) of the original Act], as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the
Legislative Delegations
of the Act that are the major tools for voting rights enforcement. Although there
are important differences between these statutory sections,29 a discussion of
vote dilution's effect on local delegations does not implicate these distinguish-
ing characteristics. 30 Nor does the analysis depend on the much-discussed
differences between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect. Sections
2 and 5 reach both types of discrimination, and delegations, like any other
entity that implicates voting power, should be free from both forms of bias.
In Part I of this Article, I discuss the importance of legislative delegations
in shaping the policies that govern the day-to-day lives of these legislators'
constituents. While delegations perform a number of roles, their most critical
function is their power to propose and pass local legislation. Delegations are
the actual decisionmakers because legislatures rarely override delegation
State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of
citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than
other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives
of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office
in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided,
That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in
numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
28. Section 5, Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988). Section 5 provides in pertinent
part:
Whenever a State or political subdivision... [covered under section 4] ... shall enact
or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on ... [the applicable date
of coverage] ... such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite,
standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the
guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2)... [protecting certain language minorities], and
unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote for
failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice or procedure: Provided,
That such qualification... may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification...
has been submitted... to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed
an objection within sixty days after such submission ....
29. The list of distinctions between the two provisions is long. For example, section 2 applies
nationwide, while section 5 applies only to selected jurisdictions. Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive
Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413, 1494 (1991). In contrast to section 2, under which
litigants may challenge longstanding election arrangements, a jurisdiction covered by section 5 must change
its voting practices to trigger the statute. See infra notes 437-41 and accompanying text. The burden of proof
lies with the submitting jurisdiction proposing electoral changes under section 5, see City of Rome v. United
States, 446 U.S. 156, 172 (1980), while plaintiffs in section 2 cases must show discrimination. Under the
two sections, the measure of discriminatory effect differs, compare Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130
(1976) (section 5) with Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (section 2), although it has been argued
that section 5 review requires jurisdictions to meet the mandates of both sections. Mark E. Haddad, Note,
Getting Results Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 94 YALE LJ. 139 (1984).
30. The critical issue is whether delegations are functionally elected entities whose electoral practices
merit the protective scrutiny of the Act. Regarding this question, section 2 and section 5 should be read
in tandem. The Supreme Court relied on the "close connection" between the scope of the two sections in
holding that judicial elections are covered under section 2, and noted that"[s]ection 5 uses language similar
to that of § 2 in defining prohibited practices .... Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2367 (1991). See
also Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056, 1064 (5th Cir.) ("[S]ection 5 and section 2, virtually companion
sections, operate in tandem to prohibit discriminatory practices in voting, whether those practices originate
in the past, present, or future."), cert. denied sub nom. Roemer v. Chisom, 488 U.S. 955 (1988).
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decisions.3 1 In order to demonstrate the ill effect of racial politics on legisla-
tive delegations, I first analyze three Voting Rights Act cases involving delega-
tions.32 The first two consider the actions of present-day delegations, while
the third discusses the functioning of a legislative delegation in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. After tracing the historical origin of delega-
tions and describing their current, wide-ranging power over local government,
I explain the procedures local legislative delegations commonly follow and the
"hands off' approach state legislatures have taken with respect to their opera-
tion. Then, I place these concepts in context through a case study of the delega-
tion from Richmond County, Georgia.
In Part II, I analyze the development of voting rights jurisprudence as
background for assessing the application of the Voting Rights Act to delega-
tions. I examine three stages of the election process that have been challenged
in voting rights litigation: (1) challenges at the pre-election and election-day
stage to formal barriers to participation in the political process; (2) challenges
at the vote dilution phase to electoral structures in which minority voters are
unable to elect candidates to formal governing bodies; and (3) challenges at the
post-election stage to governmental structures that impair the post-election
influence of minority voters.
In Part IH, I describe the discriminatory effect that methods of electing
legislative delegations can have on black voters, given the vast power that the
state legislature affords delegations. Based on the discussions of delegation
powers in Part I and voting rights theory in Part II, I characterize delegations
as elected governing bodies, or, alternatively, as integral players akin to legisla-
tive committees in the decisionmaking process of state legislatures. Because
voting rights jurisprudence emphasizes formalism over functionalism, delega-
tions do not seem to fit easily within existing formulations of voting rights. I
conclude, however, that delegations are tantamount to superlegislatures for their
local jurisdictions; that they fit squarely in the vote dilution stage; and that they
should thus be considered cognizable under the Voting Rights Act.
To discuss the structure of legislative delegations, we must analyze the
role of legislative reapportionments in the selection of delegation members, as
well as the way the reapportionment revolution has affected the membership
of delegations.33 Legislative reapportionments not only alter the composition
31. This relationship is particularly relevant to the question of whether delegations are elected entities
whose structure can be examined under the Act.
32. McMilan v. Escambia County, 638 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. Feb. 1981), cert. dismissed sub nom.
Jenkins v. City of Pensacola, 453 U.S. 946 (1981) (dismissing city council petition only), vacated in part,
688 F.2d 960 (Former 5th Cir. 1982) (county commission), vacated and remanded, 466 U.S. 48 (1984);
Brown v. Board of Comm'rs, 722 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. Tenn. 1989); Hardy v. Wallace, 603 F. Supp. 174
(N.D. Ala. 1985).
33. I borrow this term from GORDON E. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION (1966). The
term is used to describe the wide-ranging consequences stemming from the Supreme Court's mandate of
one-person, one-vote through the process of revising legislative district lines. Reapportionment is by now
a familiar part of the political landscape. Since Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), states are constitu-
[V ol. 102: 105
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of the state legislature, but also modify the membership of each local delega-
tion. Thus, delegation reapportionments may dilute the voting strength of
minority voters, thereby implicating the Voting Rights Act. Empirical evidence
from the recent round of legislative reapportionments suggests pervasive
discrimination against black voters in the composition of delegations. Because
existing doctrine does not adequately measure dilution in the delegation context,
I propose a standard for measuring delegation dilution. I conclude Part II by
discussing possible remedies for delegation dilution and the practical impact
of taking delegations seriously under the Voting Rights Act.
In Part IV, I use delegations as a lens through which to examine more
general questions of voting power. Like other elected bodies, delegations are
assigned powers and duties, and they follow a set of rules and procedures.
Through decisions to vest particular powers in delegations rather than local
governments, or to divest delegations of jurisdiction, these bodies present
numerous opportunities to manipulate legislative decisionmaking. A close look
at both the rules governing delegation decisionmaking and the power-sharing
relationship between delegations and state legislatures reveals that voting power
can be frustrated as easily in the post-election stage as in the election stage of
the political process. The doctrinal boxes that the Supreme Court has envisioned
simply do not address the realities of practical politics, and are thus useless as
vehicles for combatting voting discrimination. I conclude by suggesting that
Congress should amend the Voting Rights Act so that the process of legislative
decisionmaking can be examined, and reformed where necessary, by the courts.
I. LEGISLATIVE DELEGATIONS: A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
Legislative delegations are deliberative bodies in state legislatures that
introduce, consider, and either approve or disapprove local legislation for their
respective counties.34 Local legislation is any legislative measure that applies
only to a specific political subdivision within a state.35 In some states, local
tionally required to ensure that their legislative districts contain nearly equal numbers of people. Census
counts measuring population shifts ensure that legislative reapportionments will occur at regular intervals.
Thus, as a practical matter, states reapportion their legislative bodies every ten years after the decennial
census, even though the Constitution does not require reapportionment after any particular period.
34. The procedures for considering local legislation differ from those for general legislation. See, e.g.,
JACKSON & STAKES, supra note 23, at 85-86; see also infra notes 135-42 and accompanying text. Further-
more, although delegations are primarily legislative entities, they also exercise nonlegislative powers.
35. Karl A. Bosworth, Policy Making, in 50 STATES, supra note 22, at 297, 307-08; see also DUANE
LOCKARD, THE POLITICS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 117 (2d ed. 1969) (describing history of local
legislation). Local legislation is also referred to by a number of other terms, including "local acts," JACKSON
& STAKES, supra note 23, at 86; "local laws," THOMAS & STEWART, supra note 23, at 148; or "local bills,"
CROWELL, supra note 23, at 38. In some states, local legislation may affect more than one political
subdivision, but must have less than statewide application. See, e.g., N.C. SEN. R. 39.1; N.C. H. REP. R.
35(b) (defining local legislation as legislation affecting fewer than fifteen counties). Local legislation should
be distinguished from special legislation, which applies to private individuals or entities, not to political
subdivisions. JACKSON & STAKES, supra note 23, at 85; see also Bosworth, supra, at 308 (describing
benefits and disadvantages of special legislation). Researching local legislation poses unique difficulties
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legislation comprises a significant portion of the laws adopted by the state.36
The structure of these delegations is thus critical to the success or failure of
local initiatives.
A county's local legislative delegation is composed of those legislators
whose districts include any portion of the county.37 Hence, membership on
legislative delegations is determined by two factors: county boundaries and
legislative district lines.38 Because county boundaries are virtually fixed,39
district lines, which change at regular intervals, are the critical factor in deter-
mining which legislators sit on a given delegation.4° If the county is entirely
included within a single legislative district, then the delegation will consist of
only one legislator. If the county is split between two legislative districts, on
the other hand, two legislators will sit on the delegation. In short, each delega-
tion consists of as many members as there are legislative districts in the
political subdivision;41 as a result, some delegations are quite large.42
because, in many instances, facts can be unearthed only by reviewing session laws. In a few states, the
legislature indexes local legislation by county and subject matter. See, e.g., STATE OF ALABAMA LOCAL
LAWS INDEX (1986 & annual updates); GA. CODE ANN. (Michie 1982 & Supp. 1991) (local legislation
index); S.C. CODE ANN. (Law. Co-op. 1976) (index to local laws).
36. JACKSON & STAKES, supra note 23, at 87 (reporting that more than half of all bills passed by
Georgia legislature between 1970 and 1988 were local laws); CROWELL, supra note 23, at 38 (reporting
that fifteen percent of bills currently introduced in North Carolina legislature are local laws). According
to an earlier study of committee activity in the Alabama legislature between 1959 and 1965, the committees
in the house of representatives responsible for local legislation considered more legislation and reported
out a higher percentage of bills than any other committee; the same was true in the senate from 1961
through 1965. LEGISLATIVE REFORM STUDY COMMITrEE, IMPROVING THE ALABAMA LEGISLATURE 14-16
(1970).
37. See GA. SEN. R. 187; CROWELL, supra note 23, at 39; see also Duncan v. County of York, 228
S.E.2d 92 (S.C. 1976) (discussing composition of legislative delegations before and after the 1967 reappor-
tionment required by Supreme Court eliminated South Carolina's one-county, one-senator system); infra
notes 153-54 and accompanying text (discussing composition of Richmond County, Georgia delegation).
Although each county has its own delegation, some legislators serve on more than one. Where a legislative
district comprises more than a single county, the district's representative will serve on the delegations of
as many counties as are included within the confines of the district. In 199 1, for example, Georgia Senator
Culver Kidd served on seven delegations. List of Local Legislative Delegations in Georgia (on file with
author).
38. Similarly, the two determinants of city delegations are municipal boundaries and legislative district
lines. See supra note 22.
39. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 73 n.309 (1990) ("[T]he location of county lines has remained virtually unchanged for decades.").
Although a county can change its boundaries by merging or consolidating with an adjoining county, this
is rare. See infra note 271 for an example of such an occurrence. A merger of a county with a city is a more
common form of consolidation, but such mergers change only city boundaries while leaving county
boundaries unchanged. For a general discussion of city-county consolidation, see LEE S. GREENE ET AL.,
THE STATE AND THE METROPOLIS 121-27 (1968). City boundaries are a more dynamic factor than county
boundaries in determining delegation membership because of the greater potential for change in city
boundaries. Cities can change their boundaries through consolidation, incorporation or annexation. Gayle
Binion, Incident Survey and Analysis, 54 U. DET. J. URB. L. 695, 698 (1977).
40. See infra Part III(A)(3) (discussing discriminatory potential of this method of electing delegations).
Because their membership is determined by legislative district lines, the composition of these delegations
may be altered dramatically by the state legislative reapportionments required after the 1990 census.
41. The above analysis assumes a state that elects its members from single-member districts. For
multimember district systems, the number of members elected from each district must be considered in
computing the size of the delegation.
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This relationship between legislative district lines and delegation mem-
bership creates the opportunity for discrimination, while the critical role of
delegations in local governance makes this discrimination profitable. This issue,
racial politics in the exercise of delegation power, is addressed in the next
Section.
A. Racial Politics
As the facts of Hardy v. Wallace43 powerfully demonstrate, legislative
delegations have often been the objects of intense racial maneuvering aimed
at undercutting their authority. At the same time, they have themselves perpe-
trated acts of racial discrimination, as is evident in McMillan v. Escambia
County4 and Brown v. Board of Commissioners.5
Hardy concerned, among other things, greyhound racing in Greene County,
Alabama. Until 1983, the three-member legislative delegation from Greene
County was all white.' One of the delegation's major powers was to appoint
the county racing commissioners, who oversee greyhound racing at the local
track. The racing commission, the county's largest employer, generated a
majority of the county's tax revenue.4 7 Three days after a federal court ap-
proved a reapportionment plan that placed Greene County in two new legisla-
tive districts with black majorities-thereby creating the possibility of an
entirely black delegation-the lame-duck delegation advertised local legislation
transferring the authority to appoint the racing commission to then-Governor
George Wallace.48 The legislature approved this change in procedure several
42. For instance, the delegation for Fulton County, Georgia (which includes Atlanta) has nineteen
members; Beas Cutts, Clash Assured on House Remap, ATLANTA CONST., Aug. 26, 1981, at IA; the
delegation for Jefferson County, Alabama (which includes Birmingham) has eighteen members; Thomas
B. Edsall, Racial Forces Battering Southern Democrats, WAsH. PosT, June 25, 1989, at A6.
43. 603 F. Supp. 174 (N.D. Ala. 1985).
44. 638 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. Feb. 1981), cert. dismissed, 453 U.S. 946 (1981) (dismissing city council
petition only), vacated in part, 688 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1982) (county commission), vacated and remanded,
466 U.S. 48 (1984).
45. 722 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. Tenn. 1989).
46. Political control of local government in Greene County had shifted from whites to blacks twelve
years earlier, see David W. Coombs, et al., Black Political Control in Greene County, Alabama, 42 RURAL
Soc. 398 (Fall 1977), and black leaders had persuaded investors to establish a greyhound racing track shortly
thereafter, id. at 403. This shift of political control was "unprecedented" and "unique because it represents
the first case of a total shift in [local] political decision-making power to blacks." Id. at 398. Despite black
gains at the local level, whites controlled the delegation until 1983 because black voters were divided by
legislative districting lines. Hardy, 603 F. Supp. at 179 (Appendix A) (reprinting Letter from William
Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice,
to Charles A. Graddick (June 18, 1984)). See Burton v. Hobbie, 561 F. Supp. 1029, 1032 n.8, 1033 (M.D.
Ala. 1983).
47. Hardy, 603 F. Supp. at 175-76. In 1984, the county's unemployment rate was 18 percent and the
revenue from the race track amounted to 63 percent of the county's budget. Id. at 176. In 1981, black leaders
charged that the commission's hiring practices were racially discriminatory and protested the hiring of a
commissioner with a poor record of employing blacks. UPI, Jan. 17, 1981, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, UPI File (untitled).
48. Hardy, 603 F. Supp. at 176. See also Burton, 561 F. Supp. 1029 (approving Alabama reapportion-
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months later. After holding elections under the new reapportionment plan, the
legislature rejected the newly elected black legislators' efforts to repeal the
legislation.49
The court in Hardy held that the reallocation of authority to appoint racing
commissioners from the delegation to the governor was cognizable under
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. The court reasoned that transfers of authori-
ty over an "agency of unique importance" to county voters from the delegation
to the governor "substantially dilutes the power of the voters in Greene County
by effectively eliminating [their power] over the Commission."" Local voters
exercised significant control over the commission through the delegation, but
as less than one half of one percent of the state's residents, they could exercise
relatively little influence on the governor. In effect, the maneuver transferred
authority over regional matters from local voters to the electorate of the entire
state.
5'
The plaintiffs in Brown and McMillan, on the other hand, challenged the
electoral structures adopted by their respective delegations. In McMillan, black
voters challenged the method of electing the Escambia County school board. 2
No black candidate had ever won election to the board, the members of which
had been elected on an at-large basis since 1947.5' In 1973, the school board
became embroiled in a controversy over the use of the nickname "Rebel" for
the high school athletic teams. When black students challenged the nickname
ment). See infra note 133 for an explanation of the requirement of advertising local legislation.
49. Hardy, 603 F. Supp. at 176-77. The senate committee refused to report the bill introduced by the
black legislators, an action that the district court described as "virtually without precedent." Id. at 177. The
court noted that under the prevailing practice of "legislative courtesy," the Alabama legislature would "pass
perfunctorily" all local bills to which members of the relevant delegations agreed. Id. at 176. For a more
extensive discussion of the legislative courtesy rule, see infra notes 136-51 and accompanying text.
50. Hardy, 603 F. Supp. at 179. The court did not actually find that the reallocation of authority
discriminated against black voters because the court was not empowered to reach this question, since the
statute vests authority for that decision in the United States Attorney General or in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia. See NAACP v. Hampton County Election Comm'n., 470 U.S. 166, 181
(1985). Under section 5, the Alabama federal district court had jurisdiction solely to determine whether the
change was covered by section 5.
51. Hardy, 603 F. Supp. at 179. The court distinguished the type of change in Hardy from the more
typical case, noting that "[t]he most relevant attribute of the challenged act is its effect on the power of the
voters rather than any aspect of the electoral process." Id. at 178. Although the majority in Presley did not
cite Hardy, the Supreme Court effectively overruled Hardy's conclusion that voting power can be compro-
mised by reallocating governmental authority. Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820, 829-30
(1992).
52. McMillan v. Escambia County, 638 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. Feb. 1981), cert. dismissed sub nom.
Pensacola v. Jenkins, 453 U.S. 946 (1981). Plaintiffs also challenged the method by which the Pensacola
city council and the county commission were elected. Although the district court found all three systems
to be unconstitutional, id. at 1240, the appellate court initially upheld these findings only with respect to
the school board and the city council, id. at 1245, 1248-49. The court of appeals subsequently vacated the
portion of its opinion concerning the county commission, 688 F.2d 960 (Former 5th Cir. 1982), and
ultimately found that the commission's method of election violated the Voting Rights Act. 748 F.2d 1037
(Former 5th Cir. 1984), on remand from 466 U.S. 48 (1984), vacating 688 F.2d 960 (Former 5th Cir. 1982).
53. McMillan, 638 F.2d at 1240-41, 1245.
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by intervening in a pending school desegregation lawsuit, 4 white students and
parents intervened in defense of the nickname. After a protracted court battle,
the board ultimately terminated use of the nickname "Rebel." 55
The local delegation responded by introducing local legislation in the state
legislature designed to "pack" the school board. Among other things, the bill
increased the size of the board from five to seven members and reduced the
members' salaries.56 In affirming the district court's finding that the county's
entire system for electing board members was discriminatory, the court of
appeals quoted the district court's finding that the delegation intended the
board-packing episode to make the board "'more responsive to the white
majority on a particular racially polarized issue [and to render] black voters
politically impotent to the desires of the white majority."'
' 57
Brown v. Board of Commissioners58 involved the efforts of the legislative
delegation for Chattanooga, Tennessee to limit the growing influence of black
voters in city elections during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
During Reconstruction in Tennessee, as in the rest of the South, blacks obtained
and exercised the right to register, vote, and run for public office.59 Blacks
were elected to the city's board of aldermen, and served as justices of the
peace, constables, deputy sheriffs, and as members of the school board and the
police and fire departments. In the early 1880's, Chattanooga whites lobbied
the legislative delegation to replace the city charter with a new document
creating a "taxing district," most of whose officeholders would be appointed
by the governor. As a compromise, the delegation instead imposed a poll tax,
more restrictive voter registration procedures, and changes in the method of
electing city aldermen.60
After these changes in the voting process failed to prevent black candidates
from being elected to the board of aldermen, and when two blacks were elected
to the state legislature during the 1880's, the delegation turned to other discrim-
54. Augustus v. School Board, 361 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Fla. 1973), modified in part, 507 F.2d 152 (5th
Cir. 1975).
55. As described in McMillan, the district court enjoined the school board from using the name, and
the court of appeals directed the district court to allow the school board to devise a solution. The school
board decided to reinstate the term if two-thirds of the students voted in favor of it. When only a simple
majority of students voted for the nickname, the school board resisted community pressure to revive the
nickname. McMillan, 638 F.2d at 1246, n.13.
56. Id. at 1246. The bill had the delegation's unanimous support and passed overwhelmingly in a county
referendum. The court of appeals explained the key role of the legislative delegation: "[C]hanges in local
governments are submitted to the Florida Legislature through the local delegation, generally based on a
resolution by the local government. As a practical matter, local legislation will pass the legislature if it has
the unanimous support of the local delegation." Id. at 1246, n.14.
57. Id. at 1247 (quoting district court order). in many respects, the delegation was simply continuing
a long tradition of discrimination. In 1959, the delegation had switched to at-large elections for the city
council in order to prevent the election of black candidates. Id. at 1247-48.
58. 722 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. Tenn. 1989).
59. Kousser, supra note 7, at 28-30; WOODWARD, supra note 3, at 105-06.
60. Brown, 722 F. Supp. at 385-86. These revisions were accomplished through changes in the city
charter intended to limit the electoral strength of black voters.
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inatory strategies over the next few decades. To reduce black political influence,
the delegation increased the number of aldermanic wards in the city, created
a bicameral city government, and gerrymandered the ward lines twice.61
Finally, in 1911, the county's legislative delegation passed a local bill adopting
a commission form of government with commissioners elected on an at-large
basis. 62 The court in Brown found that the delegation, in adopting the commis-
sion form of government, was motivated in part by a discriminatory purpose63
and had as "an important goal ... the elimination of the last vestiges of black
electoral power. '
Although local delegations have operated as the moving force behind many
discriminatory electoral structures, from at-large methods of election to suspect
reapportionment plans, they have acted free of any real legal constraints. Unlike
those of other governing bodies, the electoral structures of legislative delega-
tions have not been challenged legally,65 and the true breadth of their powers
has been largely ignored. The origins, powers and manner of operation of
delegations are the subjects of the remainder of Part II.
B. Origins of Delegations
Local legislative delegations are the products of two closely related factors:
the limited power of local governments and the historical emphasis on counties
as the basic unit of representation in state legislatures. As state power over local
governments grew, so did the states' corresponding need to find a mechanism
for regulating local affairs.66 Although it is impossible to identify the precise
moment at which legislative delegations came into existence, they had already
become an important vehicle for state authority over localities by the late
nineteenth century.67 Moreover, it is likely that racial factors also played a role
in their creation.68
61. Id. at 386-87. At the time, the local newspaper announced that, as a result of one gerrymander,
"the negroes of Bushtown, Stanleyville and Churchville are about the nearest disfranchised they could
possibly be." Id. at 387.
62. Id. at 387. The local newspaper predicted that the success of the movement for commission
government would cause the political downfall of Hiram Tyree, a prominent black leader ("his light promises
to go out forever.") Id. By making it illegal to pay another voter's poll tax and eliminating "ward workers,"
the charter change further disfranchised black voters. Id.
63. Id. at 389, 397.
64. Id. at 387. No black candidate was elected to the City Commission until 1971, 60 years after the
commission form of government was adopted. Id. at 387-88.
65. The sole exception is apparently the recently-filed litigation in South Carolina, discussed supra
note 21.
66. See Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts,
48 MINN. L. REv. 643, 647 (1964).
67. Discussions of these early legislative delegations can be found in Brown, 722 F. Supp. at 386
(discussing Chattanooga, Tennessee delegation in early 1880's) and Jackson v. Edgefield County Sch. Dist.,
650 F. Supp. 1176, 1180 (D.S.C. 1986) (discussing South Carolina delegations in 1890's).
68. See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
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When states have limited the "home rule" authority of local governing
bodies to enact legislation,69 they usually have developed procedures that leave
the responsibility for introducing, considering, and passing local legislation to
legislative delegations. The role of delegations is thus influenced in large part
by the limits of home rule.70
Because local governments7' derive their limited, delegated powers entire-
ly from the states, they exercise authority as agents of the states,72 which grant
home rule to local jurisdictions through state constitutions and implementing
legislation. Localities, in turn, amend their charters to reflect the expansion of
state-granted powers. The local governments may then enact laws and ordinanc-
es and provide for administrative and executive functions free from state
interference.73 The degree of home rule that states afford to localities thus
circumscribes state involvement in local affairs.74 Although all states provide
for some measure of home rule, the degree of control retained by state govern-
69. The term "home rule" delineates the division of power between state and local governments and
the discretion exercised by local government without interference from the state. See, e.g., Briffault, supra
note 39, at 6-Il; Robert L. Morlan, Local Governments-The Cities, in 50 STATES, supra note 22, at 467;
LOCKARD, supra note 35, at 120, 122.
70. See JACKSON & STAKES, supra note 23, at 86; LOCKARD, supra note 35, at 117; THOMAS &
STEWART, supra note 23, at 150; Bosworth, supra note 35, at 307-08; Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part
l-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 358 (1990) (describing home rule as constraint
on legislative involvement in local affairs).
71. The term "local government" includes towns, cities, counties and special district governments.
Morlan, supra note 22, at 517-31. Although most of the literature on home rule discusses municipalities,
see LOCKARD, supra note 35, at 116-24, the discussion in this Section does not distinguish between home
rule for municipalities and other political subdivisions. In the South, counties are the basic unit of local
government. Id. at 102. Historically, states have played an active role in the formation and expansion of
local governments. Briffault, supra note 70, at 357-58. Two extreme examples of the reverse phenomenon
are provided by the Alabama and Tennessee legislatures, which abolished the cities of Mobile and Memphis
in the 19th century. Allan R. Richards, The Heritage of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, in 50
STATES, supra note 22, at 67.
72. For an excellent general discussion of this principle, see Briffault, supra note 70; see also LOCKARD,
supra note 35, at 116-24; Harvey C. Mansfield, Intergovernmental Relations, in 50 STATES, supra note 22,
at 178. In fact, the Supreme Court relied on the exercise of these delegated powers by local governing bodies
as the basis for extending the one-person, one-vote principle to local legislative elections. See Avery v.
Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 478-79 (1968).
73. C. DALLAS SANDS Er AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 4.07 (1991 & Supp.).
74. States, of course, retain the power to change the terms of self-government granted to localities.
Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907). Georgia is a case in point. In 1945, Georgia adopted a new
constitution providing for mandatory home rule. The legislature passed, repealed, and later re-adopted
enabling legislation for the home rule provisions. The state supreme court found the enabling legislation
adopted by the legislature unconstitutional. A new constitutional provision providing for home rule was
adopted in 1954, but legislation implementing this provision was not adopted until 1966. LOCKARD, supra
note 35, at 121; J. DEVEREAUX WEEKS, INVENTORY OF GENERAL HOME RULE & REVENUE POWERS OF
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS IN GEORGIA 1 (1984). The Constitution was again revised in 1972 to give cities
and counties additional powers. Id.
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ments varies substantially 5 When states have limited the authority of local
government to act, it typically has been in the legislative arena.76
Legislative delegations also derive from the historical emphasis on counties
as the basic unit of representation in state legislatures. 77 Before the one-person,
one-vote principle78 became the basis for apportioning state legislatures in the
early 1960's, legislators in most states were elected from legislative districts
consisting of a single county, or a larger district that included two or more
counties in their entirety.79 Regardless of the apportionment structure used,
districts generally did not cross county lines.80 Under this arrangement, each
county was effectively guaranteed representation in the state legislature on
matters of statewide concern. 8'
Counties also provided a ready mechanism for states to exercise the powers
states retained over local matters.82 Because legislative district lines generally
75. See generally ANTIEAU, supra note 20, at ch. 3. For example, states diverge concerning the
authority accorded cities over their charters. In some states, cities may adopt their own charters; in others,
state law either assigns charters to cities depending upon the class of the city or provides the locality with
a choice between several alternative charters. LOCKARD, supra note 35, at 116-17, 121.
76. See Ellen J. Alexander, Home Rule Expansion But at What Cost?, 13 URB. LAW. 765 (1981)
(reviewing state court challenges to legislative acts of local governments); George D. Vaubel, Toward
Principles of State Restraint Upon the Exercise of Municipal Power in Home Rule, 20 STETSON L. REV.
845, 853-59 (1991) (describing division of legislative power between state and local governments).
77. Donald 0. Bushman & William R. Stanley, State Senate Reapportionment in the Southeast, 61
ANNALS Ass'N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 654,655-56 (1971); Paul T. David, Issues and Problems in Redistricting
State Legislatures, in EVOLVING ISSUES AND PATTERNS OF STATE LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING IN LARGE
METROPOLITAN AREAS 105 (Morris W.H. Collins, Jr. et al. eds., 1966).
78. See infra notes 282-95 and accompanying text for the impact of equal population principles on
the structure of delegations.
79. Robert Dixon's classic work provides an account of legislative reapportionment in the period before
equal apportionment was the rule. DIXON, supra note 17. In the 19th century, states allocated seats to
political subdivisions, while giving some recognition to the principle that more populous counties deserved
a greater number of seats in the legislature. Id. at 82. In the 20th century, states moved towards a "federal"
principle of apportionment that emphasized county equality in one house of the legislature and population
apportionment in the other house. Id. at 82, 86 (showing in chart 4 apportionment formula for state
legislatures as of July 1, 196 1); NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, APPORTIONMENT IN THE NINETEEN SIXTIES
(1970) (summarizing status of state and congressional legislative apportionments following one-person, one-
vote); THE INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT, REAPPORTIONMENT IN GEORGIA (1970) (describing Georgia's
reapportionment scheme); Preston W. Edsall, North Carolina: People or Pine Trees, in THE POLITICS OF
REAPPORTIONMENT 98 (Malcolm E. Jewelled., 1962) (describing North Carolina's apportionment scheme).
80. See Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 686 (1964) (noting "tradition of respecting the integrity of the
boundaries of cities and counties in drawing district lines"). In many instances, state constitutions contained
prohibitions against creating legislative districts that crossed county lines. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. IX,
§ 200; IND. CONST. art. 4, § 6 (repealed 1984). Rarely were counties divided into more than one district.
In Southern states, it was common for counties entitled to elect more than one senator or representative to
elect these legislators on a countywide basis, MALCOLM E. JEWELL, LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATION IN THE
CONTEMPORARY SOUTH 39-40 (1967) [hereinafter JEWELL, CONTEMPORARY SOUTH] (giving as examples
Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina and Tennessee), rather than from single-
member districts. See also Davis, 377 U.S. at 686; Malcolm E. Jewell, How Many Members?, 57 NAT'L.
CIVIC REV. 75 (1968).
81. Malcolm E. Jewell, PoliticalPatterns in Reapportionment, in THE PoLxTCS OF REAPPORTIONMENT,
supra note 79, at 8; Bill Kovach, Some Lessons of Reapportionment, 37 REPORTER, Sept. 21, 1967, at 26,
31-32.
82. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 580, 581 (1964) (observing that preservation of political subdivision
boundaries makes enactment of local legislation easier).
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conformed to county boundaries, 3 a close "fit" between membership on a
delegation and connection to county affairs was almost automatic.
84
County-based representation was an especially common phenomenon in the
South.8 5 In many Southern states, delegations operated as a kind of superlegis-
lature for their respective counties, their powers enhanced by their operating
procedures. Rather than having the state legislature as a whole consider issues
that interested very few people outside of the affected county, the states delegat-
ed this responsibility to the county legislative delegations.8 6 State legislators
elected from a county sat as members of its delegation and reviewed local
legislation affecting the region. A delegation typically approved legislation if
its members unanimously supported it. 7 The customary practice of state
legislatures was to enact legislation passed by the delegations and to decline
to adopt local bills that lacked delegation approval. This practice became known
as "local (or legislative) courtesy."8
South Carolina best illustrates the operation of local legislative delegations
in a setting where local jurisdictions had little home rule authority and counties
were the basic unit of representation in the state legislature. Although legislative
delegations in many Southern states historically have exercised broad powers,
the dominance of South Carolina delegations over local government was
83. This system stands in sharp contrast to contemporary legislative delegations, in which district lines
often resemble a jigsaw puzzle. See infra Part lI(A)(2).
84. In multi-county districts, most common in state senates, the delegation member often resided outside
of the affected county, but nonetheless decided matters of purely local concern. In the South, this awkward
arrangement was tempered by the use of rotation agreements, in which each county in a multicounty district
took a turn at electing the senator from the district. DIXON, supra note 17, at 514; JEWELL, CONTEMPORARY
SOUTH, supra note 80, at 23-24 (noting that Alabama, Kentucky, Tennessee and North Carolina employed
rotation agreements). Voters could only cast ballots in the primary when it was their turn to select officials.
CULLEN B. GOSNELL & C. DAVID ANDERSON, THE GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF GEORGIA 51
(1956). Because winning the primary was tantamount to election at that time, these gentlemen's agreements
in effect guaranteed each county a resident senator at regular intervals. Rotation agreements are no longer
used and would likely violate one-person, one-vote standards. Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248, 257
(N.D. Ga. 1962) (holding rotation agreements unconstitutional); DIXON, supra note 17, at 514. The
implications of multicounty districts for the analysis of present day delegations is discussed infra notes 300-
02, 434 and accompanying text.
85. Bushman & Stanley, supra note 77, at 655-56. Georgia demonstrated an especially high regard
for county representation through its peculiar county unit system. DIXON, supra note 17, at 173-74
(describing Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963)); THE INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 79, at 7;
William G. Cornelius, The County Unit System of Georgia: Facts and Prospects, 14 W. POL. Q. 942 (1961);
Jewell, supra note 81, at 21.
86. GOSNELL & ANDERSON, supra note 84, at 31; LOCKARD, supra note 35, at 118; Teaford, supra
note 22, at 190, 192, 196-99.
87. Carrollton Branch of NAACP v. Stallings, 829 F.2d 1547 (1 Ith Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom.
Duncan v. City of Carrollton, 485 U.S. 936 (1988). The so-called "unanimity" rule is now the exception
rather than the rule. See infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text for the implications of this change.
88. See Morlan, supra note 22, at 515; Sandalow, supra note 66, at 656. For an interesting account
of the operation of the local courtesy rule in Alabama, see HALLJE FARMER, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
IN ALABAMA 248 (1949) ("[Clourtesy and usage of the House or Senate leave [legislators] no alternative
but to support any measure which has the endorsement and sanction of the local member.") (quoting former
state legislator Emmet O'Neal). This practice remains substantially unaltered today. See infra notes 135-47
and accompanying text.
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unique.89 Before the implementation of home rule in 1975,90 South Carolina's
local legislative delegations performed most governmental functions for counties
and municipalities.9' The delegations enacted "local supply bills" which levied
taxes on county residents and set each county's budget. The county treasurer
disbursed funds only after receiving a letter from the delegation signed by the
county's state senator and a majority of the county's state representatives.92
Each delegation also appointed the members of its county's local governing
body, whose duties were primarily administrative and ministerial.93
In addition to concerns about home rule and county representation, racial
factors also may have played a role in creating and developing local legislative
delegations. In South Carolina, for example, evidence suggests that Governor
Tillman, an avowed white supremacist, replaced local government structures
with delegations to limit growing black political strength. 94 Certainly, many
political developments in the South can be traced to a desire to ensure blacks'
political impotence.95 But because delegations have received little attention
from scholars, the historical record is incomplete.
Delegations, by empowering the state in local matters while still allowing
for local administration, could also serve as tools for discrimination. By delegat-
ing to local state legislators virtually plenary authority over administrative
decisions and bills of local import, the state kept control over those issues out
89. COLUMBUS ANDREWS, ADMINISTRATIVE COUNTY GOVERNMT IN SoUTH CAROLINA 34-46(1933);
WALTER BASS & JACK DEVRIES, THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SOCIAL CHANGE AND
POLITICAL CONSEQUENCE SINCE 1945, at 276-81 (1976); V.0. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND
NATION 151-52 (new ed. 1984); Peyton McCrary & J. Gerald Hebert, Keeping the Courts Honest: The Role
of Historians as Expert Witnesses in Southern Voting Rights Cases, 16 S.U. L. REV. 101, 113 (1989). The
role of legislative delegations in South Carolina during this period is discussed in a number of cases filed
under the Voting Rights Act. See, e.g., McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236 (1984); Jackson v. Edgefield
County, 650 F. Supp. 1176 (D.S.C. 1986); County Council of Sumter County v. United States, 555 F. Supp.
694 (D.D.C. 1983) (dismissing summary judgment motion), 596 F. Supp. 35 (D.D.C. 1984) (opinion after
trial on merits); Blanding v. Dubose, 509 F. Supp. 1334 (D.S.C. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 454 U.S.
393 (1982) (per curiam); Woods v. Hamilton, 473 F. Supp. 641 (D.S.C. 1979); Horry County v. United
States, 449 F. Supp. 990 (D.D.C. 1978).
90. The Home Rule Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-9-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976), gave counties increased
authority over local affairs and permitted county voters to hold a referendum to select one of five alternative
forms of local government. See County Council of Sumter, 596 F. Supp. at 37.
91. Blanding, 454 U.S. at 395; Woods, 473 F. Supp. at 643. These functions included legislative,
executive, and taxing powers. Horry County, 449 F. Supp. at 993.
92. Horry County, 449 F. Supp. at 993.
93. McCain, 465 U.S. at 239 (explaining that Edgefield County Board of Commisioners had "limited
administrative and ministerial powers"); Blanding, 509 F. Supp. at 1335 (describing Sumter County Board
of Supervisors as "ministerial and supervisory body").
94. See Laughlin McDonald, An Aristocracy of Voters: The Disfranchisement of Blacks in South
Carolina, 37 S.C. L. REV. 557, 569-70 (1986). Similar developments occurred after Reconstruction in
Virginia, Kousser, supra note 7, at 36, and in Alabama, where elective local government in several black
belt counties was replaced with appointive government, J. Morgan Kousser, How to Determine Intent:
Lessons from L.A., 7 J.L. & POL. 591, 709 (1991) [hereinafter Kousser, How to Determine Intent]. As one
Alabama legislator exhorted, "[w]hen we saw the life, liberty and property of the Causcasians were at stake,
we struck down in Dallas County the Negro and his cohorts. We put men of the Caucasian race there to
try them." Kousser, supra note 7, at 36 (quoting state legislator James Jefferson Robinson).
95. See generally, Kousser, supra note 7.
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of the hands of local governmental officials. Although blacks stood little chance
of gaining any elective office whatsoever during this period of suffrage restric-
tions, such a victory was more likely at the local level than in the statewide
arena.96 Furthermore, if by some chance blacks (or their sympathizers)
achieved electoral success in a state legislature, the legislature could neverthe-
less control a renegade delegation by ignoring local courtesy and overruling
such a panel's decisions. These maneuvers could effectively suppress any
stirrings of black political activity while permitting delegations, rather than the
state itself, to manage the affairs of local government.
C. Contemporary Developments
1. Local Government Powers
Legislative delegations in many Southern states continue to exercise a wide
variety of prerogatives over the affairs of local government. As superlegislatures
for their cities and counties, delegations introduce and enact local legislation;
they serve as the de facto decisionmakers because state legislatures routinely
affirm their decisions.97 Although issues vary from state to state, local legisla-
tion is particularly significant in six general areas: the structure of local govern-
ment; changes in the boundaries of political subdivisions (through annexation,
incorporation, and consolidation); election administration; education; appoint-
ments of public officials; and revenue-raising.98 Local legislation also often
governs a variety of other local matters, including the creation of the local
bureaucracy and the compensation of its members, 99 the distribution of license
plates, 10o mass transit10' and racing." 2
96. Id. at 39. Even today, most black officeholders are elected at the local level. See JOINT CENTER
FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES, BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS: A NATIONAL ROSTER (1990).
97. The delegations' authority in the legislative process is further explained infra notes 135-42 and
accompanying text.
98. Typically, limitations on the content of local legislation are expressed negatively as descriptions
of what local legislation cannot address, rather than descriptions of the permissible scope of local legislation.
For a representive sample of such limitations, see ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 104; GA. CONST. art. 3, § 6, 1
4; MISS. CONST. art. 4, § 90; N.C. CONST. art. H, § 24; S.C. CONST. art. 3, § 34. For a general description
of limits on the scope of local legislation, see Edward M. Kresky, Local Government, in SALIENT ISSUES
OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 150, 155-56 (John P. Wheeler, Jr. ed., 1961). Moreover, some state
constitutions permit "local" constitutional amendments that set forth limits on the scope of legislation for
particular counties and their subdivisions. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. amends. 140, 144, 255. As with general
constitutional amendments, these amendments may be repealed. See ALA. CONST. amend. 337 (repealing
amend. 184).
99. See ALA. CONST. amend. 297; THOMAS & STEWART, supra note 23, at 149; WEEKS, supra note
74, at 3; Judge Okays Raisesfor Seminole Officials, UPI, Jan. 26, 1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
UPI File (legislative delegation controls salaries of local probate judge, clerk of court, and tax commis-
sioner); Tax Protests Costly, UPI, Mar. 25, 1983, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (state court
judges plan to ask Cobb County, Georgia delegation to eliminate state court judgeship and create two
superior court judgeships).
100. See UPI, Apr. 30, 1985, available in LEXIS,Nexis Library, UPI File (untitled) (discussing Georgia
license plate distribution program).
1992]
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With respect to the structure of local government, the form of government
and method of election for local governing bodies 03 must be established by
local legislation in states that have not granted counties and municipalities the
authority to make such decisions themselves. 1°4 For example, county voters
wishing to change the method for electing the county governing body from at-
large to single-member district elections must seek the approval of the legisla-
tive delegation."05 Similarly, to switch from an appointed to an elected school
board would require local legislation. 1°6 In addition, local legislation is needed
to effect changes in the boundaries of political subdivisions. 7 Municipal
boundaries are altered by annexation and incorporation, as well as by the
merger of city and county governments through consolidation.'08 Such chang-
es often require the approval of the relevant legislative delegations.
Delegations also play a role in the appointment of individuals to public
office. Their authority often includes the power to appoint "local" members of
101. See UPI, Feb. 26, 1981, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (untitled) (Birmingham,
Alabama (Jefferson County) bus system shut down when delegation refused to fund system); see also
Greenville Exempted from Transit Bill, UPI, June 5, 1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (fare
increases for local transportation systems in South Carolina).
102. See Rogers Continues to Push Sunday Racing Bill, UPI, June 23, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, UPI File (Jefferson County, Alabama delegation introduced bill to permit horse racing on Sunday);
UPI, Jan. 17, 1981, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (untitled) (Greene County, Alabama
delegation appointed member to local racing commission).
103. For a definition of method of election, see supra note 24.
104. Duncan v. County of York, 228 S.E.2d 92, 96 (S.C. 1976). This area has particular significance
for the Voting Rights Act because governmental structures can have a significant impact on the ability of
black voters to influence the political process. Chandler Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview,
in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 7, at 5-9 (identifying structures that dilute minority voting
strength). in fact, home rule is sometimes equated with the ability of a political subdivision to define its
form of government. See City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 127 (1983). in many states, local
governments have only limited authority to change their forms of government and methods of election. See
Richards, supra note 71, at 67 n.32.
105. Newspaper reports convey a clear picture of the crucial importance of delegations in this process.
in Blakely County, Georgia, the attorney representing black plaintiffs in a lawsuit challenging the at-large
method of electing the city council condemned the legislative delegation for "intentionally [choosing] to
retain the discriminatory system." Blacks Challenge Voting System They Call Discriminatory, UPI, Apr.
30, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. In Gwinnett County, Georgia, the local district
attorney requested the delegation to change the county manager's appointed position into an elected office.
Gwinnett DA Asks for Elected County CEO, UPI, Dec. 13, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI
File (alleging that county commissioners violated ethical rules in appointing current county manager). In
Lee County, Alabama, the delegation refused the request of local blacks to increase the county commission
from four to five members in order to make it possible to elect a black member to the commission. Alabama
News Briefs, UPI, Feb. 20, 1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. See infra notes 162-73, 188-
93 and accompanying text for the controversy surrounding the Richmond County, Georgia delegation's
proposal to switch from at-large to ward voting for the city council.
106. J.L. Chestnut, a black activist from Selma, Alabama, discusses the disturbing role of a local all-
white delegation in fashioning a method of school board selection that perpetuated white control. J.L.
CHESTNUT, JR. & JULIA CASS, BLACK IN SELMA 291 (1990).
107. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices No. 268, 381 So. 2d 632, 634 (Ala. 1980); Abbott v. Town of
Highlands, 277 S.E.2d 820, 824 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981). See infra notes 159-93 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the Richmond County delegation's efforts to merge the city of Augusta with Richmond
County by local legislation. The petition method is an alternative way to annex territory. See infra note 174
and accompanying text.
108. Binion, supra note 39, at 698.
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various state boards,'0 9 as well as members of local boards and commis-
sions." ° In the area of elections, for example, delegations are often responsi-
ble for appointing members to local election commissions.111 These election
officials in turn appoint poll officials to supervise the polling places and to
conduct election day activities for general elections in the county.'1 2 Through
the power to select election commissioners, delegations can significantly
influence the conduct of elections in each county. Delegations can also establish
judicial offices1 3 and participate in the appointment of individuals to mid-
term judicial vacancies. 1
4
109. Palmetto Perspective, UPI, Feb. 14,1982, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (discussing
South Carolina State Highway Commission).
110. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-27-520 (Law. Co-op. 1986) (county planning commissions); Opinion
of the Justices, 373 So. 2d 1051 (Ala. 1979) (waterworks board); Dekalb Orders Budget Cuts Up to 24
Percent, UPI, May 20, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (committee to study county
budget); Woman Rewarded for Contributions, UPI, May 1, 1984, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI
File (members of local airports authority); UPI, Jan. 5, 1983, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File
(untitled) (panel to study alternatives to weekend closing of University of South Alabama Medical Center);
UPI, Mar. 19, 1982, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (untitled) (members of civic center
authority); cf. S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-3-10 (Law. Co-op. 1986) (members of county boards of social services
appointed by governor upon recommendation by delegation majority). The role of delegations in making
appointments to these bodies varies from state to state, and in some instances, from county to county. For
South Carolina counties that have adopted the county board of commissioners form of government, all
appointments to boards, committees, and commissions in the county are made by the governor on the
recommendation of the legislative delegation. S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-9-1100 (Law. Co-op. 1986). For a
discussion of delegation authority to appoint school board members, see infra note 119.
111. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-13-70 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1991) (delegations recommend
county election commissioners for appointment by governor); State GOP Supports State-Run Primaries,
UPI, Feb. 18, 1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (delegations given appointment authority
in legislative proposal to add two members to each county election commission). Even where delegations
only have the formal power to recommend individuals for appointment, they often, as a practical matter,
possess the actual authority over these local appointments. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-11-30 (Law. Co-op.
1986) (delegation selection automatic in certain South Carolina counties where governor fails to act within
10 days). A governor typically would have little interest in overriding a delegation's recommendation.
112. See, e.g., S.C. CODE. ANN. § 7-13-70 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1991) (specifying duties of
election commissioners); S.C. CODE. ANN. §§ 7-13-1420 to 7-13-1460 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (specifying duties
of various poll officials). In South Carolina, election commissioners also have duties in municipal annexation
proceedings. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5-3-50 to 5-3-80 (Law. Co-op 1976 & Supp. 1991). Because most
elections-including federal and state elections-are conducted at the county level, the conduct of these
election officiais is a critical component of the electoral process. See Jackson v. Edgefield County Sch. Dist.,
650 F. Supp. 1176, 1182-83 (D.S.C. 1986) (explaining importance of minority poll officials to minority
political participation).
113. 1984 GA. LAws 776 (authorizing chief magistrate for Bryan County); 1988 S.C. AcTs 758
(authorizing magistrates for Aiken County, South Carolina); Tax Protests Costly, UPI, Mar. 25, 1983,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (elimination and creation of Georgia judgeship); Joan Kirchner,
Legislature: Freeways and Funding Grab Annexation's Glory in 1986, AUGUSTA CHRON., Jan. 5, 1986,
at IE, 4E (same). In South Carolina, delegations also determine other aspects of magistrate positions. For
example, the Aiken County delegation is involved in choosing the office location for magistrates. 1988 S.C.
Acts 758. For a listing of local laws relating to magistrates, see S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1-10 (Law. Co-op.
1989) (listing related local laws).
114. 1976 S.C. ACs 528 (vacancy on Union County court filled by governor on recommendation of
legislative delegation).
19921
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Delegations also play an important role in financing local government.11
Local tax increases (of school taxes, special sales taxes, and other taxes)'16
and the imposition of certain business license fees are implemented through
local legislation. In other instances, delegations control the disbursement of
funds for local projects.
1 7
The pervasive influence of local legislative delegations is often most visible
in their control over local education. In addition to possessing the authority to
determine how local school boards are selected,' 8 some delegations choose
the members of appointed school boards." 9 The delegations' involvement in
local education is often even more extensive, however. In some jurisdictions,
county boards of education cannot alter or divide school districts without the
written approval of their respective legislative delegations.' 20 In others, school
districts have no taxing authority, and school district revenue is raised through
local legislation.
12 1
In addition to their formal responsibility for enacting legislation, delegations
also play a less formal role similar to that of interest groups or caucuses in the
115. The exercise of revenue-raising powers through local legislation in Georgia is described in WEEKS,
supra note 74, at 6-10. See also Abbott v. Town of Highlands, 277 S.E.2d 820, 824 (N.C. App. 1981)
(quoting Lutterloh v. Fayetteville, 62 S.E. 758, 760 (N.C. 1908)).
116. See, e.g., Charlotte Groups Protest Tax Proposal, UPI, Nov. 30, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, UPI File (bill authorizing 50% seat tax for Charlotte, North Carolina); Gasoline Tax to be Voted,
UPI, Feb. 20, 1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (bill authorizing gasoline tax referendum
in Jackson County, Alabama); These Businesses Tax Themselves, GEOROIA TREND (Jan. 1989), §1, at 17
(bill authorizing special tax district in Cobb County, Georgia). See infra note 121 and accompanying text
for a discussion of delegations' role in financing education.
117. See, e.g., Hoyt Coffee, House Debates Raising Bingo Fees, UPI, March 11, 1987, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (South Carolina recreational programs); Linda Kuntz Logan, UPI, July 10,
1981, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (South Carolina road projects).
118. For an instance of control by an all-white delegation over a school board, see supra note 106.
119. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-15-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (providing that members of certain county
education boards are appointed by governor following delegation recommendation). As of 1986, thirteen
South Carolina school boards were appointed by majority-white delegations. Dudley Clendinen, White Grip
on Southern Schools: Keeping Control, N.Y. TIMEs, June 23, 1986, at AIO. Only three of these school
boards had a black majority. Id. Moreover, delegations' powers are not limited to local education. County
delegations in South Carolina appoint members of the State Board of Education from their respective judicial
circuit, S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-5-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976), and the governor appoints members to the State
Commission on Higher Education on the recommendation of legislative delegations, S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-
103-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1991).
120. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-17-20, 2(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976). In Alabama, delegation approval
is necessary to put the question of the merger of city and county school systems before the voters for a
referendum, as well as to authorize a referendum on increasing the number of county schools. Marshall
County May Consolidate Schools, UPI, Sept. 21, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
121. In some South Carolina counties, the legislative delegation has sole control over school finances
and taxes. UNDERWOOD, supra note 20, at 247. See also Computers and Technology in the Schools, S.C.
Bus. J., Jan. 1, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (describing delegations as school
funding source); State Developments, BNA DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Dec. 18, 1987, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (thirty-nine school districts must seek financial relief from county councils
or legislative delegations). In such counties, disagreement among delegation members can block passage
of the school budget. See UPI, Sept. 13, 1983, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (untitled); UPI,
Sept. 3, 1983, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (untitled). In some instances, city school districts




legislative process. 122 Delegations lobby for general legislation having state-
wide application but local interest-such as amendments to the state constitu-
tion that would permit delegations to pass legislation authorizing special tax
districts1 3 or counties to implement special sales taxes."n
Although there is some resemblance between local delegations and state
delegations in the United States House of Representatives, local delegations
possess significantly more formal decisionmaking authority.' 5 State congres-
sional delegations are informal caucuses whose members are those representa-
tives elected from the congressional districts in each state.Is 6 These delega-
tions often meet at regular intervals to discuss pending or proposed legisla-
tion,127 but are not granted autonomy by Congress.2 8
2. Procedures for Passing Local Legislation
Local legislation follows a winding path through state legislatures, and the
respective roles of delegations and the legislature as a whole are carefully
delineated. In exercising the functions described above, delegations follow one
set of procedures while the state legislature, in turn, employs another. In some
states the procedures are highly formalized; in others, they more closely
resemble customs or practices than rules of law.129 In both types of systems,
122. For a discussion of the role that interest groups play in the legislative process, see Keith E. Hamm,
Legislative Committees, Executive Agencies and Interest Groups, in HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 573.
123. These Businesses Tax Themselves, supra note 116, at 17 (Georgia).
124. Craig A. Aronoff, Private Firms to Spend Millions Bringing Bus Service to Cobb, ATLANTA Bus.
CHRON., May 26, 1986, §2, at 2B.
125. State delegations play a less important role in the United States Senate, although they have a
limited role in making certain federal appointments. By custom, the Senators of the majority party approve
United States Attorneys and candidates for federal judgeships in their states. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM,
AMERICAN COURTS: PROCESS AND POLICY 111-13 (1986) (senatorial courtesy for federal judgeships).
126. State delegations differs in composition from county delegations in another significant respect.
Because congressional districts do not cross state lines, state delegations do not include members from
different states. 2 U.S.C. §§ 2a, 2c (1988); David R. Mayhew, Congressional Representation: Theory and
Practice in Drawing the Districts, in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970's, at 249, 252-53 (Nelson W. Polsby
ed., 1971). The significance of this distinction for county delegations is discussed infra notes 298-99 and
accompanying text.
127. See RANDALL B. RIPLEY, PARTY LEADERS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 169-175 (1967).
128. Nevertheless, membership in a state delegation can be a source of voting cues once legislation
reaches the floor. See, e.g., Barbara Deckard, State Party Delegations in the United States House of
Representatives-An Analysis of Group Action, 5 POLITY 311 (1973); Barbara Deckard, State Party
Delegations in the United States House of Representatives-A Comparative Study of Group Cohesion, 34
J. POL. 199 (1972). In addition, committee assignments are often made on the basis of membership in a
particular delegation. Charles J. Bullock, m11, The Influence of State Party Delegations on House Committee
Assignments, 15 MIDWEST J. POL. SCl. 525 (1971); Nicholas A. Masters, Committee Assignments in the
House of Representatives, 55 AM. POL Sc. REV. 345-357 (1961). For case studies of state delegations in
the United States House of Representatives, see Alan Fiellin, The Functions of Informal Groups in
Legislative Institutions: A Case Study, 24 J. POL. 72 (1962); John H. Kessel, The Washington Congressional
Delegation, 8 MIDWEST J. POL SCI. 1 (1964).
129. Compare GA. H. REP. R. 11 (describing delegation decision rules) and N.C. H. REP. R. 27
(establishing local legislation committees) with CROWELL, supra note 23, at 39 (describing legislative
courtesy as custom).
The Yale Law Journal
however, the state legislature gives delegations virtual plenary control over local
legislation. It is this autonomy that raises the question of whether the composi-
tion of delegations can be cognizable under the Voting Rights Act.!3"
Although there is no uniform legislative process for considering local
legislation, many aspects of the process are similar across states.13' At the
beginning of every legislative session, the local delegation meets to discuss the
legislation its members will introduce that year. Legislative proposals are
received from a wide variety of sources-individuals, city or county governing
bodies, political groups, and other constituencies-and approved or rejected by
the delegation.1 32 Before proposed legislation can be introduced, it must be
advertised in the local newspaper within certain specified time periods.
1 33
After advertisement, the delegation member who "authored" the bill formally
introduces it in the legislature. The bill is then referred to the committee that
has jurisdiction over local legislation 34 and, if approved by that body, is
subsequently placed on the calendar for floor consideration. The bill is read the
requisite number of times before the legislature votes on it, and is passed once
it reaches the floor if a majority of voting legislators approve it. The bill is then
introduced in the other house of the legislature, in which similar procedures are
followed. The local legislation becomes law once the governor signs it.
This description of how local bills are enacted resembles the standard
textbook account of the legislative process. 135 However, legislative norms,
particularly the tradition that the delegation is the locus of all decisionmaking
of local import, distinguish the process employed in considering local bills from
the process for considering general legislation. 36 This powerful norm is re-
130. See infra notes 267-69 and accompanying text.
131. MALCOLM E. JEWELL, REPRESENTATION IN STATE LEGISLATURES 7 (1982). The citations to
legislative procedures in this Section do not purport to be exhaustive, but are instead intended to describe
a model with characteristics common to many states. The internal rules and handbooks of particular
legislatures are the most useful source of information about specific state procedures. See, e.g., CROWELL,
supra note 23; JACKSON AND STAKES, supra note 23; THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: A HANDBOOK FOR
ALABAMA LEGISLATORS (Robert L. McCurley, Jr. ed., 4th ed. 1987) [hereinafter ALABAMA HANDBOOK].
132. For a discussion of the interactions between delegations, constituents, and other interest groups,
see JEWELL, supra note 131, at 56, 136.
133. Typically, this requirement is mandated by state law. See, e.g., GA. CONsT. art. 3, § 5, 9. Notice
of intent to introduce the local act must be published in the local newspaper in the section where other legal
notices are printed, and an affidavit or copy of the published notice must accompany the bill when it is
introduced. See, e.g., JACKSON & STAKES, supra note 23, at 89. State courts have strictly construed these
requirements and have invalidated local acts where the requirements were not satisfied. See, e.g., Smith v.
City Council of Augusta, 47 S.E.2d 582 (Ga. 1948); Smith v. McMichael, 45 S.E.2d 431 (Ga. 1947).
134. In some states, a single committee in each legislative house considers all local legislation without
regard to substance, see, e.g., JACKSON & STAKES, supra note 23, at 132, 134 (describing Georgia General
Assembly); S.C. SEN. R. 19. In others, several committees share the workload, see, e.g., CROWELL, supra
note 23, at 39 n.3 (describing North Carolina); ALABAMA HANDBOOK, supra note 131, at 65.
135. For a general description of the procedures whereby state legislatures consider legislation, see
MALCOLM E. JEWELL & SAMUEL C. PATTERSON, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES (4th
ed. 1986).
136. Norms are "informal rules, frequently unspoken because they need not be spoken, which may
govern more effectively than any written rule. They prescribe 'how things are done around here."' BARBARA
HINCKLEY, STABILITY AND CHANGE IN CONGRESS 59 (2d ed. 1978). The tradition of legislative deference
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ferred to by the catch-all phrase "local courtesy,' '137 which essentially means
that the legislature's involvement in considering local legislation as an institu-
tion-from introduction to passage-is merely pro forma.138 In the delibera-
tive process, the stage at which the delegation votes on the legislation is
critical. 139 The committee responsible for local bills will only approve legisla-
tion supported by the requisite number of members of the legislative delega-
tion."4" Committees typically play a very minor role in considering local
legislation, simply reporting out of committee all legislation that has the
backing of the relevant delegation.141 Upon reaching the floor, legislation ap-
proved by a delegation is almost always enacted, while conversely, legislation
lacking the approval of the delegation is rarely-if ever-approved. Local
courtesy is reinforced by other legislative procedures that limit the consideration
local legislation receives from the legislature as a whole.142
to delegation decisions has the status of an informal rule. See Kousser, How to Determine Intent, supra note
94, at 714 (distinguishing formal and informal rules).
137. JACKSON & STAKES, supra note 23, at 89. Another term that is sometimes used is "legislative
courtesy." See CROWELL, supra note 23, at 39; THOMAS & STEWART, supra note 23, at 149. Although the
local courtesy rule originated many years ago, its use today continues unabated.
138. The practice of legislative deference to delegations is identified in accounts describing state legisla-
tures, see, e.g., JACKSON & STAKES, supra note 23, at 89; THOMAS & STEWART, supra note 23, at 149-50,
and by courts in the context of deciding Voting Rights Act claims, see, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S.
613, 626 (1982) (noting that "legislature defers to [delegation's] wishes on matters of purely local applica-
tion"); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 74 n.21 (1980); McMillan v. Escambia County, 638 F.2d
1239, 1246 n.14 (5th Cir. Feb. 1981), Hardy v. Wallace, 603 F. Supp. 174, 176 (N.D. Ala. 1985), Buskey
v. Oliver, 565 F. Supp. 1473, 1477 (M.D. Ala. 1983) (approval by delegation "unwritten prerequisite" to
passage by legislature). See also The Other Side of Edwards' Case for a Casino, TIMES PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), Aug. 23, 1992, at B6 (letter of State Rep. Miteh Landrieu) ("The longstanding and well-respected
tradition in the legislature is to honor the wishes of a local delegation on issues of major importance.").
The local courtesy rule is supported by the rationale that matters of purely local concern should be decided
by representatives of those citizens most affected by the legislation. When a legislative delegation agrees
on the need for a legislative enactment that affects only its locality, other members of the legislature defer
to its judgment. Members of the legislature expect that the same consideration will in turn be extended to
legislation that affects their localities. See JACKSON & STAKES, supra note 23, at 89-90; JEWELL, supra note
131, at 7, 131; LOCKARD, supra note 35, at 118.
139. In City of Mobile v. Bolden, the Court noted that delegation's opposition to a local bill will prevent
it from reaching the floor for debate. 446 U.S. 55, 74 n.21 (1980). Other decisions do not identify the point
in the legislative process at which the delegation's support or opposition is decisive. See, e.g., McMillan,
638 F.2d 1239; Buskey, 565 F. Supp. at 1477.
140. See generally Local Bill Policies and Procedures Manual, supra note 23.
141. See S.C. SEN. R. 19 (establishing role of committee with jurisdiction over local legislation as
relatively inactive).
142. Local legislation receives fewer legislative readings, is considered on an expedited basis, and is
often placed on a separate calendar. Local legislation in Georgia, for example, is read once before a floor
vote is taken whereas general legislation is read three times. JACKSON & STAKES, supra note 23, at 89, 130.
These readings are constitutionally mandated. GA. CONST. art. 3, § 5, T 8 (local legislation); GA. CONST.
art 3, § 5, 7 (general legislation). Uncontested local legislation is placed on a separate local bill calendar
and is voted upon as a package. JACKSON & STAKES, supra note 23, at 89. Legislative rules for South
Carolina also establish separate calendars for local legislation, S.C. SEN. R. 33; S.C. H. REP. R. 6.3 (7),
(1 1A) & (13A). and set strict time limits for its consideration. S.C. H. REP. R. 6.3(14)(e).
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The Supreme Court's opinion in City of Mobile v. Bolden 43 provides the
most comprehensive discussion of the local courtesy rule in a case decided
under the Voting Rights Act. In Bolden, a plurality of the Court established a
subjective intent standard for vote dilution claims under the Constitution and
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.' 44 In discussing the relevance of evidence
suggesting discriminatory intent, the Court acknowledged that local courtesy
was the prevailing practice by defining the intent of Mobile's legislative delega-
tion as the critical factual inquiry in the case. 145 The Court noted that several
proposals to alter Mobile's form of government had been defeated in the state
legislature, where the senators and representatives constituting the Mobile
delegation exercised effective veto power over local bills while "[u]nanimous
approval of a local measure by the city delegation, on the other hand, virtually
assures passage. 1 46 The Court emphasized that the motivations of these state
legislators, rather than those of city officials, were relevant to whether Mobile's
form of government had been maintained with the intent to discriminate against
black voters.147
Another correlative aspect of the local courtesy rule involves the conven-
tions governing the number of delegation members who must agree for local
legislation to be approved. The unanimity requirement in force until the 1960's
has been replaced by a majority rule in most instances.148 For legislation to
be adopted, some majority of delegation members-ranging from a simple
143. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). The Supreme Court also addressed local courtesy in Rogers v. Lodge, where
it upheld the district court's determination that the at-large system for electing the county commission in
Burke County, Georgia had been maintained by the legislative delegation for the purpose of diluting black
voting strength. 458 U.S. 613, 621-27 (1982).
144. A majority of the Court could not agree on the legal standard for proving racial purpose, and there
were six separate opinions. See infra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
145. 446 U.S. at74 & nn. 20, 21. The dissenters also emphasized the role of the legislative delegation.
Id. at 99 (White, J., dissenting) (in considering redistricting bills for the city commission, "a major concern
[of county delegation members] has centered around how many, if any, blacks would be elected" (quoting
Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384, 397 (S.D. Ala. 1976)); id. at 139 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(explaining relevance of legislative delegation's actions or inaction). Voting rights historians also concur
that the intent of local legislators, rather than the state legislature, is the appropriate focus when local
courtesy is in force. See Kousser, How to Determine Intent, supra note 94, at 714; McCrary & Hebert, supra
note 89, at 113.
146. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 74 n.21.
147. The plurality, however, held that the plaintiffs had not established the requisite discriminatory
intent, id. at 65, and reversed and remanded the case to the district court to determine whether Mobile's
election system purposefully discriminated against blacks. On remand, the district court found that the at-
large system had been adopted and maintained for racial reasons. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 542 F. Supp.
1050, 1068 (S.D. Ala. 1982). In describing the modifications that the delegation adopted in 1965, the court
observed that these changes took place "during th[e] period that the bus boycott occurred in Montgomery,
the police dogs and fire hoses were used in Birmingham against blacks, a black church was bombed in
Birmingham resulting in the death of blacks, and the Selma to Montgomery march took place. Anything
to increase black representation just would not fly." Id.
148. It is possible that this switch occurred because black candidates were running for elected office.
A "diverse" delegation could no longer operate under the "gentlemen's agreements" that pervaded early
delegation rule. See Kovach, supra note 81, at 31. Because delegations have been the subject of virtually
no scholarly study, no firm conclusions can be reached.
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majority (one-half plus one) to a supermajority-must agree to the bill.149 In
some jurisdictions, these rules of decisionmaking are determined by the legisla-
ture as a whole, and the degree of consensus required for delegation approval
is mandated by statute, legislative rule, or legislative custom. 50 In other cases,
delegations are permitted to establish their own decision criteria.15'
Despite some variation in these rules, the local courtesy norm is consistent.
The success of local bills depends almost entirely upon the approval of the
appropriate county delegation. In this sense, the delegation exercises nearly
complete autonomy in considering local legislation.
3. The Richmond County, Georgia Delegation
A case study' 52 of the deliberations of Richmond County, Georgia's dele-
gation illustrates the range of powers exercised by legislative delegations and
the procedures they follow. Richmond County is located in central east Georgia.
In 1983, eight state legislators sat on the Richmond County legislative delega-
tion. Six were elected to the Georgia House of Representatives, while two were
149. Under supermajority voting rules, a decision is not approved unless, at a minimum, one more vote
is obtained than that necessary for a simple majority. Karlan, supra note 2, at 11 n.35; Edward P. Schwartz
& Warren F. Schwartz, Decisionmaking by Juries Under Unanimity and Supermajority Voting Rules, 80
GEO. L. J. 775 (1992). For cases discussing the various decision rules applicable to delegation deliberations,
see City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 74 n.21 (1980) (two-thirds of senate delegation and majority
of house delegation in Mobile, Alabama); Buskey v. Oliver, 565 F. Supp. 1473, 1477 (M.D. Ala. 1983)
(four-fifths of Montgomery, Alabama delegation). See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-15-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976)
(senate member and at least one-half of house members for appointment of county school boards); GA. SEN.
R. 187 (majority, with special provision if senators evenly divided); GA. H. REP. R. 11 (unanimous, unless
delegation adopts its own rules). Moreover, these rules are not static but can change during each legislative
session. See infra notes 472-78, 489-95 and accompanying text for the potential for discrimination in such
changes.
150. See generally 50 STATES, supra note 22.
151. See GA. H. REP. R. 11 (establishing unanimity rule but allowing delegations to adopt their own
decision rules); CROWELL, supra note 23, at 39 (describing variation in delegation decision rules in North
Carolina). Of the 159 county delegations in the Georgia House of Representatives, U.S. DEPT. OF COM-
MERCE, COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK 1988 (1988) (Appendix B-I) (listing number of counties in
Georgia), 16 adopted their own rules for the 1991 legislative session. Of these, 3 adopted supermajority
decision rules (copies of decision rules on file with author).
152. This case study is based on my experiences as an attorney in the Voting Section of the Civil
Rights Division, United States Department of Justice. I represented the United States in a lawsuit challenging
the method of election for the Augusta city council. United States v. City of Augusta, No. CV 187-004 (S.D.
Ga. consent judgment filed July 22, 1988) (on file with author). The Augusta litigation is discussed in Frank
R. Parker, Voting Rights Enforcement in the Reagan Administration, in ONE NATION INDIISiBLE: THE CIVIL
RIGHTS CHALLENGE FOR THE 1990S 381 (Reginald C. Govan & William L. Taylor eds., 1989) (report of
the Citizens' Commission on Civil Rights). Augusta is the Richmond County seat and the fourth largest
city in Georgia. Through this case study, I seek to emphasize the importance of the day-to-day activities
of legislative delegations. Although my account is neither a narrative nor a story, I borrow from both
techniques. Scholars in a number of fields have utilized narrative and storytelling. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL,
AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987) (critical race theory); JAMES MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM:
THE CIVIL WAR ERA ix-x (1988) (historiography); PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND
RIGHTS (1991) (critical literary and legal theory); Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL.
L. REV. 971 (1991) (feminist legal scholarship); Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional
Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 343 (1991); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival
Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990) (lawyering).
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elected to the Georgia Senate. The delegation included two black members
(Representatives Charles Walker and George Brown) and six white members
(Representatives Travis Barnes, Donald Cheeks, A. Jack Connell, and Michael
Padgett, and Senators Jimmy Lester and Majority Leader Thomas Allgood). 153
The same individuals served on the legislative delegation for the city of Augus-
ta, with the exception of Representatives Barnes and Padgett, whose districts
did not include any portion of the city.15 The city's house delegation thus
had two white members and two black members.
The Richmond County delegation had broad power over local legislation
and enjoyed a high degree of autonomy in the state legislature.' 55 The city
and the county delegations followed the same procedures for passing local
legislation. The signatures of a majority of the house delegation were required
for passage of local bills. Following approval by the house delegation, a bill
was enacted by the house; it then required the signature of both senators before
it would be enacted by the senate. Once the bill passed both sections of the
delegation in this manner, it was enacted by the legislature and signed by the
governor. The last two steps were usually mere formalities because local
legislation was almost always enacted in Georgia once it had delegation sup-
port.
Augusta blacks outnumbered whites for the first time after the 1980 census
count.'56 In order to negate black voting power, Richmond County's legisla-
tive delegation addressed the question of whether to eliminate the City of
Augusta by consolidating it with Richmond County, or instead to enlarge the
city by annexing adjoining suburbs. In a 1981 runoff election, the city elected
153. Chris Peacock, Black Leaders PushforRenewedAction, AUGUSTA CHRON., July 24, 1983, at IB,
2B (describing racial composition of delegation); John H. Sorrells, Jr., Allgood Unveils Consolidation Bill;
Existing Services Left Untouched, AUGUSTA CHRON., Jan. 21, 1983, at IA, 2A (listing delegation members).
In 1984, two members of the delegation changed but the racial composition of the delegation remained the
same. Representative Barnes was replaced by Dick Ransom and Senator Lester was replaced by Frank
Albert. Margaret Twiggs, DeVaney to Present City's Needs Tomorrow, AUGUSTA CHRON., Nov. 18, 1984,
at 3B.
154. John S. Sorrells, Jr.,House Approves Bill Halving City Council, Requiring Ward Vote, AUGUSTA
CHRON., Feb. 12, 1983, at IA. Controversy later arose when the city annexed portions of both districts,
making the districts' representatives eligible to vote on city matters. See infra notes 174-83 and accompany-
ing text.
155. For a more detailed account of the interaction between legislative delegations and state legislatures,
see supra notes 130-52 and accompanying text.
156. COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK, supra note 151, at 634 (blacks 53.5% of Augusta's population).
Whites, however, retained a majority of voting age residents. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, Series PC80-I-B 12, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION, GENERAL POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS:
GEORGIA, at53 (Table 25) (1980) [hereinafter 1980 CENsus oFPoPULATION]. According to the 1990 census,
blacks currently comprise 56% of Augusta's total population, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, Series 1990 CPH-I-12, 1990 CENsUs OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, SUMMARY POPULATION
AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS: GEORGIA, 53 (Table 3) (1990) [hereinafter 1990 CENsuS OF POPULATION
AND HOUSING], and 50.7% of its voting-age population. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
General Population Charactertistics, at Table 61 (unpublished census table, on file with author) (Age and
Sex by Race and Hispanic Origin: 1990).
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Edward McIntyre as its first black mayor.157 Following the election of Mayor
McIntyre, white residents pushed to consolidate Augusta with the remainder
of unincorporated Richmond County. This consolidation, designed to avert
black control of city government, would abolish the city as an independent legal
entity and replace it with a new solidly white political subdivision. 58
In 1983, Senator Allgood and Representative Connell proposed consolida-
tion legislation to the delegation.' 59 Black leaders swiftly opposed the consoli-
dation plan because it would have made whites a strong majority in the new
metropolitan government.160 Mallory Millender, editor and publisher of the
local black newspaper, attacked the consolidation plan as "an effort to keep
black people 'where we belong' . .. impotent and out of politics.' 61 Repre-
sentative Walker, one of the two black members of the delegation, then intro-
duced a competing bill which preserved the city as a legal entity, and which
would have substituted ward voting for at-large voting and reduced the number
of councilmembers from sixteen to eight' 62 Ward voting would likely have
led to black control of four of the eight seats on the newly-constituted city
council,163 thereby effectively ending the veto power white voters held be-
cause of their slim voting majority in the city.
The Walker bill needed the support of three of the four house members
eligible to vote on city matters, as well as the approval of both senators, in
157. Rick Rountree, McIntyre Wins Mayoral Runoff; First Black Voted Mayor of Augusta, AUGUSTA
CHRON., Oct. 29, 1981, at IA. In the runoff election, 100% of the city's black residents voted for Mr.
McIntyre, while 87% of white voters supported his opponent. Deposition of Allan J. Lichtman, United States
v. Augusta, No. CV 187-004 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 17, 1987) (Table 1, Racial Bloc Voting in Augusta, Ga., Black
v. White Contests, Ecological Regression Estimates, 1979-1986). In the election that led to the runoff, even
fewer whites supported Mr. McIntyre, with 94% of white voters casting a ballot for his white opponent.
Id.
158. Blacks comprised a significantly smaller percentage of the population in the county as a whole,
making up only 37.4% of county residents. 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION, supra note 156, at 13 (Table
14). Consolidation is often viewed as a means of reducing minority political power. See, e.g., Donald G.
Hagman, Introduction and Summary, 54 U. DET. J. URB. L. 681, 683 (1977) ("[M]inority leaders oppose
consolidation because they view it as a move by the white community to retain political control."); Lawrence
B. Garcia, Consolidation: The Racial Implications, 54 U. DET. J. URB. L. 717,717 (1977) (discussing ethnic
trends and minority control of cities).
159. John H. Sorrells, Jr., Bill Introduced to Merge Augusta, Richmond County, AUGUSTA CHRON.,
Feb. 9, 1983, at 1A, 2A. The bill also would have created a nine-member governing body, with each elected
from individual districts and one of the members chosen as mayor-chairman. Id.
160. See id. at IA (unification legislation criticized for diluting black political strength). Although three
of the nine seats were from majority-black districts, blacks opposed consolidation because it ensured that
whites would elect a majority of councilmembers. J.S. Wright, Notes Ministers Against Unification,
AUGUSTA CHRON., Feb. 21, 1983, at 4A (letter to editor from Reverend J.S. Wright, chairman of political
action committee of Black Ministers Morning and Evening Conferences). Absent consolidation, the
possibility that black voters might outnumber white voters in the city loomed on the horizon.
161. Marjorie Mayfield, Blacks' Role in Unification Sparks Debate, AUGUSTA CHRON., Feb. 4, 1983,
at lB.
162. Sorrels, House Approves Bill, supra note 154, at IB.
163. John H. Sorrells, Lester Signs Merger Bill; Senate Passage Assured, AUGUSTA CHRON., Jan. 25,
1983, at IA; Richmond Legislators to Discuss Local Bills They Plan to Introduce, AUGUSTA CHRON., Jan.
18, 1983, at 2B. In contrast to at-large voting, ward (or district) voting typically enhances the ability of
minority voters to elect the representatives of their choice.
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order to pass. Though three of the four representatives signed the bill,1" the
fourth, Representative Connell, who was white, invoked a "seldom-used"
procedure to request that the bill be voted on separately so that his opposition
could be recorded. 65 Senator Allgood then employed another parliamentary
tactic to eliminate the Walker bill and to substitute his consolidation bill in its
place. 66 This maneuver killed the ward voting proposal, even though neither
the substitute bill nor any of the ensuing compromises gained delegation
support.
167
In 1984, the same conflict reemerged within the legislative delegation. In
October of that year, Representative Walker proposed a new ward voting
package linked to annexation. He stated that the role of blacks must be expand-
ed to allow participation in the "'social and political, as well as the economic
side' of life in Augusta.1 61 The proposed annexation would increase the pop-
ulation of Augusta from approximately 47,000 to at least 106,000, while retain-
ing approximately the same black-white ratio.1 69 The second portion of the
package implemented ward voting for the city council. In response, Senator
Allgood reiterated his support for total consolidation. 170
In the 1985 legislative session that followed, Senator Allgood engineered
a change in the senate rules to allow a full senate vote on disputed local
legislation.17 1 This change also replaced the rule requiring both Richmond
County senators to agree on a local bill before it passed (the unanimity rule)
with a rule requiring only one senator to sign the bill. By altering the forum
for considering local legislation, Senator Algood, as the senate majority leader,
could use his influence to circumvent the other local senator and exercise more
164. Sorrells, House Approves Bill, supra note 154, at lB. The bill was signed by representatives
Brown, Cheeks, and Walker.
165. Id. If a bill passed the delegation, the members who had not signed it rarely voiced opposition
during floor consideration.
166. John H. Sorrells, Jr., Unification Plan Substituted for Bill, AUGUSTA CHRON., Feb. 19, 1983.
Senator Allgood's move circumvented the normal procedure through which local legislation is first
introduced in the house.
167. Chris Peacock, Legislators Plan Meetings Over Summer, AUGUSTA CHRON., May 26, 1985, at
lB. In decrying the related proposal to implement ward voting for the county commission, the local
newspaper opined: "The Richmond County legislative delegation should resist the siren calls of the Walker
bill, knowing that the best solution for Black representation on the County Comm[i]ssion is for the best
qualified black citizens to offer for election." Nix District Voting, AUGUSTA CHRON., Feb. 9, 1984, at 4A
(editorial). Voting rights activists understand the term "well-qualified" black candidate to be a euphemism
for a candidate who can appeal to white voters. See James U. Blacksher & Larry T. Menefee, From
Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v. Bolden: Have the White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifteenth
Amendement?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 37 n.255 (1982) (describing white efforts to "put in office the 'best'
citizens from all-white business and professional classes").
168. Chris Peacock, Proposal to Double Augusta Population, AUGUSTA CHRON., OcL 9, 1984, at IB
(quoting Walker).
169. Id.
170. Chris Peacock, Views Vary on Proposal by Walker, AUGUSTA CHRON., Oct. 21, 1984, at lB.
171. Joan Kirchner, Legislature: Freeways and Funding Grab Annexation's Glory in '86, AUGUSTA
CHRON., Jan. 5, 1986, at IA; Chris Peacock, Forcible Annexation Won't Pass, Albert Says, AUGUSTA
CHRON., May 17, 1985, at 2B.
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power over the local legislative agenda. 172 Nonetheless, despite Senator All-
good's influence, the delegation remained deadlocked and neither the annex-
ation nor the consolidation proposal made headway during the 1985 ses-
sion.173
As a result of the deadlock within the delegation, the city organized a
petition drive to annex the territory. 4 In 1985, Charles DeVaney, the newly
elected white mayor of Augusta, 75 presented an annexation plan to the city
council. The resolution passed a racially divided city council despite charges
that the annexations were racially selective.
176
The city adopted ordinances implementing the plan in November of
1985.177 Two of these annexations added two additional house districts to the
city's boundaries, house district 86 and house district 90;178 the districts added
two white members to the city delegation, Representatives Michael Padgett and
Dick Ransome. 179 The majority of territory in both legislators' districts re-
172. Peacock, supra note 171, at 2B; Peacock, supra note 167, at IB (noting Allgood's "veto power
over local bills").
173. Peacock, supra note 167, at lB. Despite meetings called by Senator Allgood over the summer
recess to break the deadlock on consolidation and annexation, the delegation remained splintered. Chris
Peacock, Delegation Airs Disputes, AUGUSTA CHRON., July 23, 1985, at lB.
174. Don Rhodes, Augusta Annexation Efforts Die in Legislative Debate, AUGUSTA CHRON., Dec. 29,
1985, at IA [hereinafter Rhodes, Annexation Efforts Die]. "Petition" is an alternative method by which
Georgia cities may annex territory. The petitions must contain signatures of at least 60% of the property
owners in the area to be annexed. See Don Rhodes, Committee Backs Annexation Plan, AUGUSTA CHRON.,
Aug. 16, 1985, at IA. Typically, the petition method is more costly and cumbersome than the legislative
method. Note, The Right to Vote in Municipal Annexations, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1571, 1607 n.193 (1975).
In Augusta, the petition drive had a better chance of success than did the legislative proposals because of
strife within the local delegation.
175. In 1984, Mayor McIntyre was convicted of extortion and sentenced to a five-year prison term.
Ex-Mayor of Augusta Sentenced in Kickbacks, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1984, at A12. Many members of the
black community were outraged by the conviction. Mayor of Augusta Weighs Resignation After Guilty
Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1984, at A23. Some believed that the mayor had been set up by powerful
interests. Chris Peacock, McIntyre Supporters Rally, Raise Funds, AUGUSTA CHRON., Dec. 30, 1983, at 1B
(black elected officials "charged law enforcement officials with a new type of racism"); Mike Vogel, Black
Leaders Back McIntyre Despite Arrest, AUGUSTA CHRON., Dec. 25, 1983, at 1B (community had "doubts
about the fairness of the investigation"). During the past decade, it has been widely alleged that a number
of black politicians have been targeted for racially selective investigation and prosecution. See Mark
Curriden, Selective Prosecution: Are Black Officials Investigative Targets?, 78 A.B.A. J. 54 (Feb. 1992).
176. Minutes of the Augusta City Council, Aug. 19, 1985, at 347-49 (on file with author). All of the
white members voted in favor of the annexations while three of the four black members voted against them.
Id. at 350-51. See Don Rhodes, Augusta Council Vote Brings 1,747 Acres into City Limits, AUGUSTA
CHRON., Aug. 20, 1985, at 1A (black councilmembers I.E. Washington, William H. Mays, m, Kathleen
Beasley, and Margaret Armstrong voted against plan, while all white members voted in favor of it).
177. Minutes of the Augusta City Council, Nov. 4, 1985, at 402-05 (on file with author); Chris Peacock,
Annexation Adds Acreage andAugustans, AUGUSTA CHRON., Nov. 5,1985, at lB. Racial divisions remained
intact, with black members continuing to oppose the annexations. Black leaders asserted that a portion of
predominantly black Albion Acres was excluded because "the majority of white city government leaders
were interested only in making the city more white." Rhodes, Annexation Efforts Die, supra note 174, at
IA.
178. John Winters, Voting Mix-Up Leaves Reduction of Panel in Limbo, AUGUSTA HERALD, June 21,
1986, at IA.
179. John Winters, City Can File Suit Or Ignore Bill, Attorney Says, AUGUSTA HERALD, June 22, 1986,
at IA; Winters, supra note 178, at IA. Later, when the delegation reduced the size of the city council over
the city's objection, a local columnist commented that legislators' power ranks alongside "taxation without
representation." Margaret Twiggs, Walker's Bill Targets City Council, AUGUSTA CHRON., Feb. 9, 1986, at
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mained outside of the city limits. 8 ° After the annexations were precleared
by the Justice Department,1 81 black leaders alleged that the purpose of the
86th district annexation was to make it more difficult for black members of the
delegation to prevail in delegation deliberations.'82 The delegation also adopt-
ed a formal rule permitting only those representatives whose districts included
a portion of the city to vote on city legislation and requiring a majority vote
for delegation approval of legislation.'83
At the same time, efforts to achieve annexation through legislation contin-
ued.' 84 The delegation held a public meeting to gauge the reaction to Senator
Allgood's latest annexation plan. At this heated meating, Christine Bagwell,
a white county resident, bluntly assessed the city's motivation for expansion:
"the niggers are going to take over Augusta and they have done it."'85 In the
weeks following the meeting, Senator Allgood and Representative Padgett
declared the annexation initiative dead.1 86 Senator Allgood summed up the
year with the comment, "I'm not proud of it (the failure to pass annexation
legislation), and I'm not proud of our delegation."' 87
In four years, the delegation had profound disagreements concerning ward
voting, annexation and consolidation. During that time, two white members had
been added to a racially divided delegation. Delegation rules had been manipu-
lated to promote legislation favored by white leaders, and legislative obstacles
had been placed in the way of ward voting. The delegation repeatedly frustrated
the desires of black voters in Richmond County.
The epilogue to the Augusta story is a mixed one. The city's efforts to
annex portions of white Richmond County in the mid-1980's failed when the
3E. The columnist was apparently referring to the fact that state legislators whose districts included only
a portion of the city could nonetheless determine the outcome of city legislation.
180. See Winters, supra note 178, at IA (annexations of house districts 86 and 90 comprised 57 acres
and 1800 acres, respectively).
181. Letter from William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, United
States Department of Justice, to Paul H. Dunbar, III, Augusta City Attorney, Feb. 4, 1986 (on file with
author) (preclearing annexations); Letter from Paul H. Dunbar, III, Augusta City Attorney, to Gerald W.
Jones, Chief, Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice, Dec. 5, 1985 (on
file with author) (submitting annexations adopted on November 4, 1985).
182. My review of the Department of Justice's public file revealed no evidence suggesting that the
impact of the annexations on the delegation was raised during section 5 review.
183. Winters, supra note 178. Although the record is not entirely clear, it appears that the rule simply
formalized the delegation's existing practice that only legislators whose districts included the city limits
could vote on city legislation. See Richmond Legislators to Discuss Local Bills They Plan to Introduce,
AUGUSTA CHRON., Jan. 18, 1983, at 2B (delineating delegation members who may vote on ward voting
proposal); see also Chris Peacock, Views Vary on Proposal by Walker, AUGUSTA CHRON., Oct. 21, 1984,
at lB (discussing voting eligibility for matters affecting specific portions of county).
184. See Peacock, supra note 177, at lB.
185. Chris Peacock, Flared Tempers Mark Annexation Discussion, AUGUSTA CHRON., Oct. 18, 1985,
at IB. When Representative Cheeks accused Senator Allgood of "telling falsehoods," the Senator responded,
"I'm going to ignore your remark because I think that's the only way we can have a delegation." Id.
Delegation Chairman Padgett banged his gavel in vain during the heated exchange.
186. Chris Peacock, DeVaney, Walker Debate Annexation, AUGUSTA CHRoN., Nov. 14, 1985, at IA.
187. Rhodes, Annexation Efforts Die, supra note 174, at IA.
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Justice Department deemed the city's annexation policy to be racially selec-
tive.' 8 In 1988, the city settled the section 2 lawsuit challenging its at-large
method of election and implemented ward voting as a condition of the settle-
ment.8 9 Not long afterward, the Richmond County delegation adopted consol-
idation legislation that would have eliminated the city as a legal entity and,
simultaneously, wiped out the gains made through ward elections. 19 After
the population growth reflected in the 1990 census made the consolidated
government's election districts unenforceable,' 9' the delegation failed to agree
on replacement consolidation legislation in 1992 and thus returned the city to
its original status.192 During the same period, the delegation added a white
member to its numbers by attaching a minuscule portion of unpopulated
Richmond County to a district centered on neighboring counties.193
Now that a clear picture of the powers of delegations has emerged, a
discussion of voting rights jurisprudence is necessary to provide context for the
issue of how delegations fit within this framework.
H. THEMES IN VOTING RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE
Voting rights doctrine provides a starting point for assessing discrimination
in the structure of delegations. As currently articulated, the doctrine involves
three stages of inquiry: the first (the "election procedures" phase) looks at pre-
election and election day activities; the second (the "vote dilution" stage)
examines how election structures affect the composition of the electorate and
188. Letter from William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, United
States Department of Justice, to Charles DeVaney, Mayor, Augusta, Georgia I (July 27, 1987) (on file with
author).
189. United States v. City of Augusta, No. 187-004 (S.D. Ga. consent judgment filed July 22, 1988).
See also supra note 152.
190. The Justice Department initially objected to the timing of the city's decision to hold a special
election deciding the consolidation question. See Letter from William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney
General, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice, to Linda Beazley, Executive Director,
Richmond County Board of Elections 1 (July 15, 1988) (on file with author). The city responded by agreeing
to hold the referendum during the 1988 general election. After voters approved consolidation in the
referendum, the United States Department of Justice objected to the consolidation plan. See Letter from
James P. Turner, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of
Justice, to Linda Beazley, Executive Director, Richmond County Board of Elections 4-5 (May 30, 1989)
(on file with author). The city then sought preclearance of the consolidation plan in federal district court.
City Council of Augusta v. United States, No. 90-0171 (D.D.C. Jan. 24, 1990).
191. Motion of Defendants-Intervenors to Dismiss for Mootness, Lack of Case or Controversy, and
Failure to Prosecute, City Council of Augusta v. United States, No. 90-0171, at 1-2 and Exhibit A (Joint
Status Report) at 3 (D.D.C. Feb. 11, 1992) (districts severely malapportioned).
192. Plaintiffs' Notice of Disposition of Consolidation Bill at 2, City Council of Augusta v. United
States, No. 90-0171 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 1992). After the legislature failed to enact new legislation, the federal
district court dismissed the city's challenge as moot. Order, City Council of Augusta v. United States, No.
90-0171 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 1992). Had local legislation been passed, the legislation would have been
submitted for section 5 review, and the process would have begun anew.
193. For a discussion of the Richmond County delegation gerrymander and its resolution see infra notes
330-35 and accompanying text. For a general discussion of delegation gerrymanders, see infra Part HII(A)(3).
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thus the ability of minority voters to elect candidates.'94 Taken together, these
two aspects of the doctrine address discrimination in the first level of political
competition, beginning with pre-election day activities and ending with the
election itself.195
A third approach, appearing in the last quarter century of voting rights
jurisprudence, recognizes that election outcomes should not define the end of
the inquiry into equality. This post-election stage considers the way in which
electoral power is used in office after election day.196 Although the viability
of post-election stage litigation has been eclipsed by the Presley decision, this
approach remains important both as a critique of that decision and as an
argument for amending the Voting Rights Act.
A. Election Procedures: Formal Barriers to Participation
Black voters have attacked formal barriers to participating in elections as
violations of the Voting Rights Act as well as the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments to the Constitution. t97 Formal impediments to voting include
absolute denials of the franchise, procedures making it more difficult actually
to cast a vote, and rules affecting other pre-election activities. Cases decided
194. Although the term "vote dilution" is used with great frequency by commentators and the courts,
no single definition is accepted in all contexts. Davidson, supra note 104, at 4. Most often the term is used
to describe election laws and practices-such as at-large elections--that make it more difficult for minority
groups to elect candidates to office without restricting the ability of minority voters to cast a ballot. Id. This
definition may be too narrow in some contexts because it fails to acknowledge that any action that limits
the practical political power of minority voters could properly be viewed as resulting in "vote dilution"--that
is, making the votes of minority voters worth less than those of their white counterparts. See Frank R.
Parker, The Mississippi Congressional Redistricting Case: A Case Study in Minority Vote Dilution, 28 How.
L.J. 397, 397 (1985) (quoting a speech by Reverend Jesse Jackson comparing vote dilution to "yellow rain").
Nonetheless, in deference to common usage, I use the term "vote dilution" in this section in its narrower
sense to refer to those mechanisms that determine the composition of the electorate voting for a given office.
195. Other commentators have traced similar themes in the development of voting rights jurisprudence,
although they have labeled the relevant categories somewhat differently. See Davidson, supra note 104, at
3 (identifying relevant types of discrimination as disfranchisement, candidate diminution and vote dilution);
Kathryn Abrams, "Raising Politics Up:" Minority Political Participation and Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 449,453 (1988) (identifying themes of political opportunity and electoral success);
Guinier, supra note 29, at 1415-18; Lard Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and
the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1093-94 (1991) [hereinafter Guinier,
Triumph of Tokenism] (describing first and second generation voting rights litigation).
196. See, e.g., Guinier, Triumph of Tokenism, supra note 195, at 1126 (describing prejudice in the post-
election phase as a"third-generation" problem); Alan Howard & Bruce Howard, The Dilemma of the Voting
Rights Act-Recognizing the Emerging Political Equality Norm, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1615, 1654 (1983)
(criticizing remedies that provide a "bye" into the second level of political competition); Pamela S. Karlan,
Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 237 (1989) (describing remedies to "enhance the practical political power and
inclusion of minority representatives").
197. Most litigants making statutory challenges to direct impediments to voting rights have alleged
violations of section 5. See infra notes 203-07 and accompanying text. The amendment of section 2 also
has spawned litigation challenging such barriers. See, e.g., Operation Push v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1245
(N.D. Miss. 1987), affd, 932 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying section 2 to dual registration system and
prohibition on satellite registration); Harris v. Graddick, 601 F. Supp. 70 (M.D. Ala. 1984); 615 F. Supp.
239 (M.D. Ala. 1985) (appointment of poll officials).
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under the Constitution involve challenges to the white primary, 98 literacy
tests,199 poll taxes, 20 and manipulations of city boundaries.2°' Although
the Supreme Court was shamefully slow to recognize that these devices in-
fringed upon protected voting rights, there is no doubt that the practices
disfranchised blacks by making it more difficult for them to cast a ballot.
In recent years, section 5 of the Voting Rights Act has provided an effec-
tive weapon for striking down more subtle impediments to voting.203 When
the Supreme Court first addressed the scope of section 5, in Allen v. State
Board of Elections,' 4 the Court applied that section to changes in candidate
qualifications, procedures for casting write-in votes, changes from elective to
appointive offices, and changes from single-member districts to at-large elec-
tions.205 Later, the Court found that section 5 reached changes in the location
of polling places1°6 and personnel rules governing leaves of absence for pro-
spective candidates. 2°7
The constitutional cases, coupled with the decisions under section 5, afford
broad protections for voting rights in the pre-election and election day phase.
The doctrine protects a broad span of political participation, ranging from
198. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). See also Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon
v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Hemdon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). The white primary is described
supra note 8.
199. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 333-34 (1966), the Court recognized that under
Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53 (1959), literacy tests were not per se
unconstitutional but could be applied in a discriminatory fashion. The cases holding literacy tests unconstitu-
tional dealt with statutes that exempted certain groups from taking the test ("the grandfather clause cases"),
see Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915), and Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915), or imposed
procedural hurdles to passing the test, see Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939) (finding cause of action
under Fifteenth Amendment in suit against literacy requirements).
200. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (overruling Breedlove v. Suttles,
302 U.S. 277 (1937)) (Fourteenth Amendment).
201. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). The Gomillion case is discussed in more detail
supra note 11.
202. The Court's halfhearted efforts to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment prior to the enactment of the
Voting Rights Act are well-documented. See, e.g., JOEL WILLIAMSON, THE CRUCIBLE OF RACE: BLACK-
WHITE RELATIONS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH SINCE EMANCIPATION (1984); Emma C. Jordan, The Future
of the Fifteenth Amendment, 28 HOw. L.J. 541 (1985). The Court's more recent efforts are no less troubling.
See Emma C. Jordan, Taking Voting Rights Seriously: Rediscovering the Fifteenth Amendment, 64 NEB.
L. REV. 389 (1985).
203. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of section 5 in South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301 (1966). The Department of Justice, in its role as chief enforcer of section 5, reviews many
changes that affect the pre-election and election-day activities of voters. Between 1965 and October 1991,
the Department reviewed nearly 200,000 voting changes. United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights
Division, Voting Section, Number of Changes by State and Calendar Year, 1965-1991 (Oct. 9, 1991) (on
file with author). See infra notes 437-50 for a description of the administrative and judicial mechanism for
section 5 review.
204. 393 U.S. 544 (1969). The Court held that section 5 applies to any measure that could "undermine
the effectiveness of voters," id. at 570-71, and should be given "the broadest possible scope," id. at 567.
205. The method of election change is more properly considered a vote dilution device, rather than
a formal barrier. See supra note 194 (defining vote dilution).
206. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 388 (1971) ("[Polling place] locations at distances remote
from black communities or at places calculated to intimidate blacks from entering, or failure to publicize
changes adequately" could affect voters' ability to exercise franchise.).
207. Dougherty County Bd. of Educ. v. White, 439 U.S. 32 (1978).
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election day activities to earlier points at which, for example, a restrictive
personnel rule can discourage candidates from running for office. This "interac-
tive" view of the political process looks backward from election day, encom-
passing the various steps along the way that make the election of candidates
to office possible.
B. Vote Dilution: The Electoral Phase
In the wake of court decisions striking down formal restrictions on the right
to vote, plaintiffs developed new theories to address other less obvious-but
equally insidious-forms of voting discrimination. These approaches looked
at existing electoral structures, under which minority candidates were consist-
ently defeated, and asserted that the minority voters' votes were worth
less-that is, their votes were diluted-when compared to those of white
voters. °8
The starting point for an examination of vote dilution litigation is Reynolds
v. Sims.W9 In that case, suburban residents of Alabama's large cities alleged
their votes were worth less than those of rural voters because legislative
districts containing vastly different numbers of people were given the same
numbers of representatives. 20 The Court, equating vote dilution with mathe-
matical inequality, noted that legislative apportionments that were not popula-
tion-based deprived voters in overpopulated districts of the right to vote no less
than would policies that prohibited them from voting, permitted other voters
to cast more votes, or multiplied the votes of others by some factor.2 " A
voter, the Court held, is deprived of the right to vote if the district in which
he or she resides elects fewer representatives than a district with an equal or
greater number of residents, or elects the same number of representatives as
does a district with fewer residents.12
208. Vote dilution is defined supra note 194, but the line between direct impediments to voting and
vote dilution mechanisms is not always so clear. For instance, although poll taxes are commonly categorized
as formal barriers to participating in elections, see Davidson, supra note 104, at 3, others define poll taxes
as vote dilutive, see BELL, supra note 152, at 89. Even though annexations and deannexations are analogous
to other voting restrictions in that they impose barriers to voting, they also might be considered vote dilutive
because they operate as gerrymanders by determining the boundaries of voting districts. See Frank R. Parker,
Racial Gerrymandering and Legislative Reapportionment, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 7, at
85.
209. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). The impact of Reynolds' theory of population-based representation on the
structure of legislative delegations is discussed infra Part TII(A)(2).
210. For a view of Reynolds as a case about enhancing the political power of white suburbanites, see
Blacksher & Menefee, supra note 167.
211. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562.
212. The Reynolds theory of vote dilution has been characterized as the quantitative prong of vote
dilution theory. See Karlan, supra note 196, at 176 (describing quantitative and qualitative theories
generally). The Reynolds approach, which focused on vote counting rather than on articulating a theory about
the relationship of voting to the political process, has been criticized from its inception. See Blacksher &




Reynolds moved from the existing theory of voting rights, which prohibited
absolute barriers to participation, to an approach based upon equalizing the
power of different groups of voters who could otherwise register and vote
freely. As the Court saw it, "the right of suffrage can be denied by a debase-
ment or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by
wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.
213
In the aftermath of Reynolds, plaintiffs challenged election structures on
the grounds that they submerged--or diluted-the votes of black voters. These
cases became known as racial vote dilution cases.2t 4 These plaintiffs claimed
not that they were prevented from registering and voting, or that their votes
were miscounted, but that their votes were less effective than those cast by
white voters. As a numerical majority, the preferences of white voters invari-
ably prevailed.
In White v. Regester,1 6 the Supreme Court defined the test for racial vote
dilution under the Constitution for the first time.217 White involved the validi-
ty of a reapportionment plan for the Texas House of Representatives.2 8 In
sustaining the district court's finding of racial vote dilution, the Court articulat-
ed a "totality of the circumstances" test for determining the existence of this
213. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555 (emphasis added).
214. Smith v. Paris, 257 F. Supp. 901 (M.D. Ala. 1966), a case from Barbour County, Alabama,
resulted in the first published opinion in a racial vote dilution case. See Karlan, supra note 196, at 184 n.45.
Racial vote dilution cases actually lie in the middle of the spectrum of vote dilution litigation, which had
its origins in the one-person, one-vote logic of Reynolds and has since been found to include claims of
political vote dilution. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 1 (1986). The racial vote dilution cases developed
along two separate lines: the constitutional cases litigated under the Equal Protection Clause prior to the
amendment of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, see infra notes 216-30 and accompanying text, and the
statutory cases litigated after the amendment of section 2, see infra notes 231-44 and accompanying text.
215. Racial vote dilution theory differed from the Reynolds approach in one important respect The
one-person one-vote mandate has a quantitative dimension because it assures an individual right to have
one's district represented in the legislature in proportion to its population, see supra note 212 and accomp-
anying text, while the principles forbiding discriminatory racial apportionments have a qualitative dimension:
racial groups have a right to equal influence in the outcome of elections vis-4-vis the majority group. Karlan,
supra note 196, at 176.
216. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
217. The legislative history of amended section 2 describes White as "the leading pre-Bolden vote
dilution case." S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 179
[hereinafter SENATE REPORT]. By identifying an aggregate of factors, White offered more guidance than
did earlier decisions on how electoral structures should be measured against Equal Protection standards.
Compare White, 412 U.S. at 766-69, with Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971) (asking whether
blacks were afforded an equal opportunity "to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators
of their choice"); Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966) (asking whether "a particular multi-member
scheme effects an invidious result"); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965) (asking whether structure
"minimize[s] or cancel[s] out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population").
218. The State used multimember districts when electing members to the house of representatives for
the eleven counties that included large metropolitan areas, but used single-member districts in the remainder
of the state. The issue culminating in White concerned only the racially discriminatory aspects of multi-
member districts in Dallas and Bexar counties, 412 U.S. at 756, although the Court also considered whether
the plan as a whole satisfied one-person, one-vote requirements. Id. On remand, the district court heard
evidence that the remaining nine multimember districts were racially discriminatory. Graves v. Barnes, 378
F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Tex. 1974).
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phenomenon." 9 The Court catalogued a number of political, social, and elec-
toral factors supporting the finding that multimember districts discriminated
against blacks in Dallas County, and Mexican-Americans in Bexar County 2
These factors included the history of de jure discrimination against blacks and
Mexican-Americans in Texas, the lack of success of black and Mexican-Ameri-
can candidates in state legislative elections, the use of numbered place and
majority vote requirements," appeals to race in the candidate slating and
campaign processes, and the nonresponsiveness of the state legislative delega-
tion. The ultimate question was whether the minority voters enjoyed "less
opportunity than did other residents to participate in the political processes and
to elect legislators of their choice.' '222 The election of representatives to office
was one aspect of "effective participation in political life."2 3
Following White, the lower courts assessed vote dilution under this "results"
test, but focused primarily on whether minority voters could elect candidates
to office. The touchstone was whether minority voters were aggregated in a
district or districts in high enough numbers that their votes were sufficient to
elect one or more candidates.2 Where black voters and white voters vote
differently,225 a districting plan that disaggregated minority voters by dividing
219. White, 412 U.S. at 769.
220. White, 412 U.S. at 766-69. These factors were catalogued more concisely in Zimmer v. McKeithen,
485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973), affd sub nom. East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 422 U.S. 636
(1976), in which the court held that minority votes can be diluted by "an aggregate of... factors," including
"a lack of access to the process of slating candidates, the unresponsiveness of legislators to [minority voters]
particularized interests, a tenuous state policy underlying the preference for multi-member or at-large
districting, or... the existence of past discrimination in general [that] precludes the effective participation
in the election system ..." (footnote omitted). These factors are "enhanced by a showing of the existence
of large districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot voting provisions and the lack of provision
for at-large candidates running from particular geographic subdistricts." Id. These factors are now referred
to as "primary" and "enhancing" factors.
221. Numbered place (or post) laws require candidates in multimember districts to fill designated seats,
and voters to vote for one candidate for each seat. Davidson, supra note 104, at 7. Majority vote require-
ments mandate that only candidates receiving more than 50% of the votes cast will be declared winners,
and require a runoff election between the top two candidates if neither receives a majority. Karlan, supra
note 2, at 26-27. Both requirements can impair the voting strength of black voters. Laughlin McDonald,
The Majority Vote Requirement: Its Use and Abuse in the South, 17 URB. LAW. 429 (1985) (acknowledging
that majority vote requirements dilute black voting strength but concluding that abolition of such require-
ments would be counterproductive); Davidson, supra note 104, at 7 (numbered place laws).
222. White, 412 U.S. at 766. This test was later codified in section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as
amended. See infra notes 231-34 and accompanying text.
223. White, 412 U.S. at 769. The suggestion in White that participation includes access to a more
extended political process, including the post-election activities of legislators themselves, is further explored
infra Part IV.
224. In White, the Court focused on whether multimember districts provided black and Mexican-
American voters with the opportunity to elect candidates, 412 U.S. at 765-66, although it reiterated its prior
holding that the lack of proportional representation would not by itself sustain a racial vote dilution claim.
Much of the early vote dilution litigation challenged at-large structures for the election of local governing
bodies. See, e.g., Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968
(1977); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc) (at-large elections for police jury
and school board), affd sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976) (per
curiam).
225. Voting patterns in which "black voters and white voters vote differently," Thornburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30, 53 n.21 (1986), are called "racially polarized voting" or "racial bloc voting." In the absence
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them among different districts or submerging them in a larger district failed to
satisfy this standard.22
Constitutional vote dilution theory took a sharp turn in Mobile v.
Bolden.227 The plurality in Bolden rejected the "results" approach of earlier
cases, and held that a finding of discriminatory intent is necessary to prove that
an election system unconstitutionally dilutes the weight of minority votes.
228
Although the totality of circumstances test might be used as evidence of
discriminatory motive, it could not by itself establish intent. The only real issue
was what was in the minds of the legislators-in this case, the legislative
delegation-who were responsible for the election system.229 The Court thus
reversed the district court's finding of discrimination and remanded the case
for further proceedings.Y0
Congress responded to Bolden by amending section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act in 1982 to clarify that discriminatory purpose was not an essential element
of a vote dilution claim.231 Instead, an electoral system or other "standard,
of racial bloc voting, districting lines would have little relevance to whether candidates preferred by minority
voters were successful.
226. At that time, elections for state and local offices shared features that diluted black voting strength.
Elections for county and municipal office were held on either an at-large or a district basis, with some
jurisdictions adopting election systems that included features of both. At the time, the "winner-take-all"
feature of at-large elections was a well-known means of ensuring that the majority could always outvote
the minority. See EDWARD C. BANFIELD & JAMES Q. WILSON, CITY PoLIcS 87-96, 307-09 (1965). Even
in the absence of at-large elections, artfully drawn districts could fragment existing concentrations of
minority voters. State legislators were elected from single-member districts, multimember districts, or a
combination of both. Bernard Grofman, Alternatives to Single-Member Plurality Districts: Legal and
Empirical Issues, 9 POL'Y STUD. J. 875, 889 n.1 (1981). While single-member districts could fragment
minority voters, multimember districts could submerge minority votes in the same fashion as at-large
elections. An at-large district is simply the largest possible multimember district for that jurisdiction, with
the boundaries of the district identical to the jurisdiction's boundaries. Id. at 875.
227. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). Under the city commission form of government, which Mobile had used since
1911, the city was governed by three commissioners, elected by Mobile voters at large. Although the city's
population was more than 35% black, no black candidate had ever been elected to serve on the city commis-
sion. Id. at 97-98 (white, J., dissenting). The relevance of the Mobile decision to the powers of legislative
delegations is discussed supra notes 143-47.
228. The plurality read White as "strongly indicating that only a purposeful dilution of the plaintiffs'
vote would offend the Equal Protection Clause," id. at 69, in contrast to Zimmer, which was "quite evidently
decided upon the misunderstanding that it is not necessary to show a discriminatory purpose in order to
prove a violation of the Equal Protection Clause-that proof of a discriminatory effect is sufficient." Id.
at 71. The plurality decision in Bolden was harshly criticized in the academic and legal communities. See,
e.g., Kousser, How to Determine Intent, supra note 94, at 700 (plurality received "perhaps the most
vociferous protest of any Supreme Court civil rights opinion since Brown"); Frank R. Parker, The "Results"
Test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: Abandoning the Intent Standard, 69 VA. L. REV. 715 (1983);
Aviam Soifer, Complacency and Constitutional Law, 42 OHIO ST. LJ. 383 (1981). But see, e.g., James F.
Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race Discrimination: Perspectives on the Purpose vs. the Results Approach
from the Voting Rights Act, 69 VA. L. REV. 633 (1983).
229. 446 U.S. at 74 (describing "[d]iscrimination by white [city] officials" as "the most tenuous and
circumstantial evidence" of discriminatory purpose).
230. After remand, the district court held that racial discrimination motivated the city to change its
form of government in 1911, Bolden v. Mobile, 542 F. Supp. 1050, 1076 (S.D. Ala. 1982), that the system
had been maintained for racial reasons, and that its effect was to deny blacks access to the political system.
Id. at 1077.
231. SENATE REPORT, supra note 217, at 214-15 (noting that intent standard is "unnecessarily divisive"
in requiring proof of racism; requires an "inordinately difficult" burden of proof; and "asks the wrong
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practice or procedure" that "results in a denial or abridgement" of the right to
vote of members of racial or language minorities was prohibited. 2 A viola-
tion of the statute is established where the "totality of circumstances" demon-
strates that minority voters "have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of
their choice." 233 The statutory language was taken directly from White v.
Regester, whose definition of vote dilution was codified by the amendment.
2 4
Finally, in Thornburg v. Gingles,"5 the Supreme Court further defined
the statutory test for one type of vote dilution, an "ability to elect" claim.2
36
In reviewing a challenge to North Carolina's multimember districts for electing
state legislators, the Court stated that, "[t]he essence of a § 2 claim is that a
certain electoral law, practice or structure interacts with social and historical
conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and
white voters to elect their preferred representatives. ' 'n7 The Court found that
of the seven factors identified in the senate report, the most significant for a
claim of vote dilution in a multimember district was "the history and extent of
question"). In amending section 2, Congress stated that proof of discriminatory intent had never been an
element of the statutory claim, noting that the amendment "restate[d] Congress' earlier intent that violations
of the Voting Rights Act, including section 2, could be established by showing the discriminatory effect
of the challenged practice." H.R. REP. No. 227, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1981) (footnotes omitted). See
also Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); SENATE REPORT, supra note 217, at 179.
232. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1988).
233. Id. § 1973(b). The statute provides that "[t]he extent to which members of a protected class have
been elected to office ... is one circumstance which may be considered ... ," 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b),
although this language was accompanied by the disclaimer that "nothing in this section establishes a right
to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population." Id.
This latter proviso, known as the Dole Compromise, is explained in SENATE REPORT, supra note 217, at
363-64 (additional views of Senator Dole).
234. SENATE REPORT, supra note 217, at 16, 27. A complete list of the factors derived from White's
analytical framework is provided in the senate report. These "typical" factors include:
I. [T]he extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that
touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to
participate in the democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially
polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts,
majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures
that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group have been
denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear
the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder
their ability to participate effectively in the political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the
jurisdiction.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 217, at 206-07 (footnotes omitted).
235. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
236. Id. at 46. The plaintiffs' theory of the case was that the legislature's choice of multimember
districts, rather than single-member districts, submerged concentrations of black voters and impaired their
ability to elect their candidates of choice.
237. Id. at 47.
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minority electoral success and of racial bloc voting." 38 In addressing the
plaintiffs' theory that the redistricting diluted the votes of black voters through
"submergence in multimember districts,"239 the Court adopted a standard that
focused on electoral outcomes under the challenged system: "a bloc voting
majority must usually be able to defeat candidates supported by a politically
cohesive, geographically insular minority group."'  The Court took what it
called a "functional" view of the political process, and suggested that this
standard might vary with the type of dilution claim asserted.241
Since Gingles, the section 2 "results" test has provided the cornerstone for
protecting and enforcing voting rights. 42 Litigation under amended section
238. Id. at 49 n.15 (citation omitted). The Court has been criticized for articulating a test that bypasses
the remaining factors listed in the senate report. See Abrams, supra note 195, at 464-65.
239. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48.
240. Id. at 49 (emphasis in original). Gingles thus appeared to hold that in order to make out a claim
of vote dilution in a multimember district, a minority group must be able to show "that [it] is sufficiently
large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district." Id. at 50 n.16. In
the wake of Gingles, some courts have treated geographic compactness as a threshhold requirement of a
claim. See, e.g., McGhee v. Granville County, 860 F.2d 110, 117 (4th Cir. 1988); McNeil v. Springfield
Park Dist, 666 F. Supp. 1208, 1211 (C.D. 111. 1987), affd, 851 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1031 (1989). But see Dillard v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1465-66 (M.D. Ala.
1988). Professor Karlan has argued persuasively that Gingles should not be read to impose geographic
compactness as a threshold requirement for a finding of vote dilution. See Karlan, supra note 196, at 199-
213.
241. 478 U.S. at 48 n. 15. Although the Court did not attempt an exhaustive list of all the possible forms
of vote dilution, it specifically identified two other means of dilution in addition to multimember district
submergence: the use of multimember districts to impair the ability of a minority group to influence elections
(in a district where the group would form a substantial proportion but not a majority of the district's
population), id. at 46-47 n.12, and splitting a concentration of minority voters between two or more districts
so that the group constituted a majority in neither district. Id. The Court's cautious view of the application
of its standards to these factual situations is somewhat puzzling, given the obvious similarities between a
gerrymander case and the claim asserted by the Gingles plaintiffs, see Paige v. Gray, 538 F. 2d 1108, 1110
n.l (5th Cir. 1976) ("[C]ourts have not hesitated to apply recent [at-large] dilution cases to solve redistricting
problems.") (citations omitted), and the Court's own suggestion that a geographic compactness requirement
would probably apply to a gerrymander case. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 n.16. See Karlan, supra note 196,
at 199-204 for an incisive criticism of the Court's failure to provide guidance concerning the application
of its holding in other factual contexts.
242. Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196, 202 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (three-judge court) ("[Gingles] is the
pole star of the law."), afftd, 111 S. Ct 662 (1991). Although Section 2 also forbids intentional discrimina-
tion, Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 681
(1991), a court would rarely reach the constitutionality of a challenged election structure because courts
are admonished to resolve constitutional issues only if other grounds are unavailable, Escambia County v.
McMillan, 466 U.S. 48 (1984) (per curiam); Hagans v. Levine, 415 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1974). Because the
results test of section 2 typically is easier to meet than an intent test, most cases are resolved without
considering the purpose behind the election system. See McDonald, supra note 13, at 1279-81 (describing
acceleration of litigation and increased success by plaintiffs under section 2). But see Garza v. County of
Los Angeles, 756 F. Supp. 1298, 1303-04 (C.D. Cal.) (finding districting plan discriminatory both in purpose
and effect), affid, 918 F.2d 763, 771 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 662 (1991). Moreover,
discriminatory intent has the same meaning under section 2 as under the Constitution. Garza, 756 F. Supp.
at 1349; Brown v. Board of Comm'rs, 722 F. Supp. 380, 383 (E.D. Tenn. 1989). Although Gingles did not
discuss Congress' authority to enact civil tights statutes such as section 2 that provide protections beyond
those afforded by the Constitution, it is well-established that Congress may do so. See Karlan, supra note
2, at 14 (Morgan power supports constitutionality of amended section 2); see also Stephen L. Carter, The
"Morgan" Power and the Forced Reconsideration of Constitutional Decisions, 53 U. CHl. L. REV. 819
(1986) (arguing that the Morgan power is best understood as form of moral discourse). The continuing
importance of section 5 to the resolution of voting rights questions is discussed supra notes 437-51 and
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2 since Gingles has centered on the "ability to elect" aspect of vote dil-
ution.243 If a state or locality chooses to make an office an elected office,'"
then the method of election for that position may be examined in terms of its
effect on the ability of minority voters to elect candidates to that office.
In Gingles, the Court faced far less sweeping issues than it had in earlier
decisions. The critical issue in Gingles was the impact of congressional action
on the standard for measuring vote dilution in the familiar context of multi-
member districts 4 5 Although the answer to this question was neither easy
nor unimportant, there was little question that multimember districting plans
could impair black voting strength under some circumstances.2 The Court
was not required to define either the starting or ending point of political
participation, or to assess how to measure dilution at a different stage.
accompanying text.
243. Although the language of section 2 speaks broadly of the opportunities for minority voters to
participate in the political process, see supra text accompanying note 233, few cases filed under section
2 have challenged electoral practices other than discriminatory election systems. Whitfield v. Democratic
Party of Arkansas, 890 F.2d 1423, 1427 (8th Cir. 1989) ("[V]irtually all of the cases decided under section
2 deal with at-large elections or legislative districting matters."), rev'g 686 F. Supp. 1365 (E.D. Ark. 1988),
af'd on reh'g en banc by an equally divided court, 902 F.2d 15 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom.
Whitfield v. Clinton, 111 S. Ct. 1089 (199 1). Claims that electoral participation has been abridged may be
more difficult to assert after Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354 (1991), where the Court noted that section
2 claims must allege an abridgement of the opportunity "to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of one's choice," id. at 2365 (emphasis in original), and that to separate these two aspects
of section 2 would require "radical surgery." Id. This language implies that section 2 does not protect the
opportunity of minority groups to participate in the political process in the absence of an impact on election
results. This interpretation is at odds with the prevailing view that Congress intended to protect a broad
spectrum of political rights, not just the ability to elect candidates. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 195, at
458-59, 475-76; Guinier, Triumph of Tokenism, supra note 195, at 1094-95; Karlan, supra note 196, at 196-
99.
244. For a discussion of the parameters of an elected office, see infra notes 386-88 and accompanying
text. The applicability of section 2 does not depend on the function performed by the elected officials,
Chisom, Ill S. Ct. at 2366; Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Texas, 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991). Before the Court
in Houston Lawyers' rejected the so-called "single-member office theory," 111 S. Ct. at 238 1, several courts
had used this theory to exclude from section 2 coverage any elected position in which the officeholder
served as a member of a single-member rather than a multimember body. See, e.g., United States v. Dallas
County Comm'n, 850 F.2d 1430, 1432 n.1 (I th Cir. 1988) (judicial aspect of office of probate judge), reh'g
denied, 858 F.2d 746 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, I11 S. Ct. 681 (1991); Butts v. City of New York, 779
F.2d 141, 148 (2d Cir. 1985) (mayor), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986). But see Carrollton Branch of
NAACP v. Stallings, 829 F.2d 1547 (1 lth Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Duncan v. Carrollton, 485 U.S.
936 (1988) (single-commissioner county government subject to section 2 challenge where purpose alleged).
For a penetrating criticism of the single-member office exception, see Karlan, supra note 2.
245. See Abrams, supra note 195, at 451-52 (vast majority of voting rights cases during first two
decades following passage of Act dealt with elections for multimember bodies).
246. In Chisom, 111 S. Ct. at 2361, the Court recently reiterated that section 2 protects political
participation beyond the formal right to vote, stating that "there is no question that [the language of section
2 is] broad enough to encompass the use of multimember districts to minimize a racial minority's ability
to influence the outcome of an election." Even before Chisom was decided, most commentators agreed with
this interpretation of section 2, see, e.g., Abrams, supra note 195, at 453-55; Karlan, supra note 196, at 183-
85, but there were dissenters, see, e.g., ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT?: AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS (1987) (section 2 only guarantees formal right to enter voting
booth); Abigail Therastrom, The Odd Evolution of the Voting Rights Act, 55 PUB. INTEREST 49 (1979).
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C. The Post-Election Phase
In contrast to the stages involving electoral participation and the actual
election of candidates, the post-election phase looks to the way electoral power
is used, rather than to the way it is gained. Because the post-election phase
considers the process by which legislative decisions are reached, this stage
examines the powers and duties of elected bodies (and individual elected
officials), as well as legislative structures such as legislative rules and proce-
dures, committee assignments and the like.' 7 How do these legislative func-
tions248 hinder representatives elected by minority voters, and thus restrict the
ability of these voters to cast meaningful ballots?
Before the recent Supreme Court decision in Presley, section 5 clearly
reached the post-election phase but questions remained about the scope of a
voting powers analysis premised on the allocation of power among various
governmental actors. The language of the Act suggested an expansive interpre-
tation of the right to vote, 2A9 as did the views of several commentators 50
The federal courts251 and the Justice Department? 2 concurred that section
247. Put simply, powers and duties are what the legislature does, whereas rules and procedures are
how the legislature goes about doing what it does.
248. The term "legislative function" suggests that powers, duties, and rules and procedures are simply
different aspects of the decisionmaking process. They are conceptually intertwined in the sense that rules
and procedures affect the powers and duties of legislators by including (or excluding) them from the
decisionmaking process.
249. Section 14(c)(1) defines "vote" and "voting" to include "all action necessary to make a vote
effective.., with respect to candidates for public or party office." 42 U.S.C. § 19731 (c)(1) (1988). Section
5 carries out this mandate by scrutinizing "any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure with respect to voting." 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
250. See, e.g., Guinier, supra note 29, at 1504 ('[Changes that affect the minority representatives'
authority and power to decide particular legislative issues should be scrutinized under section 5"); Karlan,
supra note 196, at 180 (urging courts to "look beyond the voting booth to the council chamber and the
'voting' (decision-making) that occurs there").
251. The courts held in four cases that section 5 reached the change in question. Robinson v. Alabama
State Dep't of Educ., 652 F. Supp. 484 (M.D. Ala. 1987) (three-judge court) (transfer of authority over city
schools from elected county school board to appointed city school board), affd, 918 F.2d 183 (1lth Cir.
1990); Hardy v. Wallace, 603 F. Supp. 174 (N.D. Ala. 1985) (three-judge court) (transfer of appointment
power over county racing commission from legislative delegation to governor); County Council v. United
States, 555 F. Supp. 694 (D.D.C. 1983) (three-judge court) (transfer of authority from state legislature,
governor, and legislative delegation to county council); Horry County v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 990
(D.D.C. 1978) (three-judge court) (transfer of administrative functions from chairperson elected at large to
administrator appointed by city council). In a fifth case, the court held that the transfer of road supervision
authority from individual commissioners to the holdover commissioners was covered, while changes which
altered the spending authority of individual commissioners and transferred road operations to the county
engineer were not. Mack v. Russell County Comm., No. 89-T-459-E (M.D. Ala. Aug. 1, 1990) (three-judge
court) (transfers of decisionmaking authority), affd sub nom. Presley v. Etowah County Comm., 112 S.
Ct. 820 (1992) (no appeal taken from ruling that road supervision change covered). In a sixth case, Rojas
v. Victoria Independent School District, No. V-87-16, 1988 WL 92053 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 1988) (three-
judge court), affd, 490 U.S. 1001 (1989) (mem.), the court found that the "de minimis import" of the agenda
policy at issue placed it outside of section 5, id. at *2, but expressly declined to exempt all actions that "[lie]
beyond the actual election process" from section 5. Id. at *1.
252. Comments, Final Rule, Revision of Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 52 Fed. Reg. 486, 488 (1987) [hereinafter Comments]; 28 C.F.R. § 51.15 (1991)
(enabling legislation for political subunits covered under section 5). Before Presley, the Justice Department
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5 covered actions taking place after election day, although they drew different
distinctions between changes that implicated voting and those that did not. 3
Although the Supreme Court had not reached the question prior to Presley, one
decision, City of Lockhart v. United States,' 4 suggested an interpretation of
section 5 that would include powers and duties, while a second decision,
McCain v. Lybrand25 remained neutral.
reviewed numerous submissions involving reallocations of the authority of individual officeholders and
elected bodies and objected to changes of this type on at least eight occasions. Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 16-17 and n.6, Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct.
820 (1992) (Nos. 90-711 and 90-712) [hereinafter Brief for the United States]. These decisions spanned
a fourteen-year period, with the most recent decision rendered on May 7, 1990 (San Patricio, Texas: transfer
of voter registration duties from county clerk to county tax authority) and the earliest on March 2, 1976
(Mobile, Alabama: transfer of administrative functions from city commission to individual commissioners).
In some instances, these changes implicated home rule because authority was transferred from one level
of government to another. See, e.g., Hillsborough County, Florida (Aug. 29, 1984) (transfer of power over
municipalities from legislative delegation to county commission; objection withdrawn after change revoked);
City of Brunswick and Glynn County, Georgia (Aug. 16, 1982) (transfer of power from separate city and
county commissions to consolidated commission); Colleton County, South Carolina (Sept. 4, 1979) (transfer
of school taxing authority from legislative delegation to county council); Edgefield County, South Carolina
(Feb. 8, 1979) (transfer of increased taxing power to county council); Charleston County, South Carolina
(June 14, 1977) (transfer of taxing authority from legislative delegation to county council). Brief for the
United States, supra, at 16 n.6.
253. In its amicus brief in Presley, the Department offered the following test: "[T]ransfers of authority
that implicate an elected official's decisionmal'ng authority are covered by Section 5," while "[changes
that do not affect an offical's power to make decisions generally have no such potential to dilute the power
of a citizen's vote." Brief for the United States, supra note 252, at 17-18. The courts have applied several
tests in evaluating these changes. See, e.g., Mack v. Russell County Comm., No. 89-T-459-E, slip op. at
19 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 1, 1990) (appropriate standard is whether changes "effect a significant relative change
in the powers exercised by governmental officials elected by, or responsible to, substantially different
constituencies"); Hardy, 603 F. Supp. at 179 (describing relevant attributes of modifications of governmental
duties that fall within reach of section 5); Horry County, 449 F. Supp. at 995 (change that "reallocates
governmental powers among elected officials voted upon by different constituencies" is covered by section
5).
254. 460 U.S. 125 (1983). The City of Lockhart, Texas, changed its form of government from a
commission, consisting of a mayor and two commissioners, to a city council, consisting of a mayor and
four councilmembers. The commission was elected at large, using a "numbered-posf' system in which each
candidate filed for a separate seat. See supra note 221 for a discussion of numbered posts. Under the new
system, these officials continued to be elected at-large from numbered posts, but the city expanded its
governing body and added staggered terms to which councilmembers were elected in alternate years. The
city conceded that the increase in the body's size and the addition of staggered terms were covered changes,
but argued that the two "continuing" council seats could not be reviewed for discrimination because they
had not changed: there were two "numbered" at-large seats under both the new and old systems.
The Court rejected this argument, and instead evaluated the relative position of the numbered post
seats under the old and new system in terms of their relationship to the governing body: "In moving from
a three-member commission to a five-member council, [the city] has changed the nature of the seats at
issue.... For example, [the two old seats] now constitute only 40% of the council, rather than 67% of the
commission." 460 U.S. at 131. In effect, the change reallocated the authority of the individuals holding the
at-large seats. Although their formal powers had not changed, they functionally possessed different powers
on a three-member body than on a five-member body.
255. 465 U.S. 236 (1984). McCain does not undercut the argument that reallocations of governmental
authority are covered by section 5. The question before the Court was whether the Attorney General had
precleared the changes incorporated in a 1966 South Carolina statute. Because the parties had stipulated
that the statute incorporated voting changes, the Court simply observed that "several changes are suggested,"
including "the basic reallocation of authority from the state legislative delegation to the [county council]."
Id. at 250 n.17. The Court held that preclearance had not been obtained, id. at 254, 257-58, and remanded
the case to the district court to identify the covered changes.
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Although the question of whether a particular change is covered requires
a case-by-case determination, 2 6 all decisions applying section 5 standards to
changes in the political system's distribution of power assume that the power
of a person's vote is dependent upon the power held by his or her elected
representatives. 7 To strip a representative of all power renders the vote for
that office meaningless, while a diminution or transfer of these powers can
reduce the effectiveness of constituents' votes. Whatever the limits of this
analysis, the few decisions that concern reallocations of authority apply a
concept of voting rights that looks beyond the voting booth.
Presley, however, effectively blocked the use of section 5 against discrimi-
nation in the post-election stage by holding that "[c]hanges which affect only
the distribution of power among officials are not subject to § 5 because such
changes have no direct relation to, or impact on, voting. ''258
In Presley, the Court considered changes in the powers and duties of
elected members serving on the county commissions of Etowah and Russell
Counties, Alabama, whose "principal function [was] to supervise and control
the maintenance, repair, and construction of the county roads." 259 In Etowah
County, each individual county commissioner traditionally determined how to
spend the road funds allocated to his or her district. But nine months after the
county's first black commissioner took office, the four holdover members
altered this longstanding practice via the "Common Fund Resolution," which
transferred spending authority for road funds to the Commission as a whole.
The Russell County Commission also abolished individual road districts and,
through a "Unit System," transferred the responsibility of individual commis-
sioners for road operations to the appointed county engineer. The federal district
court found these changes to be outside the scope of section 5," ° and the
Supreme Court affirmed.
The Court read its previous section 5 holdings as presenting only four
categories of voting changes: changes in "the manner of voting"; changes in
256. The Justice Department has declined to specify all possible covered changes, noting that "we do
not believe that a sufficiently clear principle has yet emerged distinguishing covered from noncovered re-
allocations to enable us to expand our list of illustrative examples [of covered changes] in a helpful way."
Comments, supra note 252, at 488.
257. See, e.g., Robinson v. Alabama State Dep't of Educ., 652 F. Supp. 484,485-86 (M.D. Ala. 1987)
(three-judge court), affd, 918 F.2d 183 (11th Cir. 1990); Hardy v. Wallace, 603 F. Supp. 174, 178 (N.D.
Ala. 1985) (three-judge court). These cases should be viewed as the logical successors to Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964), in which the right to vote also was considered a right to equal voting power. Although
the Court did not expressly use the term "power" when describing the protected right, its concept of "one-
person, one-vote" reflects a concern with voting power. All Alabama voters literally cast the same number
of votes, but the plaintiffs' votes were "undervalued." Id. at 563. The only difference is that Reynolds looked
at voting power from the perspective of election day, whereas these cases look beyond election day to the
duties actually performed by elected officials.
258. Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820, 830 (1992).
259. Id. at 824.
260. Mack v. Russell County Comm'n, No. 89-T-459-E (M.D. Ala. Aug. 1, 1990). The parties did not
appeal the district court's holding that a resolution precluding two newly-elected commissioners from
exercising road supervision authority was covered by section 5.
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"candidacy requirements and qualifications"; changes in "the composition of
the electorate that may vote for candidates for a given office"; and finally,
changes "affecting the creation or abolition of an elective office.' 261 The
Court found that the changes at issue fell outside this description because
"[t]hey had no impact on the substantive question whether a particular office
would be elective or the procedural question how an election would be conduct-
ed," and thus could not be considered rules governing voting.262
Presley leaves little room to argue that voting power is compromised by
changes in the individual or collective powers and duties of elected officials,
or by changes in the internal operating procedures of governing bodies. Unless
a transfer of decisionmaking authority eviscerates an official's responsibil-
ities,263 the logic of Presley affords no remedy under the Voting Rights Act
for post-election stage discrimination.264 In Part IV, I revisit the post-election
phase to consider the real world implications of Presley in the context of
legislative delegations and to suggest other avenues of relief.
III. RIGHTS AND REMEDIES:
DELEGATION DILUTION AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
Legislative delegations have played a behind-the-scenes role in Voting
Rights Act litigation. They were responsible for establishing Mobile, Alabama's
unconstitutional election system265 and were the object of racial maneuvering
in Greene County, Alabama.266 Despite the fact that delegations have been
responsible for many discriminatory election practices, the methods and factors
determining a delegation's composition, whether they be reapportionment or
annexation, have not been examined. A thorough examination of delegations
261. Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 828.
262. Id. at 832. Although the Court said it was not "implying that the four typologies exhaust the
statute's coverage," id. at 828, this caveat seems more reflexive than sincere. The Court relied heavily on
this typology in excluding changes in the power of elected bodies, id. at 829-30, and reiterated it in
excluding the specific changes at issue. Id. at 832. Thus, the opinion should be read as limiting the reach
of section 5 to this four-part typology.
263. The Court left open the possibility that, under some circumstances, the transfer of duties from
an elected to an appointed official might amount to a de facto substantive decision replacing an elected
office with an appointed one, 112 S. Ct. at 83 1, but the decision suggests that this would be the exceptional
case.
264. The Court suggested that other legal theories might apply: "Nothing we say implies that the
conduct at issue in these cases is not actionable under a different remedial scheme. The Voting Rights Act
is not an all-purpose antidiscrimination statute." Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 832. The decision in Presley stands
in sharp contrast to earlier decisions in which the Court made courageous leaps of faith in articulating new
theories to combat impairments of voting power. In Reynolds the Court boldly created new conceptions of
voting equality, see supra notes 209-13 and accompanying text. In White, the Court drew on Reynolds to
articulate a theory combating the opinion's otherwise majoritarian thrust and furthering minority representa-
tion. See Blacksher & Menefee, supra note 167, at 5, 37 (describing Reynolds as majoritarian).
265. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
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demonstrates that their structure should be held accountable to the demands of
the Voting Rights Act.
An analysis of delegations also helps reveal the limits of the standard vote
dilution theory developed in other contexts. As described in Part H, vote
dilution theory traditionally holds that discrimination occurs when black voters
enjoy less opportunity to elect candidates of their choice than do their white
counterparts. Voting rights doctrine would treat delegations differently depend-
ing on whether they are considered to be "superlegislatures," and hence similar
to elected bodies, or simply parts of the legislative process, akin to legislative
committees. 267 For delegations to fit into the electoral phase of standard vot-
ing rights jurisprudence, they must be characterized as formal governing bodies,
analogous to city councils and county commissions.
Although a complete understanding of the status of delegations must await
the more detailed analysis later in this Part, it is worthwhile at this juncture to
note that a functional view of the political process does suggest the framework
of an answer. This perspective yields a striking image of delegations as elected
bodies that are the functional equivalents of local governing bodies.268 Like
other governmental entities, delegations have defined memberships as well as
jurisdiction over legislation affecting their counties. Each delegation meets as
a group to determine its position concerning a local bill. Delegations are granted
a large degree of autonomy within the legislature, and their decisions are rarely
overridden. In effect, the legislature has delegated its control over local matters
to the legislators from each locality.
Under this functional view, legislative delegations share with the local
governing body responsibility for legislation concerning local matters. The
extent to which they share responsibility depends upon the relative degree of
home rule allowed by the state. Where cities and counties enjoy little home
rule, delegations exercise more control over local matters; where home rule is
more extensive, on the other hand, delegations play a less important role in
local governance. However, delegations operate in either scenario as de facto
267. Presley cited changes in committee structure as an example of an "enactment... having nothing
to do with voting." 112 S. Ct. at 829. Despite the enormous literature on legislative committees, political
scientists have offered few helpful definitions. See Heinz Eulau & Vera McCluggage, Standing Committees
in Legislatures, in HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 395-96 (describing committees as a "collective unit of
action" that mediates roles of legislator as individual member, as committee member, and as part of
legislature as whole).
268. Delegations are often described as if they were formal bodies. See, e.g., CHESTNUT & CASS, supra
note 106, at 291 (stating that"[t]here were no blacks in our local delegation then"); Robert B. McNeil, States
News Service, Oct. 20, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library (untitled) (describing State Sen. Hank
Sanders and State Rep. Lucius Black as first "black legislative delegation" from western Alabama). Even
a cursory reading of most local newspapers in the South reveals that day-to-day deliberations of delegations
often receive more attention than activities of the state legislature as a whole.
1992]
The Yale Law Journal
legislatures for local jurisdictions. 269 What, then, is the potential for discrimi-
nation in the selection of delegation members?
A. Method of Determining Delegations' Composition: Reapportionment,
Annexation, and Delegation Gerrymanders270
The major determinant of who sits on legislative delegations is the legisla-
tive reapportionment process. As we have seen, a delegation comprises those
legislators whose districts include some portion of the county. By changing
legislative district lines, the legislature influences not only who is elected to
the state legislature, but also who serves on the legislative delegation for each
city and county in the state. Although annexations can affect the membership
of city delegations, they rarely have an impact on county delegation member-
ship.271 Because legislative reapportionment is the only structural change that
has great potential to affect both city and county delegations, the impact of
reapportionment on delegation membership is the major focus of this sec-
tion."
If legislative delegations are akin to local governing bodies, then each
legislative reapportionment is also a reapportionment of the delegation.273 By
simply extending a district line across a county boundary to take in a small
piece of an adjoining county, the resulting legislative district and the voters
within it become part of the governance system for that county. By becoming
a member of the county's legislative delegation, that district's legislator can
influence the deliberations of that body and can propose or block legislation
sponsored by other delegation members. This phenomenon can lead to discrim-
ination against minority voters.
269. Because delegations do not have the status of formal governing bodies, the analogy is not exact.
Although delegation members serve because they have been elected by a designated district, they do not
run for an office identified as "legislative delegation member." Instead, legislators become members as a
result of longstanding legislative practice or legislative rules. Moreover, while delegations play a critical
role in passing local legislation, the legislature as a whole can refuse to follow the tradition of local courtesy.
270. The term "gerrymander" is derived from a combination of the words Gerry and salamander,
describing the salamander-shaped legislative district that Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry approved.
DIXON, supra note 17, at 459 n.2. Although in popular usage, "gerrymander" refers to the practice of seeking
political advantage by drawing bizarrely shaped districts, it is commonly understood that a district need not
have been assigned an irregular shape to affect the political advantage of different groups. Id. at 459-60;
see also Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REv. 77,
89-93 (1985) (noting district's shape not conclusive evidence of gerrymandering).
271. Blanton v. Campbell, No. 2-91-3635-1 (D.S.C. amended complaintfiled Dec. 12, 1991), the South
Carolina litigation discussed supra note 21, is an exception to the general rule that county boundaries seldom
change. See supra note 39.
272. Nonetheless, my proposals for the measure of dilution that should be applied to delegation
reapportionments would also be applicable to annexations affecting delegation membership. See infra Part
l(B)(3).
273. In order to avoid confusing these two distinct concepts, I shall refer to one type of reapportionment




Legislative reapportionments vary widely in scope and form. A reappor-
tionment may create or eliminate districts, aggregate districts electing a single
legislator to form a larger district that elects several representatives (commonly
referred to as a multimember district), or simply redraw district lines between
existing legislative districts. The Supreme Court has noted that "[d]istrict lines
are rarely neutral phenomena."274 As one commentator has explained, "the
key concept to grasp is that there are no neutral lines for legislative districts
.... [E]very line drawn aligns partisans and interest blocs in a particular way
different from the alignment that would result from putting the line in some
other place."2 75 Changes of this type affect the voting influence of individuals
and groups because such changes alter the contours of legislative districts,
which in turn determine who is elected to office.
The legislative reapportionment of the Indiana House of Representatives,
challenged in Davis v. Bandemer,276 illustrates this phenomenon. In 1981, the
Republicans, who controlled both houses of the state legislature, adopted a
districting plan for the 100 seats in the house of representatives. 7 Democrats
runnning for house seats in the first election after this reapportionment plan
received 51.9 percent of the votes cast in the election, but won only 43 percent
of the seats.278 Thus, alternative reapportionment proposals would likely have
yielded a Democratic majority in the house; the legislative reapportionment plan
was a significant factor in determining which party would control the legisla-
ture27 9 and what the relative voting power of Democratic and Republican
voters would be. Those citizens who voted for Republican candidates benefited
274. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973) (holding that minor population variations do
not make out prima facie case of invidious discrimination under Equal Protection Clause).
275. RobertG. Dixon, Fair Criteria andProceduresfor Establishing Legislative Districts, in REPRESEN-
TATION AND REDISTRICTING ISSUES 7-8 (Bernard Grofman, et al. eds., 1982). This view of the nature of
reapportionment is shared by numerous commentators.
276. 478 U.S. 109 (1986). In Davis, the plaintiffs alleged that the apportionment plan deprived them
of the opportunity to control the legislature. Id. at 115-16. Most challenges occur in settings where plaintiffs
are unlikely to control the legislature and the claim is that a legislative apportionment gives plaintiffs fewer
seats than would a "fair" plan. See, e.g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 128-29 (1971) (challenge by
minority voters to multimember election system that reduced opportunity to elect representatives). But see
Ketehum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398 (7th Cir. 1984) (suggesting alternate remedy), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1135
(1985).
277. The plan provided for 61 single-member districts, nine double-member districts, and seven triple-
member districts. Davis, 478 U.S. at 113-14 & n.2.
278. Even more extreme was the situation in Marion and Allen counties, where Republicans won 86%
of the legislative seats allocated to the counties, despite the fact that Democratic voters accounted for 46.6%
of the population. Id. at 134.
279. Nevertheless, the legislative reapportionment was not the only factor. Even if the legislature had
a goal of fairly reflecting the political strength of both parties, see Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735,
753 (1973), each party would not necessarily have won a proportionate number of legislative seats. This
phenomenon is characteristic of winner-take-all systems in which the relevant population is unevenly
distributed. See Howard M. Shapiro, Note, Geometry and Geography: Racial Gerrymandering and the
Voting Rights Act, 94 YALE LJ. 189, 202, 205 (1984) (discussing the constraints that proportional represen-
tation schemes present for minority groups).
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under the plan, while those supporting Democratic candidates were disadvan-
taged. 
8 °
When reviewing reapportionments, courts have made only passing referenc-
es to legislative delegations, 28 instead focusing on the plan's effect on a
group's ability to elect candidates to the state legislature. Nonetheless, the reap-
portionment of legislative delegations, like any other form of reapportionment,
can be manipulated to increase the influence of particular groups of voters.
Therefore, whenever reapportionment curtails black voters' influence on the
election of members of the legislative delegation, the Voting Rights Act should
govern.
2. Fragmented and Submerged Counties: The Legacy of the One-Person,
One-Vote Principle
Despite the close resemblance of legislative delegations to local governing
bodies, the one-person, one-vote principle of legislative reapportionment often
prevents legislative delegations from being truly "local."
Several decades ago, the fit between county boundaries and membership
on legislative delegations was fairly close.82 Yet since the implementation
of the one-person, one-vote principle, the boundaries of legislative districts no
longer conform to county boundaries. Typically, counties are split between two
or more legislative districts, or are submerged in a legislative district that
includes two or more counties.8s Today, members of a legislative delegation
often reside outside counties that are subject to their jurisdiction, and are
therefore elected by noncounty voters.
Stated most simply, the one-person, one-vote rule means that legislative
districts must contain, to the extent practicable, equal numbers of people.2
4
Reapportionment cases premised on this one-person, one-vote principle recog-
nize that in drawing legislative districts, there is an inherent tension between
adhering to political subdivision boundaries and minimizing population varianc-
280. This discussion evaluates the relative advantages of the plan for Democratic and Republican voters
as a whole, rather than as individuals. For, under the plan, some Democratic voters in certain districts elected
the candidates of their choice, while certain Republican voters did not. Voting rights scholarship often
focuses on group rights instead of individual rights. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 195, at 453-54 (describing
vote dilution as group pattern rather than individual right); Karlan, supra note 196, at 176 (discussing
qualitative vote dilution as group phenomenon).
281. See, e.g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 133, 146-48, 155 (1971).
282. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
283. See JEWELL, CONTEMPORARY SOUTH, supra note 80, at 126-27; JEWELL, supra note 131, at 60;
Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The Court, the People, and 'One Man, One Vote', in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970s,
supra note 126, at 7 n.l.
284. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964) ("[Tjhe Equal Protection Clause requires that
a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly
of equal population as is practicable.").
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es among districts?' 5 If adherence to boundaries such as county lines would
result in significant population disparities among legislative districts, then those
political demarcations must be disregarded. 6 Although courts have given
some weight to maintaining city and county boundaries, 27 the reapportion-
ment revolution has meant that many of these political subdivisions can no
longer remain intact within legislative districts.
In Connor v. Finch,"s for example, the Supreme Court considered a
reapportionment plan drawn by a federal district court for Mississippi's legisla-
ture. The district court's plan followed state policy, which favored keeping
county borders intact when drawing legislative districts, but contained signifi-
cant population disparities.8 9 The Court, finding that the plan failed to satisfy
Equal Protection standards,29  concluded that, given Mississippi's demo-
graphics and the number of legislative seats, "the inviolability of county
lines.. . , if strictly adhered to, must inevitably collide with the basic equal
protection standard of one person, one vote."29'
In many states, counties must be divided among more than one legislative
district because the combination of demographics and the number of seats in
the legislature precludes strict adherence to principles of both population
equality and subdivision integrity. This tension is especially prevalent in states
285. The Court in Reynolds first recognized this tension, noting that "[c]arried too far, a scheme of
giving at least one seat in one house to each political subdivision (for example, to each county) could easily
result, in many States, in a total subversion of the equal-population principle in that legislative body." Id.
at 581. See also White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 764-65 n.8 (1973) (noting districting plan represented
accommodation of competing interests of population equality and maintaining county boundaries). Commen-
tators have also identified these competing factors. See, e.g., Dixon, supra note 283, at 30.
286. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975); Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967) (per curiam);
Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533; Chavis v. Whitcomb, 305 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D. Ind. 1969) (three-judge court) (state
policy against dividing counties conflicts with Equal Protection principles), rev'd on other grounds, 403
U.S. 124 (1971).
287. See, e.g., Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983) (upholding plan on narrow question of whether
policy of preserving county boundaries justified small deviation with respect to single county); Mahan v.
Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 329 (1973) (upholding plan but finding it "may approach tolerable limits" for
population deviations); Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971) (upholding plan). In the context of congressio-
nal reapportionment, the argument that this consideration justifies deviations has routinely been rejected,
see, e.g., White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969), although minor
deviations based on a policy of adhering to county boundaries may in some instances be justified, see
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 733 n.5, 740-41 (1983) (describing relevant factors in this calculation).
288. 431 U.S. 407 (1977).
289. Id. at416-17. The senate plan contained a maximum deviation from population equality of 16.5%;
the deviation in the house plan was 19.3%. The district court followed two criteria in seeking to preserve
county representation: (1) each county whose population equalled or exceeded the population norm was
included in a single district; and (2) no remaining counties were divided into more than two districts unless
those districts were located entirely within the county boundaries. Id. at 418. The court plan became
necessary after 12 years of litigation in which the Mississippi legislature refused to implement a constitution-
ally acceptable plan for its severely malapportioned legislative districts. Id. at 410.
290. Id. at 420-21. The Court strongly hinted that the plan also was tainted by impermissible racial
considerations, but did not specifically reach this claim. Id. at 421-26.
291. Id. at 419. The Supreme Court recognized that the twin goals of population equality and county
integrity could not be met in a state such as Mississippi where the population was unevenly distributed and
many counties lacked sufficient people to elect a representative. Id. at 418-19.
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with a large number of political subdivisions and relatively few legislative
seats,292 or in those whose population is unevenly distributed among political
subdivisions throughout the state.293 Thus, although a fair districting plan will
inevitably include whole counties and cities within some of its legislative
districts,2' population equality almost always requires some fragmentation
of cities and counties. Even those political subdivisions not fragmented are
often submerged in larger legislative districts in which their residents constitute
only a small percentage of the population.295
Under these circumstances, the members of the legislative delegation
inevitably reflect, in varying degrees, the preferences of voters residing outside
of the affected city or county. This phenomenon, as well as the opportunity to
gerrymander legislative delegations, is the subject of the remainder of Part III.
3. Delegation Gerrymanders
Although legislative delegations resemble local legislatures,296 the voting
constituency for the delegation often bears little resemblance to the voting
constituency for other local governing bodies. While members of local legisla-
tures are elected by the voters of their respective political subdivisions297 (city
council members are elected by city residents and county commission members
are elected by county residents), membership on local legislative delegations
292. As the Court noted with respect to Alabama's demographics, the use of counties as representative
districts will likely result in one-person, one-vote violations in states "where the number of counties is large
and many of them are sparsely populated, and the number of seats in the legislative body being apportioned
does not significantly exceed the number of counties." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 581 (1964). See
also Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 845 n.7 (1983) (comparing Wyoming Senate with Wyoming House
of Representatives); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 733 n.5 (1983) (noting that New Jersey is divided
into 567 municipalities). For a general discussion of the relationship between these factors and the one-
person, one-vote principle, see RICHARD L. MORRILL, POLMrC.kL REDISTRICING AND GEOGRAPHIC THEORY
25-27 (1981).
293. See, e.g., Brown, 462 U.S. at 845 n.7; Karcher, 462 U.S. at 733 n.5; Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 581.
294. The principle of population equality does not always trump the goal of maintaining subdivision
boundaries. Reynolds recognized that maintaining political subdivision lines and other natural or historical
boundaries is a legitimate consideration in legislative districting, while unnecessary fragmentation of
subdivision lines can evidence an impemissible racially motivated gerrymander. 377 U.S. at 578-79. State
policy often favors keeping subdivisions intact in legislative reapportionments. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art.
5, § 47; MASS. CONST. amend, art. CI, § 1; N.Y. ELECION LAW § 4-100 (McKinney 1978).
295. My argument is not that political subdivision boundaries should always be respected; in fact, it
is often necessary to break these boundaries in order to create districts capable of electing minority
candidates. See BRUCE E. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE 166-68 (1984); Paul S. Edwards & Nelson
W. Polsby, Introduction: The Judicial Regulation of Political Processes-in Praise of Multiple Criteria,
9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 190, 202-03 (1991) (describing North Carolina congressional redistricting).
Nonetheless, the frequency of fragmented and submerged counties may evidence discrimination in the
composition of legislative delegations. See infra notes 300-02 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 34-42, 66-76, 268-69 and accompanying text.
297. The methods for electing local legislatures vary widely. The two most common methods are at-
large election and election from single-member districts. James H. Svara, Unwrapping InstitutionalPackages
in Urban Government: the Combination of Election Institutions in American Cities, 39 J. POL. 166 (1977).
There are numerous variations on these two basic methods of election, including plans that utilize a mixture
of district and at-large components, multimember districts, majority vote requirements, numbered posts, and
other electoral mechanisms. Blacksher & Menefee, supra note 167, at 3 n. 11.
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is in many cases determined by voters who live outside of the county governed
by the delegation.
This incongruence between local legislative delegations and the voters who
elect their members allows for the manipulation of delegation membership. Any
legislator whose district includes any portion of the county will serve on the
delegation for that county, and all voters in the district are eligible to vote for
members of the delegation regardless of whether they actually reside in the
county. As a result, because a reapportionment can incorporate noncounty
voters in the delegation's constituency, electoral maneuvering can be used to
discriminate against minorities in ways separate and apart from any discrimina-
tion in the legislative reapportionment.
The voting constituency for the delegation will include voters living outside
of the county when the county is either submerged in a larger legislative district
or fragmented between two or more districts.298 In both cases, 2 99 the con-
cern is twofold: (1) when can the voting strength of minority voters be dimin-
ished; and (2) when will the measures of dilution developed for state legislative
reapportionments be inadequate with respect to delegation dilution?
A "delegation gerrymander" occurs when the legislative reapportionment
satisfies prevailing voting rights standards, but the delegation reapportionment
nonetheless impairs the voting strength of minority groups such as blacks and
Hispanics. Of course, when a legislative reapportionment falls prevailing
standards-by, say, blocking the election of minority-supported candidates to
the legislature-it automatically discriminates against the legislative delegation
because such a reapportionment plan also yields fewer minority-supported
delegation members. Moreover, just as one offense causes the other, so the
remedy for the first can repair the second: the remedy for the legislative
gerrymander also cures the delegation gerrymander. However, legislative
reapportionments that do not limit the number of minority-supported state
legislators in a region can still discriminate with respect to the delegation by
affecting the election districts for the delegation and its racial balance. These
delegation gerrymanders can escape scrutiny under the Voting Rights Act unless
their potential for discrimination is recognized.
The clearest potential for a delegation gerrymander arises when a county
with a significant percentage of black voters adjoins counties in which white
voters predominate, and when district lines are not congruent with county
boundaries.3 ° When a county is split among more than one legislative district
298. Another variation of the split-county district is the split-city district, a large urban area that is
included in legislative districts that cross city lines and include portions of the outlying suburban areas. Cain,
supra note 25, at 60-62. Voters in the city are affected by a split-city district in much the same way as
county voters are affected by a split-county district; in both cases, voters from outside of the relevant
jurisdiction are given a vote on matters affecting the jurisdiction.
299. See supra notes 282-95 and accompanying text.
300. The influence of the noncounty voters depends upon their relative numbers in the district compared
to the numbers of county voters. The disparity between the influence of noncounty and county voters
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or is completely submerged in a single district, residents of adjoining counties
can place their "representative" on the delegation." 1 Minority voting strength
can be diminished if the residents of these adjoining counties vote differently
from the county residents.0 2
Given the focus of vote dilution litigation on electing candidates to formally
constituted bodies, judicial decisions do not record the efforts of those who
would curtail black voting power on legislative delegations by manipulating
legislative district lines. 303 Nonetheless, recent developments in reapportion-
ment plans drawn after the 1990 census provide solid evidence that racial
factors have led to deliberate delegation gerrymanders. TWo delegation gerry-
manders in reapportionment plans for the Georgia House of Representatives
are cases in point.3°4 Early this year, the Justice Department found that dele-
becomes more acute as the county's population decreases as a percentage of the total population of the
legislative district. The smaller the percentage of county residents in the district that splits or submerges
the county, the less influence county residents have on the election of the legislator who sits as a member
of their delegation. In fact, a representative may sit as a member of a county delegation even if his or her
district includes no county voters. This situation arises when no one resides in the portion of the county
included in his or her district.
301. The phenomena of delegation fragmentation and submergence can occur in one of two ways.
Under one scenario, the county's black population is insufficient to constitute a majority in a legislative
district and must be joined with residents from adjoining counties. Under the other scenario, the legislature
has deliberately set out to minimize black voting strength by importing voters from adjoining counties. In
both cases, discrimination can occur even where the legislative reapportionment does not discriminate against
black voters.
302. This theory of dilution is premised on the same theory articulated in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U.S. 30 (1986): minority voters should have the same opportunity to elect representatives as white voters.
Where white voters vote differently from minority voters, and the candidates that minority voters prefer
are usually defeated, then discrimination can be inferred. This analysis thus assumes a factor that was critical
in Gingles-the existence of racial bloc voting and the concommitant lack of influence of minority voters
on the election of a legislator in a majority-white district. Although this concept of dilution follows Gingles,
the standard articulated in Gingles does not provide an appropriate measure in this context. See infra notes
411-12 and accompanying text. Moreover, the requirement that minority voters be geographically compact
is inapplicable because of the potentially open-ended size of the delegation's constituency.
303. As the discussion infra Part II(B) demonstrates, delegation gerrymanders are a subtle and complex
phenomenon. These "gerrymanders" cannot be detected simply by analyzing the impact of the legislative
districting plan on the state legislature. Typically, evidence of such a racially motivated gerrymanders can
be found where district lines fragment the county, whereas gerrymanders that are discriminatory in effect
may either fragment or submerge the county.
304. Although the Justice Department ultimately objected to two delegation gerrymanders in Georgia,
a third potential gerrymander occured in Bibb County, where the record is less well developed. Approximate-
ly 42% of Bibb County residents are black. 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, supra note 156,
at 38 (Table 3). Although the 3-2 white majority on the delegation established by the 1991 reapportionment
reflects the county's racial mix, Letter from Mark H. Cohen, Georgia Senior Assistant Attorney General,
to Sheila K. Delaney, Voting Section, United States Department of Justice (Nov. 27, 1991) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Cohen Letter] (State of Georgia Reapportionment Submissions-supplemental informa-
tion, attachment B-1.10), there is evidence that the legislature went to unusual lengths to preserve this
balance. Since Bibb County lost population during the last decade, compare 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION
AND HOUSING, supra note 156, at 38 (Table 3) with 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION, supra note 156, at 11
(Table 14), the county was entitled to only four representatives under the new plan. Rather than drawing
a plan for a four-person delegation where blacks and whites could share power, the legislature enlarged the
delegation to five members by creating a third majority-white district that cropped the county on its western
edge. Letter from Thomas E. Lawrence, Minority Whip, Georgia House of Representatives, to Nancy
Sardison, Esq., Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice 4 (Dec. 16,1991)
[hereinafter Lawrence Letter] (State of Georgia Reapportionment Submissions-supplemental information).
The Justice Department expressed concern about this action, which retained the three-two white majority
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gation gerrymanders occured in Dougherty and Richmond Counties, located in
the two areas comprising Georgia's "black belt."305 The Dougherty County
gerrymander was included in the Georgia legislature's first effort to reapportion
itself following the recent census; even more striking is the fact that the Rich-
mond County gerrymander was included in the second reapportionment de-
signed to cure the defects of the first plan.06
Dougherty County is located in southwest Georgia.307 Its county seat is
Albany, the fifth largest city in the state.308 Slightly more than half of Doug-
herty County residents are black.309 Both Dougherty County and Albany have
a sordid history of racial discrimination which is vividly captured in the
remarks of Representative John White, a black member of the Dougherty
County delegation, on the floor of the Georgia House of Representatives,
310
and in a variety of administrative and judicial decisions.31'
that had existed under the post-1980 reapportionment. Id. Only four years earlier, the Department of Justice
had objected to a boundary line change that removed a delegation member from the Bibb County delegation.
See infra note 366 and accompanying text. Local legislators were thus well aware that changes in district
boundaries could expand or contract the delegation.
305. See Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, United States
Department of Justice, to Mark H. Cohen, Georgia Senior Assistant Attorney General 4 (Jan. 21, 1992) (on
file with author) [hereinafter First Georgia Objection Letter] (objecting to Dougherty County); Letter from
John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice, to
Mark H. Cohen, Georgia Senior Assistant Attorney General 2 (Mar. 20, 1992) (on file with author) [hereinaf-
ter Second Georgia Objection Letter] (objecting to Richmond County). In both of these Justice Department
investigations, the delegation gerrymanders were only one of numerous objectionable changes occasioned
by Georgia's reapportionment changes. The house plan was drafted four times before it was approved, while
the senate and congressional maps each underwent three revisions. Rhonda Cook, Feds' Redistricting OK
Sets Up Primaries, ATLANTA CONST., Apr. 13, 1992, at IA. See infra notes 445-50 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the Justice Department's role in reviewing reapportionment plans.
306. See Letter from Michael J. Bowers, Georgia Attorney General, to Gerald W. Jones, Chief, Voting
Section, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice 10-11 (Feb. 20, 1992) (on file with
author) [hereinafter First Bowers Letter].
307. Dougherty County is one of nine contiguous counties in southwest Georgia which form a block
of majority-black counties (Baker, Calhoun, Dougherty, Clay, Randolph, Terrell, Quitman, Stewart, and
Webster Counties). Letter from Kathleen L Wilde, Staff Counsel, Southern Regional Office, American Civil
Liberties Union Foundation, to John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, United
States Department of Justice 34 (Oct. 30, 1991) (on file with author) [hereinafter ACLU Comment Letter]
(comment letter under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act).
308. 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, supra note 156, at 215 (Table 16).
309. According to the 1990 census, 50.2% of Dougherty County's residents are black. 1990 CENSUS
OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, supra note 156, at 43 (Table 3).
310. See Debates of Georgia State House of Representatives, at 25a-25c (Aug. 23, 199 1) (unpublished
transcript on file with author) [hereinafter House Floor Transcript]. The floor debate concerned the
reapportionment plan for the Georgia House of Representatives.
311. Much of this racial discrimination is catalogued in Paige v. Gray, 437 F. Supp. 137, 154-56 (M.D.
Ga. 1977), in which blacks successfully sued the City of Albany under the Voting Rights Act to overturn
the at-large system of voting for city council positions. In 1972, the Dougherty County school board
implemented a policy prohibiting unpaid leaves of absence soon after a black candidate announced his
intention to run for the Georgia House of Representatives. This policy was invalidated by the Supreme Court
in Dougherty County Bd. of Educ. v. White, 439 U.S. 32 (1978), a significant section 5 case. Representative
John White, a black legislator who vehemently opposed the house reapportionment, was the plaintiff in
Dougherty. Since the passage of the Voting Rights Act, the Justice Department has objected to four voting
changes in Albany and Dougherty County. United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division,
Complete Listing of Objections Pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Sept. 30, 1991)
(on file with author). A federal court found that the City of Albany has engaged in racially discriminatory
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Since 1982, Dougherty County has had two black and two white members
on its legislative delegation. Between 1980 and 1990, however, Dougherty
County lost residents so that its population is now only sufficient to justify
three legislative districts-and three delegation members. 12 In the 1991 reap-
portionment plan,3 13 however, Dougherty County includes four legislative
districts-three of which are entirely included within the county's borders. Two
of these districts are majority-black while the third has a white majority.
314
A fourth majority-white district was drawn to shoot up like a finger into
Dougherty County from Mitchell County, which adjoins Dougherty on its
southern border.315 Of the 34,582 constituents who reside in this district, only
3500 live in Dougherty County.316 Figure 1 depicts the configuration of all
four districts. A white incumbent currently resides in the "finger" district,
adding a second white to the legislative delegation and thus preventing black
control of the delegation.
hiring practices, Johnson v. City of Albany, 413 F. Supp. 782 (M.D. Ga. 1976), and its hiring practices have
been supervised by the court for more than a decade. Mann v. City of Albany, 687 F. Supp. 583, 584-85
(M.D. Ga. 1988) (discussing permanent injunction order issued in Johnson on Sept. 2, 1976), vacated, 883
F.2d 999 (11th Cir. 1989).
312. See ACLU Comment Letter, supra note 307, at 9; First Georgia Objection Letter, supra note 305,
at 4.
313. The statistics concerning the post-1990 reapportionment are derived from the ACLU Comment
Letter, supra note 307.
314. Districts 161 and 162 are majority-black, while district 163 contains a white majority. First Bowers
Letter, supra note 306, at 10-11 (referring to attached House Exhibit No. 6, statistical data sheet for house
districts).
315. Legislators alternatively refer to the Dougherty County portion of district 164 as a "finger" or
a "sliver." See Remarks of Representative Young-Cummings, House Floor Transript, supra note 310, at
6; Remarks of Representative White, id. at 25a. In the floor debate, Representative Young-Cummings noted
that the terms "finger or sliver" are the "nicer names that we've heard" for the plan. Id. at 6. The term
"finger" is apt, both because of the physical resemblance to an actual finger, and as a metaphor for the insult
to the black community afforded by the plan. Representative White captures this concept graphically in
noting that "down in Dougherty there is a finger that goes that way on the map [gesturing up]," id. at 25b,
and that "it is not necessary to have that sliver, or what I call that finger, which goes in one direction," id.
at 25a.
316. The Dougherty County residents who reside in the finger district could be easily absorbed by
districts 161 and 162, the two majority-black districts, which are slightly underpopulated under the proposed
plan. First Bowers Letter, supra note 306, at 8-9 (House Exhibit No. 6, showing population of district 161
(34,467) and 162 (34,211) less than that of ideal district (35,990)).
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FIGURE 1. Dougherty County, Georgia Delegation Gerrymander
The reapportionment plan for Dougherty County, as initially drawn by a
"work group" of legislators from Dougherty and surrounding counties,317 in-
cluded only three districts, all of which were centered on the county.3 18 The
two black representatives from Dougherty County supported the work group's
proposal. The recommendation was then submitted for approval to the house
reapportionment committee, which added the finger district to the initial propos-
al. 3
19
The white community strongly supported the addition of a fourth member
to the delegation while the black community vehemently opposed it. The local
chamber of commerce and Representative Chambliss, a white member of the
Dougherty County delegation, proposed the addition of the finger district,
ostensibly because a fourth delegation member was necessary to retain Dough-
erty County's influence in the state legislature given the area's decrease in
317. The potentiaI for discrimination in these "workgroup" procedures is discussed infra notes 496-500
and accompanying text.
318. ACLU Comment Letter, supra note 307, at 8-9.
319. Id. at 9.
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population during the last decade.320 Richard Royal, the representative whose
district was reconfigured into the finger district, and who resides in Mitchell
County, is a member of Albany's white business community and an influential
member of the house.321
Black residents of Dougherty County and their representatives fiercely
resisted the addition of the finger district. Black residents were especially
outraged that the public hearings on the plan were held in Dawson, Georgia
rather than in Albany, where most of the affected constituents resided.322
When Representative Young-Cummings offered an amendment on the house
floor to remove the finger and reconfigure the remaining Dougherty County
districts, all 27 black house members voted in favor of it. The amendment was
defeated, however, by a vote of 129 to 44.
313
The delegation's expansion to include a fourth white member,324 coupled
with the prevailing practice of local courtesy,325 could neutralize black voting
strength in Dougherty County because this new white legislator could vote with
the other white member of the delegation to thwart the desires of black resi-
dents in Dougherty County. In the floor debate on the reapportionment plan,
Mary Young-Cummings and John White, the two black representatives on the
Dougherty County delegation, explained how the plan discriminated against
blacks. According to Representative Young-Cummings, the plan would:
320. See id. at 9 (proffered reason for configuration was desire of white business community to
maintain delegation size); Remarks of Representative Chambliss, House Floor Transcript, supra note 3 10,
at 29 (stressing importance of delegation strength for local industrial development); Remarks of Representa-
tive Young-Cummings, House Floor Transcript, supra note 310, at 6 (describing business community's stated
reasons). The proponents opposed other means of expanding the delegation, such as splitting the county
into two senate districts. See Remarks of Representative White, House Floor Transcript, supra note 310,
at 25a (Dougherty County business community opposed division of Albany senate district while requesting
fourth house member for delegation). It is unlikely that a legislator whose district contains only a fraction
of Dougherty County would be responsive to overall county interests in the state house. Where purely local
matters are concerned, the size of the delegation is irrelevant to the success or failure of local legislation
once it reaches the state legislature. The addition of a fourth member would only affect the outcome of
internal delegation deliberations.
321. ACLU Comment Letter, supra note 307, at 21.
322. Dawson, located in Terrell County, is the home of Representative Hanner, the charperson of the
house reapportionment committee. ACLU Comment Letter, supra note 307, at 22.
323. Remarks of Representative Young-Cummings, House Floor Transcript, supra note 310, at 49.
324. The proposed addition of a fourth member to the delegation implied that the three-member
majority-black delegation could not adequately represent Dougherty County. As Representative Young-
Cummings asserted, "I am hurt by the fact that it would be assumed that the three of us could not address
the needs of the business community who just happen to be by the way, very predominantly white." Id.
at 6-7.
325. The exchange between Representative Hanner, the chairperson of the house reapportionment
committee, and Representative Young-Cummings establishes the importance and viability of local courtesy:
134TH [Rep. Young-Cummings]: Mr. Speaker, is it not true that [substantive] issues are
addressed by local legislation?
CHAIR: YES MA'AM, I THINK I COULD SAY THAT.
134TH: Is it not further true that local legislation, when properly passed by the members of the
delegation under it's [sic] rules, are passed by this House as a matter of course without further
deliberation?
CHAIR: THE LADY IS CORRECT.
Id. at 48-49 (emphasis in original).
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bring a fourth person onto the Dougherty County delegation over
whom there would be no political accounting because if you take
3,200 population and divide that in half for a voting age and then
divide it again for regist[ration] and divide it again for turnout, that
person would be almost immune to any kind of accountability for
decisions made in local legislation. And while we do have a rule that
we will not interfere, we do not get involved in other people's legisla-
tion if it's handled by the delegation, then it passes. And therein lies
the crux of the matter. All key issues from consolidation to annexation
to our school boards that are elected, on up or down, we would have
this person on the delegation without justification on key issues.326
Representative White added that "[i]t is an unnecessary move, and what it does
is dilute the decision-making of the two black members from Dougherty."327
In objecting to the Dougherty gerrymander, the Justice Department noted
that "[c]oncems were raised that the state's choices of boundary lines in this
area were a response to requests that lines be drawn to avoid control by black
voters' representatives by contriving to maintain an equal number of white and
black legislators on the Dougherty County legislative delegation.
''328 The
Justice Department commented on the "unusual configuration" of the fourth
district, which the State "stretche[d] unnecessarily to retain four house districts
based in [Dougherty] county," and noted that the State had not proffered a
nonracial justification except the nebulous claim that the configuration was
"drawn primarily due to specific requests."3 29
A second delegation gerrymander occurred in Richmond County, Georgia,
where the legislature drew a "land bridge" through Richmond County from
neighboring Columbia and Jefferson Counties.330 The land bridge, pictured
in Figure 2, clipped the western edge of Richmond County by stretching across
Fort Gordon, an army base.331 Like the Dougherty County finger, the land
bridge expanded the county delegation, increasing the size of the Richmond
County house delegation from six to seven members, 332 and in the process
added a fourth white member to the delegation.333
326. Id. at 7.
327. Id. at 25b.
328. First Georgia Objection Letter, supra note 305, at 4.
329. Id. After the Justice Department objection, the State replaced the objectionable plan with a fair
plan. See First Bowers Letter, supra note 306, at 11 ("The House has acceded to the Justice Department's
request by removing the so-called 'finger' into Dougherty County... "); Second Georgia Objection Letter,
supra note 305 (identifying no objection to Dougherty County).
330. Second Georgia Objection Letter, supra note 305, at 2.
331. Two Counties Sliced, AUGUSTA CHRON., Feb. 13, 1992, at 4A (editorial describing district as
"gerrymandered").
332. James Salzer, New Black District Proposed, AUGUSTA CHRON., Feb. 11,1992 at 1A, 3A [hereinaf-
ter Salzer, New District]; James Salzer, House Backs Remap Plan More Generous to Blacks, AUGUSTA
CHRON., Feb. 12, 1992, at IA.
333. Salzer, New District, supra note 332, at 3A.
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FIGURE 2. Richmond County, Georgia Delegation Gerrymander
In its objection letter, the Justice Department expressed concern that the State's
proposed configuration "was designed to maintain a white majority legislative
delegation rather than have an equal number of white and black legislators on
the Richmond County delegation. 334 Moreover, the composition of the house
delegation should not be viewed in isolation from the senate delegation. Since
the election of Charles Walker in 1990, the two-member senate delegation has
334. Second Georgia Objection Letter, supra note 305, at 2. The State later enacted a fair plan to
replace the objectionable plan. Letter from Michael J. Bowers, Georgia Attorney General, to Gerald W.
Jones, Chief, Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice 3 (Mar. 25, 1992)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Second Bowers Letter] (noting that state had removed objectionable aspect
of Richmond County plan); Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division,
United States Department of Justice, to Mark H. Cohen, Georgia Senior Assistant Attorney General (Mar.
29, 1992) [hereinafter Third Georgia Objection Letter] (identifying no objection to Richmond County plan).
The plan ultimately precleared by the Justice Department, see Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney
General, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice, to Mark H. Cohen, Georgia Senior
Assistant Attorney General (Apr. 2, 1992) (on file with author), created three majority-black districts
(districts 116, 117, and 118) and three majority-white districts (districts 114, 115, 119). House Legislative
Districts as Reflected in House Floor Substitute to S.B. 174 (March 30, 1992) (on file with author)
[hereinafter 1992 House Reapportionment Statistics].
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had only one black member.33 Thus, the land bridge enabled white residents
to retain control not only of the house delegation, but also of the unified house
and senate delegation.
Burke County, a rural county adjoining Richmond County in central east
Georgia, illustrates another means by which a delegation districting plan can
dilute the voting power of black residents. Although a slim majority of its
inhabitants are black,336 this county has always had an all-white delega-
tion.337 Since the county's population is insufficient to sustain a senate dis-
trict, Burke County must be combined with adjoining counties for senate
elections. Moreover, county demographics prevent the formation of a viable
minority house district within the county's borders. In fact, black voters did not
have a real opportunity to elect a delegation reflecting the county's racial
composition until Burke County was linked with Richmond County in the 1992
legislative reapportionment.33
The Burke County delegation has repeatedly frustrated black residents'
efforts to attain political power. In the 1970's, for example, the local delegation
refused to introduce legislation requiring members of the Burke County Com-
mission to be elected from single-member districts.339 An even more glaring
example of the delegation's refusal to relinquish control materialized during the
controversy in the mid-1980's regarding the city of Keysville, a majority-black
town of approximately 300 people340 which is located 25 miles southwest of
335. See Linda Day, Walker's Victory 'Sweet', AUGUSTA CHRON., July 18, 1990, at IA (describing
Walker victory in the primary). Walker ran unopposed in the general election.
336. According to the 1990 census, slightly over 52% of Burke County residents are black. 1990
CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, supra note 156, at 38 (Table 3).
337. Bill English represents senate district 21, Members of the General Assembly of Georgia, Senate
and House of Representatives, Second Session of 1991-1992 Term, at 4, 6 (on file with author), while John
Godbee and Emory Bargeron represent house district 110 and house district 108, respectively. Id. at 34,
36-37. None of these legislators resides in Burke County.
338. In the elections to be held in the fall of 1992 after the new reapportionment, Burke County's
legislators will be elected from senate district 22, Map of Senate Districts of Georgia (on file with author),
and house districts 116 and 119, Map of Representative Districts of Georgia (on file with author). Burke
County blacks may be able to elect black legislators from senate district 22 and house district 116, both
of which have black majorities in total population and in voting age population. 1992 Senate Reapportion-
ment Statistics, as adopted March 24, 1992, at 2 (on file with author); 1992 House Reapportionment
Statistics, supra note 334. Both districts make incursions into neighboring Richmond County to create black
voting majorities. House district 116 was created only after the Justice Department objected to the legisla-
ture's first submission as "fragmentling] the politically cohesive and active Burke County voters." First
Georgia Objection Letter, supra note 305, at 3. See also First Bowers Letter, supra note 306, at 13-14 (new
Burke County district drawn in response to objection). Neither of the two incumbents resides in this district.
Id. at 14.
339. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 625-27 (1982). This was one of the factors that the Court cited
in support of its conclusion that the at-large system had been maintained for racially discriminatory reasons.
Id.
340. Effort to Restore Government in Georgia Town is Blocked, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 31, 1987, at A17
[hereinafter Effort to Restore Government]. At the time, estimates of the percentage of Keysvile's residents
who are black ranged from 70%, id., to 90%, UPI, Aug. 15, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI
File (untitled). According to the 1990 census, 78% of Keysvlle's residents are black. 1990 CENSUS OF
POPULATION AND HOUSING, supra note 156, at 38 (Table 3).
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Augusta in Burke County.34' When black residents petitioned their local dele-
gation to support local legislation that would have established Keysville's
boundaries, a prerequisite for holding municipal elections, the delegation
refused to approve the legislation.342 Although elections had been held using
temporary boundaries, legislative action was necessary to end white residents'
challenges to these demarcations. The delegation's refusal to cooperate effec-
tively stalled black residents' efforts at self-governance until 1991.
The story of black residents' efforts to revive local government in Keysville
is a compelling tale of racial strife. Although Keysville was incorporated in the
the nineteenth century, town government had lain dormant since 1933 .343 In
1985, controversy arose concerning the town's boundaries34 when local
blacks attempted to revive local government to fill the void they endured in
basic municipal services345 A New York Tunes article described Keysville's
horrific conditions in graphic terms:
State highway 88, which meanders through part of town, is virtually
the only paved surface. Sandy roads lined by scrub brush, rusty cars
and barking dogs lead to the shacks and mobile homes where most of
the people live. Some people have wells and septic tanks. Others haul
water and have crude homemade cesspools 6
Black residents believed that an active city government might help them acquire
needed services. 347
An all-black slate of candidates for Mayor and City Council ran unop-
posed34' and were sworn into office in January of 1986. But white residents
341. Lawyer Says Irregularities May Have Marred Keysville Vote, UPI, Jan. 6, 1988, available. in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File [hereinafter Lawyer Says Irregularities].
342. Gresham v. Harris, 695 F. Supp. 1179, 1180 (N.D. Ga. 1988), affd sub nom. Poole v. Gresham,
110 S. Ct. 2556 (1990).
343. Keysville Blacks Eager to Get GovernmentRolling, UPI, Sept. 9,1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, UPI File [hereinafter Keysville Blacks Eager]. The Great Depression apparently contributed to the
demise of Keysville's local government. David Corvette, Keysville's Long Sleep May End, ATLANTA CONST.,
April 12, 1987, at IC.
344. The town's boundaries were based on the location of the Keysville Academy, an all-white school
that had been demolished in a tornado in the 1890's. Effort to Restore Government, supra note 340; Judge,
Backing Blacks' Case, Orders Vote in Georgia Town, N.Y. TIIES, Jan. 1, 1988, at 37 [hereinafter Backing
Blacks' Case]. Boundaries were set as a circle with a half-mile radius centering on the school. Town Holds
First Vote in 55 Years, Elects 5 Blacks, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1988, at 12 [hereinafter Town Holds First Vote].
Because the location of the school was disputed, white residents argued that the town's boundaries were
different from those asserted by the black citizens' group supporting the revival of local government.
345. The effort to reactivate the government was sparked by a local grocery store owner's application
to Burke County officials for a beer license. Effort to Restore Government, supra note 340. County officials
told the applicant they lacked authority to issue licenses to businesses located in incorporated towns. He
therefore found himself unable to obtain a license from either the county or the nonexistent city government.
Id.; Corvette, supra note 343, at 7C.
346. Effort to Restore Government, supra note 340.
347. Backing Blacks' Case, supra note 344.
348. Corvette, supra note 343; Effort to Restore Government, supra note 340. White residents boycotted
the contest, Candidates Qualify in Keysvile, UPI, Dec. 5, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI
File [hereinafter Candidates Qualify], and an election was unnecessary because the candidates ran unop-
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obtained an injunction prohibiting the black officeholders from performing their
official duties, and presented the injunction to the newly elected government
five hours after it assumed office.349
Black residents then sought local legislation that would firmly establish
Keysville's boundaries and forestall further legal challenges, but the delegation
consistently rebuffed these efforts.35° Undeterred, blacks took their cause to
State officials and the United States Department of Justice. Later that year, the
Georgia Attorney General approved a map delineating tentative boundaries for
Keysville,351 and the Justice Department subsequently precleared both the
boundaries and an election schedule.352 Emma Gresham, a black candidate
for mayor, stated: "The concerned citizens of Keysville are not ordinary people,
they are people who are Christians who believe that God is a God of justice
and a God of love, and that because of that Keysville will be a town with
sanitary sewage, fire protection and a Democratic government.
' 353 With this
victory in hand, black residents once again pushed forward to hold elec-
tions,354 and after a flurry of litigation,355 the long-awaited vote occurred.
In the first election held in Keysville in 55 years, a black mayor, four black
posed. Corvette, supra note 343.
349. Effort to Restore Government, supra note 340.
350. Gresham v. Harris, 695 F. Supp. at 1180 (N.D. Ga. 1988), vacated 488 U.S. 978 (1988).
351. Backing Blacks' Case, supra note 344; Effort to Restore Government, supra note 340. The
Attorney General considered two alternative maps which bore little similarity to one another. The map
presented by black residents of Keysville resulted in a majority-black city whereas the proposal of the white
residents made the city majority-white. The Attorney General adopted boundaries similar to those included
in the black group's map, noting that "although the boundaries of Keysville are still inexact they 'appear
capable of being sufficiently fixed as to determine the electors of the town."' Candidates Qualify, supra
note 348.
352. Gresham, 695 F.Supp. at 1181.
353. UPI, Aug. 15, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (untitled).
354. Keysville residents were divided along racial lines, with black residents supporting an independent
town government, and white residents opposing it. Backing Blacks' Case, supra note 344; Keysville Blacks
Eager, supra note 343 (describing Keysville as "racially divided, small east Georgia town"); Keysville to
Hold First Election Since 1933, UPI, Dec. 25, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File [hereinaf-
ter Keysville to Hold First Election] ("The lines drawn between black and white residents over efforts to
reactivate city government in Keysville are clearer than the [city's] boundary lines... "). Although white
residents claimed that they opposed change because they feared higher taxes and preferred a simple country
way of life, charges of racism were levied against them. Effort to Restore Government, supra note 340;
Keysville to Hold First Election, supra ("It's degenerated into a racial confrontation.") (quoting Laughlin
McDonald, Director, Southern Regional Office, American Civil Liberties Union).
355. A state court judge enjoined the election, ruling that the city's boundaries were unknown and that
only a slight shift in the boundaries could disqualify voters and candidates. Poole v. Lodge, No. 85-V-414
(Burke County Superior Court, Dec. 30, 1987). See Backing Blacks' Case, supra note 344; Effort to Restore
Government, supra note 340. A federal court judge overturned the injunction, Gresham, 695 F. Supp. at
1179 (describing preliminary injunction), and the election proceeded as planned on January 4, 1988. Town
Election is First Since '33, N.Y. TIiES, Jan. 5, 1988, at B5 [hereinafter Town Election]. On the same date,
a group of whites appealed the federal ruling. Town Holds First Vote, supra note 344. Their lawyer charged
that voting irregularities marred the election. Lawyer Says Irregularities, supra note 341. Finally, the federal
court entered a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from implementing the voting changes
included in the state court order until the Justice Department precleared those changes. Gresham, 695 F.
Supp. at 1184.
1992]
The Yale Law Journal
city councilpersons, and one white city councilperson were elected to city
government.356 The elections were monitored by the Justice Department.357
Black residents continued to press for local legislation to define the city's
boundaries, 358 but the delegation effectively stonewalled on this issue. It was
not until 1991 that black residents were able to persuade the delegation to pass
local legislation establishing the city lines.359
In Burke County, the decision to concentrate political power with the
delegation, rather than with local government, minimized black voting power.
After a lengthy battle, Burke County blacks obtained a method of election that
enabled them to replace the all-white county commission with a majority-black
local governing body.360 Yet blacks would have fared better if delegation
powers had been transferred to local government, where blacks have more
political influence. This disparity demonstrates the dichotomy between two
structures for managing local government: a delegation system that undercuts
black voting strength and a truly local system that recognizes it.
In addition to delegation gerrymandering through reapportionment, evidence
shows that delegations have also been used to limit the voting strength of black
voters via annexation and the manipulation of city boundaries. The membership
of legislative delegations can be altered not only by changing legislative district
lines, but also by redefining the boundaries of political subdivisions. By
expanding its boundaries across an existing legislative district line, a city can
annex a portion of that legislative district and thereby add legislators to the
city's delegation; in contrast, by contracting its boundaries so that the city
includes fewer legislative districts within its borders, the city can remove
legislators from its delegation.
356. Town Election, supra note 355; Town Holds First Vote, supra note 344. The black candidates
were elected from what residents referred to as the "Emma Gresham slate," while the lone white council-
person was elected from the slate known as the "nursing home slate." Blacks Urging High Turnout in
Keysville Election, UPI, Dec. 20, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. State Representative
Tyrone Brooks accused the local nursing home of spearheading white opposition and of intimidating
employees to oppose reactivating government Id.; Candidates Go Door-to-Door Soliciting Votes, UPI, Dec.
19, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
357. Town Election, supra note 355.
358. State officials repeatedly urged that local legislation was required to firmly establish Keysville's
boundaries. Corvette, supra note 343.
359. A 1987 effort to pass local legislation failed, Corvette, supra note 343, while a 1989 bill passed
the senate, see Georgia S.B. 392 (1989) (act to provide new charter for City of Keysville), but failed to gain
the support of Representative Bargeron in the house. Finally, black residents leveraged their election year
clout to force Representative Bargeron to sign the legislation. Telephone Interview with Herman Lodge,
Burke County Commission, and Laughlin McDonald, Director, Southern Regional Office, American Civil
Liberties Union Foundation (Sept. 25, 199 1) (memorandum summarizing conversations on file with author).
S.B. 392 was endorsed by the delegation and unanimously approved by the Georgia Senate and House of
Representatives. See Georgia S.B. 392 (1989).
360. The litigation against the Burke County Commission culminated in Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S.
613 (1982), in which the Court held that the at-large method of electing the county commission had been
maintained with the intent to discriminate against black voters. After Rogers, the county adopted a district




A recently filed lawsuit, Blanton v. Campbell,61 challenges this type of
annexation by Dorchester County, South Carolina. Plaintiffs allege that Dor-
chester County annexed 50 acres of uninhabited land, and in so doing, crossed
over the boundaries of a state house district and a state senate district. This
action increased the size of the delegation from 5 to 7 members. The additional
state senator and state representative are white, and have therefore reduced the
voting power of the lone black delegation member from one vote out of 5 to
one vote out of 7.362
An annexation altered the composition of the Augusta, Georgia delegation
in a similar fashion. As mentioned earlier,363 the city annexed two parcels of
land that lay in legislative districts abutting the city limits in 1985, and in so
doing added two white legislators to the previously half-black, half-white,
delegation.364 Although the impact of this action on the delegation was never
scrutinized, minority leaders alleged that the purpose was to diminish black
political power.365
In 1984, the city of Macon, Georgia similarly decreased the size of its
delegation by severing the entire portion of a legislative district that lay within
city boundaries. The city was divided between Bibb County and Jones County,
although only a tiny portion of the city was located in Jones County. The city
asserted that by detaching the Jones County portion of Macon, it could remove
the Jones County legislator from the Bibb and Macon delegations. This action
demonstrates that local officials have been acutely aware of their ability to
manipulate delegation membership.366
361. C.A. No. 2-91-3635-1 (D.S.C. filed Dec. 12, 1991).
362. Although the complaint does not cite specific instances of discrimination by the delegation, it
alleges violations of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as well as a failure to satisfy the one-person, one-
vote principle. The plaintiffs seek a remedy pertaining not only to Dorchester County, but also to the general
delegation system statewide. The remedy aspect of the case is further discussed infra Part 11(D). At the
present time, the court has not ruled on the merits of the case. In any event, the position of the delegation
has changed as a consequence of the 1992 reapportionment. See Plaintiffs' Opposition to Motion to be
Relieved as Counsel Until Substitute Counsel is Obtained, and Motion to Stay Proceedings, Blanton v.
Campbell, No. 2-91-3635-1, at 1 (D.S.C. Sept. 17, 1992).
363. See supra notes 174-83 and accompanying text.
364. Prior to the 1985 annexations, the city's boundaries included four districts. The four legislators
elected from those districts sat as members of the city delegation. Since two of the delegation members were
white and two were black, delegation deliberations on racial issues provoked controversy and deadlock. See
supra Part I(C)(3).
365. See supra notes 176-82.
366. The Justice Department found the alteration of municipal boundaries objectionable for reasons
other than its impact on the delegation. See Letter from William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney
General, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice, to Roy W. Griffis, Assistant City
Attorney, Macon, Georgia 2 (Apr. 24, 1987) (on file with author). The city claimed that the Jones County
legislator was the target of the deannexation, id., and asserted the novel argument that it intended to remove
him from the delegation because he was hostile to black interests. The Justice Department noted that "this
[action] could have been accomplished through alternate and much less drastic means," id., and found
instead that the purpose was to remove the virtually all black portion of Jones county from the city limits.
The detachment would have ousted black residents from a Macon city council ward in which a black
candidate had narrowly won office in a recent election. See Letter from James M. Elliott, Jr., Macon City
Attorney, to Mary Ann Jackman, Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice
(Aug. 8, 1984) (election results attachment at 11) (on file with author).
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Moreover, there is every reason to believe that the type of discrimination
against delegations revealed by the Georgia reapportionment and annexation
cases is not uncommon. Delegations enjoy local power analogous to that
possessed by formal local governing bodies. The history of discrimination
against minority voters in the selection of local governing bodies is well
documented; 367 thus, delegations have also likely been the focus of discrimi-
natory reapportionments and annexations. Furthermore, two recent developments
are likely to multiply the number of such gerrymanders by creating even
stronger incentives to manipulate delegation membership.
First, the most obvious means of limiting minority voting power in state
legislatures-the imposition of barriers to electing minority candidates-has
become less available. Now that the Supreme Court's opinion in Gingles has
clarified the standards governing discrimination in the election of state legisla-
tors, the case will serve as a powerful weapon to attack discriminatory reappor-
tionments in the new census-related round of legislative redistricting.368
Following Gingles, many of these legislative districting schemes have encoun-
tered objections from the Justice Department. 369 Because traditional modes
of discrimination via legislative reapportionment have become less available,
the focus of prejudice will likely shift to newer methods of discriminatory line-
drawing.
Second, the threat of minorities gaining influence or control of delegations
has become real as minority candidates are elected to state legislatures in ever-
increasing numbers.37° In fact, minority legislators are a significant presence
on many legislative delegations,371 although they still constitute only a frac-
367. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (at-large election of city commissioners
has effect of diluting minority vote); Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990)
(districting for county board of supervisors discriminatory), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 681 (1991); Ketchum
v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398 (7th Cir. 1985) (districting for city council discriminatory), cert. denied sub. nom.
City Council of Chicago v. Ketchum, 471 U.S. 1135 (1985); Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d
139 (5th Cir. 1977) (redistricting plan for county board of supervisors discriminatory).
368. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). See Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196, 202 (E.D.
Ark. 1989) (three-judge court) (only with Gingles can law be said to have jelled), affd, I ll S. CL 662
(1991). Because Gingles was decided after the legality of most post-1980 reapportionments had been
decided, it affected only a few of these reapportionments. See, e.g., Armour v. State of Ohio, 775 F. Supp.
1044, 1050 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (three-judge court) (applying modified Gingles test); Jeffers, 730 F. Supp.
at 205 (applying Gingles to 1981 reapportionment of Arkansas legislature).
369. The Department of Justice objected to redistrictings in Mississippi, Louisiana, Virginia, and
Georgia. Robert Pear, Under the Voting Law, Citizens' Rights Get More Than Lip Service, N.Y. TIMEs, July
21, 1991, at D4; Gary Taylor, Vote Storms Ahead, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 4, 1991, at 1. The Justice Department
has been justly criticized for weak enforcement of voting rights during the 1980's, NoRMAN C. AMAKER,
CIVIL RIGHTs & THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 153 (1988); Lani Guinier, Keeping the Faith: Black Voters
in the Post-Reagan Era, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 393, 399-414 (1989) (reviewing Reagan Administra-
tion's voting rights record), although its enforcement efforts have been revitalized during the past few years.
See Pear, supra; Taylor, supra.
370. McDonald, supra note 13, at 1252; Thomas B. Edsall, GOP Goal: Gain Ground by Fostering
'Majority Minority' Districts, WAsH. POST, July 7, 1990, at A6.
371. See, e.g., Edsall, supra note 370 (describing Columbia County, South Carolina and Jefferson
County, Alabama delegations); McNeil, supra note 268 (describing Greene County, Alabama delegation
as all-black delegation); supra note 153-54 and accompanying text (describing Richmond County (Augusta),
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tion of those elected to the legislature in any state. Moreover, because of
partisan alliances, the effect of the changing racial composition of legislative
delegations in the South has been amplified. In many instances, Republican
gains have paralleled the increase in the number of blacks serving on legislative
delegations,372 while both of these changes have derived in large part from
the switch from multimember to single-member districts. 373 Thus, black Dem-
ocrats and white Republicans are at the epicenter of a struggle for power on
delegations no longer dominated by white Democrats.374
In this changing political landscape, delegation members often represent
a diverse spectrum of interests.375 The deliberations of many delegations have
become increasingly divisive as voting patterns polarized along race and party
lines.376 On many delegations, even minor changes in delegation membership
could shift the balance of political control.377 The delegation from Jefferson
County, Alabama provides a striking example of a delegation divided along
Georgia delegation).
372. See Keith E. Hamm et al., Ethnic and Partisan Minorities in Two Southern State Legislatures,
8 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 177, 177 (1983) [hereinafter, Hamm et al., Ethnic & Partisan Minorities]; Keith E. Hamm
et al., Impacts of Districting Change on Voting Cohesion and Representation, 43 J. POL. 544, 546 (1981)
[hereinafter Hamm et al., Voting Cohesion] (describing delegations in Texas and South Carolina). Although
Republicans are a minority in every Southern legislature, Edsall, supra note 42 (noting that Republicans
have controlled only one Southern legislature (Tennessee) in the past 100 years), they are often a significant
presence on legislative delegations. See, e.g., Edsall, supra note 370 (describing Columbia County, South
Carolina and Jefferson County, Alabama delegations); Edsall, supra note 42, at A6 (describing delegations
in 15 South Carolina counties as evenly split between Democrats and Republicans).
373. JACK BASS & WALTER DEVRIES, THE TRANSFORMAION OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SOCIAL CHANGE
AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCE SINCE 1945 13-15 (1976); Harm, et al, Voting Cohesion, supra note 372,
at 545; Edsall, supra note 370, at A6 (describing minorities' increased political leverage as a result of post-
1980's redistrictings). Ironically, the change touted as the vehicle for increased representation for racial
minorities has resulted in a greater number of "white" and Republican-dominated districts. See Guinier,
supra note 29, at 1464 n.188 ("unholy alliance" between Republicans and minorities results in Republican
districts with white majorities); Jack Quinn et al., Redrawing Political Maps: An America of Groups?,
VASH. POST, March 24,1991, at C1, C4. Not surprisingly, black Democrats are being elected from majority-
black districts, McDonald, supra note 13, at 1282-83 (citations omitted), and white Republicans are being
elected from majority-white districts. Edsall, supra note 370.
374. Race and party are closely correlated as blacks have gained political strength in the Democratic
party and white Democrats have defected to the Republican party. See, e.g., Edsall, supra note 370; Edsall,
supra note 42 (describing memorandum circulated by Alabama Democratic party entitled "Alabama's
Democratic Agenda; Making 1989 The 'Year of the White Male."').
375. See Dauer, supra note 20, at 623-25; Brett Hawkins & Cheryl Whelchel, Reapportionment and
Urban Representation in Legislative Influence Positions: The Case of Georgia, URB. AFF. Q., Mar. 1968,
at 69 (suggesting that Georgia reapportionment may result in diverse, more proportional representation).
During the period dominated by multimember district elections, delegation members were elected by
countywide constituencies and served nearly identical interests.
376. Hamm et al., Voting Cohesion, supra note 372, at 554-55; Edsall, supra note 42, at A6.
377. I do not suggest that political actors only have an incentive to play racial politics when election
outcomes or control of an elected body are at stake. Voting cases document numerous instances in which
the white power structure took steps to bar minority voters' access to the political process even when whites
were guaranteed to remain in control of local politics. See, e.g., Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d
763 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding district court's finding of discrimination even though no "majority-minority"
district could have been drawn when the districting plan was drafted), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 681 (1991);
Paige v. Gray, 538 F.2d 1108, 1109 (5th Cir. 1976) (white legislators took steps to guard against black
control of single city ward). Nonetheless, political machinations are more likely to follow when control is
at issue.
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racial and partisan lines. Jefferson County includes the city of Birmingham,
Alabama's largest city, and its surrounding suburbs.3 78 The eighteen-member
delegation includes eight black Democrats, one white Democrat and nine white
Republicans.379 Delegation deliberations are extremely divisive, with members
of the delegation voting along race and party lines.380 In this situation, and
in others like it, the incentives to tinker with delegation membership are strong.
B. Measuring Dilution
As has been demonstrated, the method of selecting delegations can diminish
the voting power of minority voters. What standard can be used to assess this
diminution of voting strength? The standards for measuring racial vote dilu-
tion381 in the selection of representatives for other governing bodies provide
a starting point for analysis.
382
1. Traditional Measures
The essence of a racial vote dilution or racial gerrymander claim383 is that
378. Birmingham has made headlines with reports of racial tensions. See, e.g., Edsall, supra note 42,
at A6 (alleged targeting of black elected officials for selective prosecution).
379. Edsall, supra note 42, at A6.
380. Edsall, supra note 370, at A6; Edsall, supra note 42, at A6 (delegation adopted a single-member
district plan for Birmingham to ensure that white voters in the majority-black city would elect some council
members). In 1981, the Birmingham-Jefferson County bus system shut down when a divided legislative
delegation failed to agree on a funding proposal. UPI, Feb. 26, 1981, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
UPI File (untitled).
381. The racial vote dilution cases represent only one type of vote dilution litigation; the other strands
are the one-person, one-vote cases and the political vote dilution cases. See supra note 214. The standards
for measuring racial vote dilution, however, differ from those used in these other areas. The one-person,
one-vote cases have a quantitative focus. See Karlan, supra note 196, at 176. Plaintiffs face a higher standard
of proof for political gerrymander claims than for racial gerrymander claims, see Davis v. Bandemer, 478
U.S. 109, 132 (1986) ("[U]nconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the electoral system is arranged
in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the political process
as a whole."). The other strands of dilution theory are nonetheless instructive because they explain how
political influence can be manipulated by the drawing of district lines.
382. The measure of dilution is relevant even where the delegation reapportionment is claimed to be
purposefully discriminatory, but is especially critical where the reapportionment is claimed simply to have
a discriminatory effect. Compare Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462,471-72 (1987) (explaining
impermissible effect of annexations found purposefully discriminatory) with City of Richmond v. United
States, 422 U.S. 358, 378 (1975) (relevant comparison of effects is between "the relative political strength
of the minority race in the enlarged city as compared with what it was before the annexation").
383. Because discriminatory line-drawing is alternatively described as vote dilution or a racial
gerrymander, see Parker, supra note 208, at 106-08, I use the terms interchangeably in discussing the impact
of districting lines on delegations. The claim that district lines are racially gerrymandered has arisen in the
context of multimember districts, see, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); City of Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U.S. 55 (1980); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), and single-member districts, see United Jewish
Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964). Although the term
gerrymander typically encompasses the alteration of district lines, other lines can be manipulated to
disadvantage minority voters as well. Claims that municipal boundaries have been altered to discriminate
against minority voters, either through annexation, see Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), or
consolidation are also properly considered gerrymander claims because these lines, like legislative districting
lines, determine the constituency for elections. See Parker, supra note 208, at 86-87. Vote dilution includes
[Vol. 102: 105
Legislative Delegations
a fairer districting plan would give minority voters a better opportunity to elect
candidates of their choice.3g4 There are two critical components to this inqui-
ry: first, the definition of an elected office; and second, the measure of dilution
used.385
Although the vote dilution inquiry is triggered once an office is designated
elective,386 a precise definition of an elected office has not emerged from
voting rights cases. When a candidate files for a designated office, has his or
her name placed on the ballot as a candidate, and receives votes on election
day for that position, there is little doubt that the office sought is an elected
office.387 The facts in these cases have not given rise to any ambiguity about
whether the office is an elected one.388
With respect to the measure of dilution, the racial vote dilution cases fall
into two broad categories: challenges to electoral structures that submerge
minority voters in multimember districts, 389 and challenges to electoral struc-
tures that fragment minority voters between districts.390 Thornburg v. Gingles
not only the drawing of district lines, but a broad range of other mechanisms for discrimination. See supra
note 194.
384. Guinier, supra note 29, at 1415 (describing view of traditional voting rights advocates).
385. As promised in the introduction, the analysis in this Section does not depend on distinctions
between section 2 and section 5 of the Act. Because section 5 is limited geographically and requires some
change in the status quo, see supra note 30 and accompanying text, section 2 comes into play more often
than section 5. On the other hand, once litigants have met the threshhold requirements of section 5
(challenging a voting change in a covered jurisdiction), they are more likely to prevail because the burden
of proof is on the entity seeking to implement the voting practice. Nonetheless, the general contours of
dilution do not differ significantly under the two sections.
386. Although section 5 applies to appointed offices in the sense that it governs the substantive decision
as to whether an office is made elective or appointive, see Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct.
820, 828, 832 (1992), section 2 applies only to elective offices. See Irby v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections,
889 F.2d 1352, 1357 (4th Cir. 1989) ("i[lt appears more probable than not that section 2 is not applicable
to appointive offices."), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 906 (1990). However, a district court in Alabama has held
that section 2 applies to the appointment of poll and registration officials. Harris v. Graddick, 601 F. Supp.
70 (M.D. Ala. 1984) (denying motion to dissolve injunction); Harris v. Graddick, 615 F. Supp. 239 (M.D.
Ala. 1985) (granting motion to approve settlement).
387. In fact, the question of whether an office is elected is not always straightforward. The classic
example is Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967), in which the Court discussed the applicability
of the one-person, one-vote standard to the selection of a county school board. Members of local school
boards were elected from districts of varying size, and in turn selected delegates from among their members
to choose the members of the county school board. The Court concluded that the process was "basically
appointive rather than elective," id. at 109, because school board members were not "determined, directly
or indirectly, through an election in which the residents of the county participate." Id. at 110 n.6.
388. For example, the elective status of the legislative seats at issue in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S.
30 (1986), or the judgeships in Chisom v. Roemer, Ill S. Ct. 2354 (199 1), was not in dispute. From another
perspective, the North Carolina legislators occupied more than one legislative office. They wore at least
two hats: that of representative to the state legislature, and that of representative on their respective
legislative delegations.
389. For a general discussion of these cases, see supra notes 214-44 and accompanying text. In a
multimember district, voters elect more than one representative. At-large electoral structures are thus the
ultimate multimember district: all of the representatives for the jurisdiction are elected from one district.
See supra note 226.
390. Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 681
(1991); Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1977). Plaintiffs with submergence claims
typically allege that there are too few districts, while plaintiffs with fragmentation claims assert that while
the number of districts is sufficient, minority voters are divided among the districts in a way that diminishes
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articulates the liability standard for vote dilution caused by the submergence
of black voters in multimember districts. There, the Court held that "unless
there is a conjunction of the following circumstances, the use of multimember
districts generally will not impede the ability of minority voters to elect repre-
sentatives of their choice. Stated succinctly, a bloc voting majority must usually
be able to defeat candidates supported by a politically cohesive, geographically
insular minority group."39'
Although the concepts of racial bloc voting, geographic insularity, and
political cohesiveness are complex, the Gingles test in its simplest form is quite
straightforward: if candidates supported by minority voters enjoyed little success
under the existing system even though minority voters potentially could elect
candidates from single-member districts, then multimember districts are dilutive.
Under the Court's analysis, dilution stems from the decision to draw an insuffi-
cient number of districts, coupled with white voters' refusal to support black
,candidates. Thus, dilution is only legally significant when the outcome would
be different under an alternative system.
With respect to the second type of vote dilution claim-that a districting
plan fragments minority voters-Gingles offers little explicit guidance. 92
Presumptively, the Gingles test is as analytically sound for a fragmentation case
as it is for a submergence case.393 In both types of cases, dilution occurs
their ability to elect candidates. In this respect, the fragmentation cases bear a close resemblance to two
other types of racial gerrymanders: packing and stacking cases. Parker, supra note 208, at 87. Packing refers
to placing large concentrations of minority voters in one district so that they cannot achieve voting majorities
in adjoining districts. Id. at 96-99. Stacking refers to the placing of a large minority population into a district
with a larger white population in order to create a white majority district and eliminate a majority-minority
district. Id. at 92-96.
391. 478 U.S. 30,48-49 (1986) (footnote omitted). The Court defined a geographically insular minority
group as one that is "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-
member district." Id. at 50. The court also observed that "showing that a significant number of minority
group members usually vote for the same candidates is one way of proving the political cohesiveness
necessary to a vote dilution claim." Id. at 56. The concept of political cohesiveness is further explored in
Butler & Murray, supra note 15.
392. See supra note 241. The court noted that it had "no occasion to consider" whether its standards
"are fully pertinent to other sorts of vote dilution claims, such as a claim alleging that the splitting of a large
and geographically cohesive minority between two or more multimember or single-member districts resulted
in the dilution of the minority vote." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47 n. 12.
393. Frank R. Parker et aL, Section 2 Litigation After Thomburg v. Gingles 64 (1990) (unpublished
manuscript on file with author). Several courts have applied the Gingles test to redistrictings that fragment
minority voters. See, e.g., Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 756 F. Supp. 1298, 1303-04, 1343-48 (C.D.
Cal. 1990), affd on other grounds, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 681 (1991);
Armour v. Ohio, 775 F. Supp. 1090 (applying Gingles as modified); Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. at 202,
aft'd, 111 S. Ct. 662 (1991). Cf. East Jefferson Coalition v. Jefferson Parish, 691 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. La.
1988) (applying Gingles test to remedial phase of litigation to determine appropriateness of districting plan
that included some single-member districts). Some commentators have argued that the factors identified in
section 2's legislative history bear little relevance to racial gerrymander cases. See Shapiro, supra note 279,
at 198. Gingles, however, placed a significant "gloss" on the factors listed in SENATE REPORT, supra note
217, by placing primary emphasis on one factor, racial bloc voting, and adding another factor, geographic
compactness, that is not mentioned in the report. See City of Carrollton Branch of NAACP v. Stallings,
829 F.2d 1547, 1549-51 (11 th Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Duncan v. City of Carrollton, Ga. Branch
of NAACP, 485 U.S. 936 (1988); see also Karlan, supra note 196, at 177-79. The Gingles factors seem
equally applicable to vote dilution and racial gerrymander claims.
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because white voters, as a numerical majority, are able to defeat the candidate
choices of black voters.3 4
2. Applying Traditional Measures to Delegations
In applying the principles of racial vote dilution cases to legislative delega-
tions, we must first determine whether legislative delegations can be considered
to be elected bodies. Typically, an elected office is listed on a ballot and filled
by the candidate receiving the most votes. By contrast, an appointed office is
filled at the discretion of the appointing authority. Legislative delegations do
not fit neatly into either category. An individual does not run for an office
called "legislative delegate;" instead, individuals run for state legislative seats
and, if elected, serve as members of the legislature as a whole and, thus, of the
delegation. Nor is the office appointed in the sense that some public official
or group of officials determines who sits on a delegation.39 5 Legislators be-
come members of their respective delegations automatically upon election to
the state legislature.
Because vote dilution cases provide little guidance on whether this uncon-
ventional arrangement fits the definition of an elected office,396 standards
must be found elsewhere. Courts have grappled with the definition of an elected
body in deciding whether the composition of certain public bodies violates the
principle of one-person, one-vote.397 In Board of Estimate v. Morris,398 the
Supreme Court applied the one-person, one-vote principle to the Board of
Estimate of the City of New York. The members of the board, which consisted
of the mayor, the president of the city council, the city comptroller, and the
presidents of the five boroughs, had been elected to their respective city or
394. Evidence of racial bloc voting is especially critical because the placement of district lines will
only curtail the influence of minority voters if black and white voters support different candidates. For an
analysis of the relevance of racial bloc voting to racial gerrymander cases, see Shapiro, supra note 279,
at 199-200. Moreover, the means of accomplishing the dilution are identical: white voters vote as a bloc
and the voting district lines create districts in which black voters are outnumbered by white voters. In both
cases, the votes of the minority group would have a greater impact where these voters vote as a bloc and
district lines aggregated larger concentrations of minority voters.
395. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
396. See supra notes 386-88 and accompanying text.
397. The Equal Protection mandate applies when officials are selected by popular election and when
those officials perform "governmental functions." See, e.g., Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50
(1970). Compared to the "governmental function" component of the one-person, one-vote inquiry, the
"elective" component has received little attention. The meaning of a "governmental function" has been
explored in numerous decisions, see, e.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare
Lake Basin water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973); Hadley, 397 U.S. 50; Avery v. Midland County, 390
U.S. 474 (1968), while cases discussing the elective/appointive distinction are relatively scarce. But see
Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
398. 489 U.S. 688 (1989).
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borough offices and served on the board by virtue of their election to these
positions."'
In the court of appeals, the board argued that its members were not selected
by popular election because they served ex officio, and no separate election was
held for the board position.' The court rejected this contention and conclud-
ed that the members of the board "are directly elected by the voters. Upon
election to their respective positions, they automatically become Board members
as a matter of law."' The Supreme Court adopted this reasoning, noting that
the selection of the members "trigger[ed] th[e] constitutional safeguard [of one
person one-vote] [because] [a]ll eight officials become members as a matter
of law upon their various elections." 4 2
This concept of an elected body is a functional one that rests on the
relationship between the election and any intervening mechanism for selecting
members of the body. The Court in Board of Estimate attributed no significance
to the absence of a separate election or the lack of any formal description of
the contested office on the ballot. The election was functionally an election for
two offices because popular vote determined both the winners in the election
and the membership of the board.4°3 Successful candidates were in effect
representatives in a dual capacity, both that of city official and board mem-
ber.4o4
Under the Board of Estimate analysis, legislative delegations should be
viewed as elective bodies and state legislators as dual officeholders. Only those
individuals who are elected to the state legislature from a particular county
serve as members of the delegation.4°5 -It is their election by the voters that
places them on the delegation, just as it is their election to the state legislature
that makes them members of the state legislature as a whole. County boundaries
determine which elected officials sit as members of each delegation, and the
selection of delegation members is automatic upon winning election to the state
399. The presidents of the five boroughs were elected from districts having widely varying populations;
the remaining three officials were elected at-large. Id. at 690.
400. Morris v. Board of Estimate, 707 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 1983), affd, 489 U.S. 688 (1989).
401. Id. at 689. Section 61 of the New York City Charter provided: "The mayor, the complroller, the
president of the council and the presidents of the boroughs shall constitute the board of estimate." Id.
402. Board of Estimate, 489 U.S. at 694. This is the only part of the opinion to address the fact that
the Board is an elective rather than an appointive body. The remainder of the opinion addresses the functions
performed by the Board, and the relevance that the presence of at-large members on the Board had to
calculations of population deviations. The Court found that shared legislative powers and exclusive
nonlegislative powers were sufficient to require compliance with equal protection principles. Id. at 694-96.
403. As the court of appeals noted, "a citizen entering the voting booth in New York City 'chooses
at one and the same time' his Borough President and his Board of Estimate member." 707 F.2d at 689.
404. This characterization of certain offices as dual in nature can be found in other one-person, one-vote
cases. See, e.g., Bianchi v. Griffing, 393 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1968) (elected town supervisors serve as town
supervisors and county board members).
405. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
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legislature."6 This election fills two offices, that of state legislator and that
of local delegation member.
Once delegations are seen as elective bodies, then the method by which
they are elected merits examination-any other elected body-to determine
whether minority voters have an equal opportunity to elect representatives to
the delegation. Gingles4°7 teaches that geographically compact groups of
minority voters submerged in large multimember districts suffer vote dilution
where white voters usually vote as a bloc to defeat candidates supported by
politically cohesive minority voters.4°s However, under some circumstances,
the Gingles test cannot capture dilution in the context of legislative delegations.
Take, for example, the case of hypothetical County A, whose population
is more than sufficient to entitle it to two legislative seats but not large enough
to entitle it to three.409 Fifty percent of the population is black and the re-
mainder is white. County residents vote along racial lines. The county's black
residents are concentrated in the county in such a way that they could constitute
a majority of the population in a single legislative district. The counties sur-
rounding County A are predominantly white and no majority-black district could
be drawn in this area.
Three primary options exist for drawing legislative districts in County A:
the legislature could draw one multimember district with two seats; two single-
member districts that divide black voters between the districts; or two single-
member districts with one majority-white district and one majority-black
district.4 0 Because County A has more residents than can be allocated to two
districts, a third legislative district, centered on an adjoining county, would
include a portion of County A voters. This district is predominantly white.
Because the first option submerges and the second fragments black voters,
each would fail the Gingles test, both with respect to membership in the state
legislature and to membership on the delegation. Under those options, black
voters cannot determine the outcome of elections for any member of the
legislature or the delegation, and so their votes are diluted.
406. The match with the Board of Estimate case is in fact a close one. The city-wide members and
the borough presidents became members of the Board upon their election to their respective offices and
by virtue of the city charter provision, which provided that election to these offices would determine
membership on the Board. Given this provision, no discretion was vested in any entity other than the
electorate to determine who sat on the board. Legislative rules-whether de facto or de jure-determine
membership on legislative delegations. These rules, whether enacted or the result of longstanding legislative
practice, similarly give no discretion to any other entity to change the composition of the delegation. Election
to the state legislature is election to the delegation.
407. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
408. Id. at 56. See supra notes 235-41, 391 and accompanying text.
409. The demographics and districting plan for County A are similar to those of Dougherty County.
See supra notes 312-16 and accompanying text.
410. There are, of course, an almost infinite number of variations on these primary options. See
generally ELECrORAL LAWS AND THEIR POLMCAL CONSEQUENCES (Bernard Grofman & Arend Lijphart
eds., 1986) (overview of various electoral laws). Here, a discussion of these elaborate options is not necessary
to explain how traditional standards fail to capture delegation dilution.
1992]
The Yale Law Journal
The third option recognizes the concentration of black voters in County A,
and so the legislative reapportionment would pass muster under Gingles.41
Nonetheless, black votes have less clout than white votes in the selection of
the legislative delegation. The constituency, for purposes of electing members
to the delegation, has been expanded to add a second representative elected by
white voters. If one measure of political opportunity for black voters is the
ability to elect representatives of their choice to office, it would appear that the
ability of black voters to participate in the political process has been dimin-
ished. The Gingles test cannot assess this form of vote dilution.
Hence, definitions of dilution developed in the legislative reapportionment
context are inadequate to measure delegation dilution 12 Although both types
of dilution occur as a result of the way in which legislative lines are drawn,
the potential for delegation dilution arises not from the decision to draw an
insufficient number of legislative districts or to split communities of voters.
Instead, dilution may result from the decision to include voters outside the
jurisdiction in the selection of delegation members. Whether that decision was
made for the purpose of disadvantaging black voters-or simply because
additional voters were necessary to satisfy one-person, one-vote require-
ments-the impact is the same. Voters from an adjoining county are permitted
to vote in an election determining the candidate who will sit as a member of
the delegation for the first county.4 13 This occurs each time a legislative dis-
trict line crosses a county boundary. Reapportionment thus can either expand
or contract the constituency that elects members to the delegation.414
411. Under option three, the districting plan has taken into account geographically compact minority
voters, so the third Gingles factor is not present
412. Existing doctrine is tied to a narrow conception of voting power that ends at election day. See
supra notes 258-64 and accompanying text. The measure of dilution is whether the legislative lines are
drawn so that groups of voters, voting alike, form a "bloc" sufficient to determine the outcome of elections.
This measure is narrowly tailored to the notion of a single office and does not look beyond election day
to the various arrangements that determine what these representatives actually do.
413. This analysis defines the issue as a traditional vote dilution problem under the Voting Rights Act
in order to demonstrate the potential for race discrimination. An alternative way to frame the issue would
be to look at the structure of the delegation as an extension of the franchise to voters living outside of the
jurisdiction. Viewed in this way, these structures might be thought to violate traditional Equal Protection
principles by permitting voters with no substantial interest in the operation of the delegation nevertheless
to "vote" for members of the delegation. See, e.g., Hogencamp v. Lee County Bd. of Educ., 722 F.2d 720
(11 th Cir. 1984) (residents of cities served by independent school boards had no substantial interest in
operation of separate county school system and statute permitting city residents to vote in county school
board elections was unconstitutional as applied); Brown v. Board of Comm'rs, 722 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. Tenn.
1989) (city ordinance permitting nonresidents who owned trivial amounts of property to vote in city elections
violated the Equal Protection clause).
414. See infra notes 430-31 and accompanying text for an analysis of why the voting strength of the




Since the Gingles standards cannot be used to evaluate delegation dilution,
it is necessary to turn to doctrine developed outside the context of challenges
to election systems 5 A close parallel to this type of dilution is discussed
in the annexation cases decided under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 416
An annexation, by changing a city's boundary lines, has the potential to add
voters to the city rolls and change the city's election constituency.4 17 This in
turn affects the relative influence of black voters in city elections. Likewise,
a reapportionment changes the election constituency for legislative delegations
by expanding legislative districts beyond the county's borders. 8
The Supreme Court first explained how annexation can affect voting power
in Perkins v. Matthews. 419 The Court offered two formulations for the
relationship between annexation and voting: "(1) by including certain voters
within the city and leaving others outside, [the annexation] determines who may
vote in the municipal election and who may not; (2) it dilutes the weight of the
votes of the voters to whom the franchise was limited before the annex-
ation. . . ,42 The Court viewed annexations as boundary line changes that
415. Existing doctrine does provide some analogy to delegations and therefore provides a useful starting
point. An alternative to squeezing delegations into existing doctrine is simply to ask "how much more
influence could black voters have under a different system?" Under this approach, the technical character-
ization of the delegation as an elected body has far less significance than the role of the delegation and its
impact on black voters. For a provocative example of this kind of interpretation, see Guinier, supra note
29, at 1459-1487 (arguing for "interest representation" as alternative voting rights concept).
416. Although section 2 presumably covers annexations, which, by changing the election constituency,
can affect the ability of voters to "participate in the political process and elect representatives of their
choice" to office, only a few courts have considered such challenges. See, e.g., Dotson v. City of Indianola,
739 F.2d 1022, 1023 n.l (5th Cir. 1984) (remanding to district court for section 2 determination and other
purposes); United States v. Town of Indian Head, No. R86-964 (D. Md. Nov. 18, 1986) (approving final
consent judgment and final decree); Tolbert v. City of Bessemer, No. CV-83-P-3050-S (N.D. Ala. Oct. 21,
1985) (approving amended consent decree).
417. Typically, only city residents may vote in municipal elections.
418. It is in this sense that reapportionments can be viewed as "temporary annexations" of voters, who
then become eligible to vote for members of the county's delegation. The constituency remains in place
until the next reapportionment, when the district lines in a given county may be reconfigured. Each
reapportionment has the potential to change the voting constituency by adding a greater or lesser number
of voters from an adjoining county to the delegation or by splitting the county among a greater number of
legislative districts. The term "annexation" is used loosely in making the analogy between city boundary
changes and legislative reapportionments as they affect county delegations. Strictly speaking, an annexation
entitles residents of the annexed property to all of the benefits and burdens of city residence; a reapportion-
ment, on the other hand, only affects the voting status of residents outside of the county vis-,-vis the
members of the delegation.
419. 400 U.S. 379 (1971). Actually, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), was the first Supreme
Court case to tie city boundary line changes to the right to vote. Gomillion explained how a deannexation
prohibits the exercise of the franchise by removing voters from ajurisdiction where they could cast a ballot.
It is Perkins, however, that first offered a theory of vote dilution through annexation; that is, where voting
power, and not the absolute right to vote, was infringed.
420. Perkins, 400 U.S. at 388. It is the second formulation of vote dilution in Perkins that resembles
the vote dilution that occurs through the reapportionment of delegations. Voters are not prohibited from
voting, as they would be by a deannexation, see Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341, or a refusal to annex, see City
of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462 (1987). Instead, their votes are worth less because they
are a smaller percentage of the voting pool.
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had the same potential impact on voting as reapportionments because they
"change... the composition of the electorate" entitled to vote in elections.421
The Supreme Court has maintained its view that annexations may dilute
the votes of black voters who were residing in the city before the annexation
and whose percentage of the population was decreased as a result.422 The
question of how much dilution constitutes discrimination has not been firmly
established because, in many instances, the Court has not been faced with the
question of whether the annexations, standing alone, are discriminatory.
3
Although the Court has declined to hold every annexation that reduces the
percentage of black residents in a city's population a violation of section 5,41
it has nevertheless upheld lower court findings that annexations diluted black
voting strength even where blacks were a numerical minority in a city both
before and after the annexations4 5 Moreover, when the annexation is under-
421. 400 U.S. at 389. As a result, the Court held that revisions of boundary lines fall within the scope
of section 5 as "changes having a potential for racial discrimination in voting... " Id. at 388-89. In
analogizing annexations to changing the boundaries of election districts, the Court cited the finding of the
United States Civil Rights Commission that "gerrymandering and boundary changes had become prime
weapons" for voting discrimination. Id. at 389. The Court cited language from a Commission report noting
that "[tihese measures have taken the form of switching to at-large elections where Negro voting strength
is concentrated in particular election districts, facilitating the consolidation of predominantly Negro and
predominantly white counties, and redrawing the lines of districts to divide concentrations of Negro voting
strength." Id. at 389.
422. See, e.g., City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462 (1987); City of Port Arthur v.
United States, 459 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1982); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); City of
Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 368, 370 (1975).
423. For instance, in Perkins, the Court determined only that the annexations to Canton, Mississippi
had to be reviewed for discriminatory effect. 400 U.S. at 383-84, 388-89. The district court had found that
blacks were a majority of the city's registered voters both before and after the annexation. Id. at 382 n.4.
In Port Arthur, the parties conceded that the annexation-which reduced blacks from 45% to 41% of the
population-was dilutive, but disputed whether the remedy was sufficient to dispel the adverse effect of
the annexation. The question of whether annexations are dilutive is determined in the context of the
particular method of election used in the city. In this posture, the critical issue is the impact of the election
system, not whether black voters have decreased as a percentage of the population. Where the city can prove
that its method of election "fairly reflects the strength of the [minority] community as it exists after the
annexation," City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 187 (citing City of Richmond, 422 U.S. at 371), the annexation is
not discriminatory, absent a finding that it was adopted with the purpose of minimizing black voting
strength. As City of Richmond explained, the method of election must "afford [minority voters) representa-
tion reasonably equivalent to their political strength in the enlarged community" to cure the impact of an
annexation that reduces minority voters as a percentage of the city's population. 422 U.S. at 370.
424. Despite the diminution of black voting strength, the Court in City ofRichmond found that the ward
plan adopted for city elections cured this discriminatory effect. 422 U.S. at 372, 378. With respect to the
district court's finding that the annexation had been adopted with a discriminatory purpose five years earlier,
the Court remanded the case to the district court for a determination as to whether nondiscriminatory reasons
supported the annexation at the present time. Id. at 374, 378-79.
425. In City of Rome, the Court noted that although blacks were only 23.4% of the city's population,
446 U.S. at 159, and had never elected any city officials, the annexations nonetheless "reduced the
importance of [their] votes." Id. at 187. Several lower court decisions provide some indicia of the amount
of dilution considered discriminatory under section 5, in the absence of ameliorative election changes. See,
e.g., City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021, 1024 (1972), affd, 410 U.S. 962 (1973)
(finding reduction of blacks as percentage of city's population from 55% to 46% sufficient to establish
discrimination). Under applicable section 5 standards, the measure of discriminatory effect is whether the
change is "retrogressive"; that is, whether minority voters are worse off than they were before the change.
See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) ("[T]he purpose of §5 has always been to insure that
no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial
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taken with the purpose of discriminating against black voters, almost any
diminution in voting strength is sufficient to constitute dilution.426
The similarity between reapportionment as it affects the constituency for
delegation elections and annexation as it affects the constituency for city elec-
tions suggests a means of measuring vote dilution in the context of legislative
delegations. The analogy between legislative reapportionments and annexations
is not perfect, however. 27 More importantly, this analysis has not benefited
from the factual development and doctrinal refinement that occurs in litiga-
tion, 41 since courts have not yet explored the potential for dilution by those
structuring legislative delegations. The analysis is thus offered as a model for
conceptualizing delegations, rather than as a definitive legal standard against
which to measure vote dilution. 29
The first question that arises under this formulation is: against which
benchmark do we measure minority voting strength? In other words, conceding
that adding noncounty voters to the delegation constituency affects the voting
strength of minority voters, what should be the correct influence of minority
voters? 430 The appropriate measure of minority voting power should be their
minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise."). Since the jurisdiction seeking
to implement the change bears the burden of proof, City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 172, the standards in section
5 may not be transferred wholesale to section 2, where the burden remains with the parties challenging the
dilutive practice.
426. In Pleasant Grove, the Court sustained a finding of dilution where the effect on black voters
currently living in the city was de minimus. Although only two black residents were registered to vote in
the "all-white enclave" before the annexation, 479 U.S. at 465, the annexation "provide[d] for the growth
of a monolithic white voting block, thereby effectively diluting the black vote in advance." Id. at 472.
427. For instance, annexations typically are permanent, whereas reapportionments remain effective only
for approximately one decade. Annexations affect voting for offices that are formally denominated as elected
offices, while reapportionments affect an office that is functionally an elected office but is not denominated
as such. Moreover, the city has the opportunity to remedy a dilutive annexation through ameliorative changes
to its election system. The cure for the reapportionment of a legislative delegation that diminishes minority
voting strength is less clear. See infra Part HI(D).
428. For a discussion of the relationship of factual development to legal theory, see generally DAVID
A. BINDER & PAUL BERGMAN, FAcT INVESTIGATION: FROM HYPOTHESIS TO PROOF (1984); Gerald P.
Lopez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEO.
L.J. 1603, 1629-1649 (1989). The comments of the Supreme Court with respect to constitutional claims
of racial gerrymandering are equally applicable here: "[For claims] which derive content by an interpretive
process of inclusion and exclusion, it is imperative that generalizations, based on and qualified by the
concrete situations that gave rise to them, must not be applied out of context in disregard of variant
controlling facts." Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339,343-344 (1960). Traditional vote dilution litigation
has its roots in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and the 25 years since Reynolds have required
attention to the meaning of fair representation. It was not until 1986 that the Supreme Court refined the test
for dilution through the use of multimember districts, see Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), and
the parameters of other types of claims are still unclear, see supra notes 235-46 and accompanying text.
429. In describing their proposal for assessing racial vote dilution in at-large systems, James Blacksher
and Larry Menefee express similar sentiments: "[L]ike every other constitutional or legal standard of proof,
the one proposed here, once it is tested in the continuum of real world circumstances, may require
refinement and modification." Blacksher & Menefee, supra note 167, at 64.
430. As Justice O'Connor put the issue in Gingles: "[I]n order to decide whether an electoral system
has made it harder for minority voters to elect the candidates they prefer, a court must have an idea in mind
of how hard it 'should' be for minority voters to elect their preferred candidates ...." 478 U.S. at 88
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). The Court in Gingles struggled with this question in determining
that the single-member district is the appropriate benchmark against which to compare the relative ability
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voting power in the county governed by the delegation 31 The primary role
of the delegation is to consider matters affecting local government, and delega-
tion members are functionally representatives of the county. The appropriate
comparison is, then, between the voting strength of minority voters in the
county and their strength in the "enlarged" constituency.
Under this analysis, the structure of the delegation is potentially dilutive
any time legislative district lines cross over county boundaries to include voters
from adjoining counties in the delegation's election constituency. 32 Black
voting strength would actually be diluted (1) in counties that contain significant
numbers of black voters; and (2) where the addition of noncounty voters to the
delegation's constituency (through either fragmentation or submergence) adds
delegation members elected by white voters.
4 33
of black and white voters to elect their candidates. Id. at 50. Although this measure is clearly unsatisfactory
in many contexts, see Karlan, supra note 196, at 201-04, 221-36, other measures may also be problematic.
See generally Bernard Grofman, Alternatives to Single-Member Plurality Districts: Legal and Empirical
Issues, in REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING ISSUES (Bernard Grofman et al. eds., 1982); Note,
Alternative Voting Systems as Remedies for Unlawful At-Large Systems, 92 YALE LJ. 144, 155-56 (1982)
(discussing possible disadvantages of cumulative voting). The question of discriminatory effect is perhaps
the most difficult question facing voting rights advocates as well as other civil rights advocates. Cf. Minna
J. Kotkin, Public Remedies for Private Wrongs: Rethinking Title VII Back Pay Remedy, 41 HASTINGS L.J.
1301, 1330 (1990) ("[D]isparate impact test has spawned a jurisprudence of incredible complexity.");
Norman C. Amaker, De Facto Leadership and the Civil Rights Movement: Perspectives on the Problems
and Role of Activists and Lawyers in Legal and Social Change, 16 S.U. L. REV. 1, 40-42 (1989) (identifying
problem in determining "core" meaning of effects discrimination under Title VII). Once we leave the
confines of decisions made expressly to harm minorities, fairness and equality become more difficult to
assess.
431. By analogy to Gingles, voting power should be measured against other available alternatives. As
the Court noted, "[tlhe single-member district is generally the appropriate standard against which to measure
minority group potential to elect because it is the smallest political unit from which representatives are
elected." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 n.17. For legislative reapportionments, the single-member district may
be the best districting alternative to a multimember plan, but for delegations the logical alternative is a
district that is commensurate with the county. But for the decision to vest power over local matters in the
state legislature, local governance power would be exercised by the county as the appropriate political unit.
To the extent that the state decides to vest substantial control over local matters in a group reflecting the
crazy quilt pattern of selecting delegation members, that choice cannot be permitted if it disadvantages black
voters.
432. Not every reapportionment that diminishes minority voters' share of the election constituency
would violate the Voting Rights Act. The reapportionment might make minority voters a smaller percentage
of the delegation's constituency than of the county's voting constituency, but nevertheless have only a
minimal impact on minority voters' influence on the delegation. For example, if the county's minority
population was already too small to influence the outcome of local elections, then black voters would suffer
no additional disadvantage by being "submerged" in the larger delegation district.
433. The analysis, of course, assumes racial bloc voting. See supra notes 238-40 & 391-94 and
accompanying text. This dilution would occur irrespective of a legislative reapportionment that, with respect
to elections to the state legislature, meets the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. A legislative reappor-
tionment plan might contain only single-member districts, see Parker, supra note 208, at 88 (noting tendency
for multimember districts to submerge black voting strength), and fragment no concentrations of black
voters, id. at 89-92 (fragmentation of concentrations of minority voters between legislative districts dilutes
black voting strength), yet still have the effect of diluting the votes of minority voters with respect to the
legislative delegation. This is the inevitable effect of structuring delegations so that voters who live outside
of the affected jurisdiction have a voice in determining who sits on the delegation. See supra note 301 for
an explanation of how legislative reapportionments may fairly reflect minority voting strength with respect
to the legislature but nonetheless dilute the delegation.
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The legislative delegations for Dougherty and Richmond Counties, Georgia
illustrate the dilutive impact of a districting plan that fragments the county and
imports a large number of noncounty voters into the delegation constituency.
The delegation for Burke County, Georgia similarly demonstrates dilution in
a county that donates its residents to a larger legislative district and is thus
submerged in a predominantly white district.4 4 In Dougherty and Richmond
Counties, a legislative districting plan centered on the county resulted in the
election of a majority-black delegation and a racially balanced delegation
respectively. The incursion from adjoining counties added a predominantly
white constituency that elected an additional white member to these delegations.
Had the Justice Department not intervened, black voters would have had a
correspondingly smaller influence in delegation decisionmaking.435
In Burke County, black residents have obtained a significant voice in the
county electorate, but their voice is muted because the electorate for the
delegation has been expanded.436 As a numerical minority of the voters in a
predominantly white legislative district, they have little influence on the election
of members to the delegation. The structure of the legislative delegation thus
dilutes the votes of black voters in Burke County.
C. The Enforcement Mechanism
Given the vast potential for discrimination in the structure of delegations
and their procedures, the mechanisms for uncovering this discrimination are
critical. This is especially true in light of the near invisibility of delegations to
all but local observers. Since delegations have gone about their business in
virtual obscurity, the risk remains that they will continue to operate free of legal
constraints.
434. The delegation reapportionments of Dougherty and Richmond Counties differ from that of Burke
County in one significant respect. While the first two reapportionments appear deliberately designed to
minimize black voting strength, the Burke County reapportionment may be the inevitable result of the fact
that black voters in the county are too scarce to constitute a majority in a legislative district. In the former
reapportionment, the legislative plan could be redrawn to the cure the taint, while in the latter, the only
feasible remedy appears to have been a linkage with Richmond County or a transfer of power to a different
level of government. See infra notes 463-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the remedial
problems faced in such situations.
435. In Dougherty County, discrimination occurs despite the fact that the racial makeup of the
delegation mirrors that of the county. Blacks constitute one half of the county's voters and can elect one-half
of the delegation members. The dilution arises from the fact that the state has taken steps to reduce the
influence of black voters from what it would otherwise have been under a plan that was free from impermis-
sible racial considerations. Dilution would be even clearer in a plan where the delegation's racial makeup
did not mirror that of the county. For example, suppose that Dougherty County was entitled to two
representatives, that one majority-white and one majority-black district could be drawn within county
borders, and that the state drew a third majority-white district within only a piece of the county. In this
situation, the county's voters would have only one third of the representation on the delegation, while
constituting one half of the voters.
436. See supra note 360 and accompanying text.
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Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act provides a ready mechanism for moni-
toring changes in the membership of legislative delegations.437 Though section
5 has many nuances and has been the subject of extensive commentary,438
its operation is fairly straightforward for the purposes of this discussion. Section
5 applies whenever a covered jurisdiction adopts any change affecting voting.
Covered jurisdictions are defined as states or political subdivisions4 39 with
a history of voting discrimination and low voter registration or turnout."0 The
language of section 5 speaks broadly to voting changes, which it defines to
include any change in a "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting." 44
Section 5 covers many of the states in which delegations exercise broad
powers. 442 Legislative reapportionments 443 and annexations, 444 the two fac-
tors that have the greatest impact on who sits on legislative delegations, are vot-
ing changes within the meaning of section 5. The scope of the section, coupled
437. Theoretically, section 2 would also apply, but would in reality seem to be a less effective remedy.
Because section 2 lacks an enforcement mechanism like that in section 5, the burden would fall on private
litigants or the federal government to uncover discrimination and file a lawsuit in federal court. To date,
few section 2 lawsuits have ventured beyond the familiar issues surrounding vote dilution in a formally
elected bodies, and it is unlikely that there will be a wholesale reversal of this trend in the near future.
438. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Preclearance Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 61 N.C. L.
REV. 189 (1983) (arguing that the retrogression test has been supplanted in the administrative preclearance
process by constitutional vote dilution factors); Cynthia Grace Lamar, Note, The Resolution of Post-Election
Challenges Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 97 YALE LJ. 1765, 1766 (1988) (proposing expanded
role for federal district courts in determining the existence of discrimination).
439. The Act defines "political subdivision" as counties, where the county conducts voter registration,
or as any other local entity which conducts voter registration. 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(2) (1988). The entire
states of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia
are covered by section 5, as well as parts of California, Florida, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York,
North Carolina, and South Dakota. A complete list of the covered jurisdictions appears in the appendix to
Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, As Amended, 28 C.F.R.
pt. 51 (1991) [hereinafter Section 5 Appendix].
440. Specifically, section 4(b) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1976), covers states or political
subdivisions that meet the two-part test for coverage. Coverage is triggered for any jurisdiction that has (I)
maintained a "test or device" as defined in section 4(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(c) (1976) or 42 U.S.C. §
1973b(f) (1976), as of a certain specified date, and (2) where the number of registered voters on the same
date was less than 50% of the jurisdiction's voting age population, or the voting turnout for that year's
presidential election was less than 50% of its voting age population. States and political subdivisions initially
were covered by virtue of maintaining such tests or devices, and having low registration rates on November
1, 1964, and with the requisite low turnout for the 1964 presidential elections. In 1970, the Act was amended
to extend coverage to states and political subdivisions that met these conditions on November 1, 1968 and
in the 1968 presidential election. In 1975, the Act was amended again to extend coverage to states and
political subdivisions that met these conditions on November 1, 1972 and in the 1972 presidential election,
and to extend coverage to language minorities under certain specified conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b)(f)(3).
441. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Without preclearance, covered jurisdictions may not implement changes
adopted after the date the jurisdiction became subject to section 5 coverage. See Section 5 Appendix, supra
note 439, for the applicable trigger dates.
442. Delegations are especially influential in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina,
and South Carolina. See sources cited supra note 23. The entire states of Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi
and South Carolina are covered by section 5, and 40 counties in North Carolina are covered. See supra note
439.
443. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973).
444. Port Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S. 159 (1982); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156
(1980); City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
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with its application to Southern states, means that section 5 will apply to
changes in delegation membership in most states in which delegations are
important actors in the legislative process.
When a jurisdiction adopts a voting change that falls within the scope of
section 5, it must obtain approval for the change from the United States Attor-
ney General or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
The process of securing approval is referred to as "preclearance," 445 and the
statute provides a complex administrative and judicial mechanism for determin-
ing whether or not discrimination has occurred. 46 When a jurisdiction does
not seek preclearance, the United States Department of Justice and private
litigants can sue in federal court to force the jurisdiction to submit the
change.447 Although the statute offers judicial preclearance as an alternative
to administrative preclearance s most jurisdictions seek approval from the
Attorney General. 449 Thus, in most cases, the Justice Department decides
whether voting changes satisfy section 5 standards"
Each time a jurisdiction submits a reapportionment or an annexation for
section 5 review, the Justice Department could expand the scope of its review
to include the impact of these changes on the delegation. Specifically, the
Department could require the state to supply this information and withhold
preclearance unless the jurisdiction could satisfy its burden of showing that the
change did not have a discriminatory impact on the delegation 51
The burden of proof may be especially critical in deciding the novel issues
presented by legislative delegations. The Justice Department may be reluctant
to undertake a wholesale examination of state legislative reapportionments on
delegation membership. When state and local governments bear the burden of
establishing that the choices they have made regarding their governmental
processes are nondiscriminatory, the Department is more likely to object to the
change.
445. AMAKER, supra note 369, at 141. For a detailed description of the preclearance process, see
generally HOWARD BALL ET AL, COMPROMISED COMPLIANCE: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1965 VOTING
RIGHTS AcT (1982); John P. MacCoon, The Enforcement of the Preclearance Requirement of Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 29 CATH. U. L REv. 107 (1979).
446. Jurisdictions that oppose the administrative decision of the Attorney General may file a de novo
appeal with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The case is heard by a three-judge
panel, and that court's decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
447. Allen v. Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
448. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
449. AMAKER, supra note 369, at 142. By initially seeking approval from the Attorney General, the
jurisdiction does not forfeit its right to obtain preclearance from the court.
450. Within the Justice Department, the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division has the responsibili-
ty for administrative preclearance. AMAKER, supra note 369, at 148.
451. The regulations implementing section 5 set forth the required contents for submissions, 28 C.F.R.
§§ 51.27-.28 (1991), and could be revised to require information on reapportionment's impact on the
delegation. Even as the regulations now stand, the Justice Department can request additional information
about the proposed change. 28 C.F.R. § 51.37(a) (1991). The Justice Department may withhold preclearance
until the information submitted in response is satisfactory, 28 C.F.R. § 51.37(c) (1991), or object if the
information is not forthcoming within 60 days. 28 C.F.R. § 51.40 (1991).
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D. The Remedy
The goal in remedying delegation dilution is to reflect black voting strength
in the delegation membership.4 52 Typically, vote dilution is remedied by alter-
ing the lines for election districts, and thereby changing the composition of the
electorate entitled to vote for a particular office.4 53 Although this and several
other remedial possibilities exist for delegation dilution, all but one impose
unacceptable costs in terms of prevailing legal standards and policy consider-
ations. Thus, it appears that only the most stringent remedy-divesting the
delegation of jurisdiction and returning control to local government-is viable.
In applying the standard vote dilution remedy to delegations, noncounty
voters could be removed from the delegation's constituency in several ways.
When a legislative reapportionment has caused the dilution, district lines could
be adjusted to remove the offending legislative district from county boundaries.
Such a remedy is feasible, however, only in the few instances in which minor
adjustments could remedy the dilution, such as when the dilutive district
fragments only a small, sparsely-populated portion of the county. This remedy
could be implemented in Dougherty County, for example, where the 3,500
residents of the finger district could be distributed among existing districts.454
In most instances, however, this remedy would require unacceptable
alterations in district boundaries. For example, dilution in submerged counties
such as Burke County cannot be remedied through this means because sub-
merged counties by definition contain too few residents to constitute a legisla-
tive district. Any district seeking to recognize black voting strength, therefore,
would necessarily exclude county voters in numbers sufficient to raise serious
one-person, one-vote problems. Even where the problem is fragmentation, rather
than submergence, equal population problems likely would arise. In all but
those counties with fragmentation slivers, district line adjustments would cause
a spillover effect in adjoining counties that would require district lines to be
redrawn. The membership of delegations in those counties would, in turn, be
affected, and the impact on statewide districting would be enormous. Ultimate-
ly, the goal of maintaining county boundaries would collide with the one-
person, one-vote principle, 55 making it impossible to accommodate both
goals.
With respect to annexations, legislative lines could also be redrawn to
remove the annexed territory from the adjoining legislative district. This result
could be accomplished by expanding an existing city district to encompass the
annexed territory. Although the remedy poses the same disadvantages as those
452. The delegation constituency would fairly reflect black voting strength where the percentage of
black voters in the delegation districts is nearly equal to the percentage of black voters in the county.
453. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 208, at 111-13; Guinier, supra note 29, at 1426-27.
454. See supra notes 312-16, 329 and accompanying text.
455. See supra notes 282-95 and accompanying text.
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described above, some annexations would have few enough residents to render
the population consequences minimal.456
When this remedy is not viable, the alternative means of removing non-
county voters from the delegation's constituency involves voiding the annex-
ation and maintaining the status quo. Because annexations have no immediate
impact on legislative reapportionment, city lines could simply be redrawn to
make them congruent with legislative districting lines.4 57 This remedy, howev-
er, imposes unacceptable costs. Many annexations are undertaken for neutral
reasons, such as the desire of residents in the annexed territory to receive city
services4 58 and the racial impact on the delegation may be unintended. In this
situation, neutral objectives collide with a racially discriminatory effect on the
delegation, and the resolution of this tension is costly.
The essential weakness of line-drawing remedies for delegation dilution is
that the lines (whether city boundaries or legislative districting lines) are asked
to do too much. In the case of city boundaries, the main purpose is to determine
who receives the benefits of city residence, while in the case of reapportion-
ment, the main purpose is to determine the election constituency for the state
legislature. In sum, making these lines serve a dual purpose imposes high costs,
except in situations where the discrimination is flagrant, and only minor
adjustments are necessary.459
Another remedial possibility would be to alter the delegation's rules so that
delegation members elected by noncounty voters would be prohibited from
serving on the delegation. This option does not force the redrawing of district
lines, nor does it create the accompanying one-person, one-vote problems. Yet
this rule also has serious drawbacks. In the case of fragmented counties, the
county residents in the district fragment lying within county boundaries would
be deprived of any vote for the delegation, and would in effect have no repre-
456. For example, shifting the 395 residents in the Macon deannexation from one district to another
would have been a feasible remedy because it would have had little impact on the reapportionment. See
Letter from Neil Bradley, Associate Director, Southern Regional Office, American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation, to William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, United States
Department of Justice, 5 (Jan. 30, 1985) (on file with author) [hereinafter Bradley Letter]. See supra notes
304, 366 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Macon deannexation.
457. Unlike reapportionments, annexations simply add more territory to a political unit (the city)
without any resulting change in the population of adjoining legislative districts. By removing this territory
from the city limits, the population of legislative districts remains the same and thus one-person, one-vote
standards are not compromised. Annexations, of course, may require the city to redraw its local election
districts after the next census, but that requirement exists independent of delegation dilution.
458. Haddad, supra note 29, at 148.
459. These costs cannot be avoided by permitting the annexation to go forward while forcing the
adoption of a fairer method of election for the delegation. Although this remedy is feasible for city elections,
see City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975), in which city legislators wear only one hat,
delegation members also run for the state legislature qua state legislature. Redrawing delegation election
districts would also realign legislative districts, leading to the problems discussed supra notes 282-95 and
accompanying text.
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sentation on the delegation.460 In the case of submerged counties, county resi-
dents would be deprived of a delegation because the only eligible member
would have been elected by noncounty voters and thus prohibited from serving
on the delegation. A remedy that deprives some residents of their voting rights
in an effort to protect other voting rights is not effective.461
A variation on this theme would permit the delegation member to serve on
the delegation, but utilize measures to negate his or her influence in comparison
to the will of the "true" delegation members. Consider, for example, a four-
person delegation, three of whose members' districts lie totally within county
boundaries, and one whose district fragments the county. This fourth delegation
member could be prohibited from voting where his or her vote would make a
difference in the outcome (i.e., where the delegation is split two to one and her
vote would create a tie), or the remaining delegation members could commit
themselves to support any measure that had the support of two of the three
"true" members.42 This remedy raises difficult definitional problems concern-
ing which delegation members should be subjected to this rule, in addition to
the problem, noted above, of depriving some county residents of a delegation
vote. Because all of these remedies are unsatisfactory, a remedy divesting the
delegation of power over local government in the county in which black votes
are diluted must be seriously considered. In situations where altering district
lines cannot remedy the dilution, the delegation's power to enact local legisla-
tion could be transferred to the appropriate local governing body.4 63 The local
governing body would then exercise the legislative duties formerly exercised
by the delegation, and the state legislature would retain no control over local
legislation.4 4
460. If delegations are elected bodies, depriving an eligible voter of a vote for an elected body would
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
461. Although this remedy could be tempered by providing delegation members a vote weighted in
proportion to the number of county residents they represent, see Amended Complaint at 17, Blanton v.
Campbell, No. 2-91-3635-1 (D.S.C. filed Dec. 12, 1991), this arrangement might still result in delegation
dilution. This could occur where the delegation member was the candidate of choice of noncounty voters,
but not of county voters. In this situation, noncounty voters would still unduly influence delegation
deliberations.
462. A variant of this remedy was suggested by the lawyer representing aggrieved residents in the
Macon deannexation. See Bradley Letter, supra note 456. It is not clear that existing legislative rules permit
this remedy. GA. H. REP. R. I1, for example, permits delegations to determine the number of delegation
members who must agree on proposed legislation, but the rule on its face does not seem to give delegations
discretion to exclude members from a vote.
463. This is akin to the remedy in Hardy v. Wallace, 603 F. Supp. 174, 179 (N.D. Ala. 1985), where
the court enjoined the enforcement of a statute which transferred appointment authority over the local racing
commission from the legislative delegation to the governor, on the grounds that the state did not seek
preclearance for this change.
464. Such relief was one of two remedies suggested by the plaintiffs in Blanton v. Campbell, see
Amended Complaint at 17, Blanton v. Campbell, No. 2-91-3635-1 (D.S.C. filed Dec. 12, 1991). The
plaintiffs gave as their reasons the fact that the work performed by South Carolina delegations "would be
better... [performed] by each respective county's county government, because said county governments
totally are contained within the boundaries of Dorchester County and each member of each county's
government was and is elected by virtually the same population." Id. at 11.
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A remedy that requires the court to restructure state and local government
may lead to excessive federal intrusion into the affairs of these governments.
Nevertheless, the tension between the competing considerations of complying
with the one-person, one-vote mandate and tying delegation representation to
those voters with a real interest in delegation deliberations makes other reme-
dies unworkable. For many counties, especially submerged counties and those
with a high degree of fragmentation, it is not possible to structure the delegation
to overcome these difficulties.
Moreover, the decision to vest control over local government functions in
delegations is bad policy, even absent the racial politics that have permeated
delegation deliberations and structures. Delegations, after all, have outlived
much of their usefulness as a means of permitting the state to exercise control
over local government. In the past, the membership of delegations was more
closely correlated with ties to the local community. Today, membership of
delegations reflects a crazy quilt pattern lacking any real connection to local
concerns. Under these circumstances, delegations are an historical anomaly and
local government is likely better off without them 65
The foregoing analysis is in many ways highly formalistic. It applies
existing concepts of voting power to legislative delegations, which, when
analogized to other kinds of legislative bodies, fit within the contours of this
traditional formulation. The analysis does not fully confront the question of the
appropriate end point for measuring voting power. Instead, it places itself
squarely in the tradition of cases that view the ability to elect candidates to
office as the end point of political participation. Part IV addresses the limita-
tions of dilution analysis in dealing with other aspects of voting power.
IV. BEYOND DELEGATIONS: LESSONS FOR LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS
An understanding of delegations allows us to parse the facile notion in
Presley v. Etowah County Commission that the election of candidates to office
is both the beginning and the end of political participation. Because the vast
majority of voting rights litigation has targeted the ability of minority voters
to elect candidates to office,46 legislative rules and procedures467 have re-
465. See UNDERWOOD, supra note 20, at 160. Of course, there are circumstances in which black voters
might prefer delegation control to control at the local level. For example, where the local government
structure is discriminatory and local officeholders ignore black interests, blacks might be better off appealing
to the member of the local delegation. The solution in this situation would seem to be to make the local
government structures responsive to black interests, rather than to vest control in a distant delegation.
466. This litigation has arisen under either the ability-to-elect aspect of section 2 or related concepts
under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, or directly under the Constitution. See supra Parts H(A) & 11(B).
The ability of minority voters to elect candidates is critical to a number of goals, among them encouraging
greater minority participation in politics; providing role models in the political system for minority voters;
and incorporating diverse viewpoints in legislative deliberations. Karlan, supra note 196, at 213-19
(describing these goals generally as goals of civic inclusion); Howard & Howard, supra note 196, at 1627-33
(describing these goals as justifying "safe" minority districts).
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ceived little attention from voting rights litigators. Voting rights scholarship has
followed suit, largely concentrating on descriptive aspects of the statutory
scheme or alternative means of furthering the election of candidates whom
minority voters support4 65 As functional governing bodies, delegations pro-
vide concrete examples revealing that the election of candidates must be seen
as only the beginning of meaningful political participation. Although an exhaus-
tive treatment of this complex topic is beyond the scope of this Article, I offer
a brief analysis in order to demonstrate the vast potential for discrimination in
the post-election phase that Presley leaves untouched.
A study of delegations demonstrates that the categories of voting rights
jurisprudence established by Presley's four-part typology fail to capture the
impact of voting in the real world of politics.4 69 Because membership on
delegations is directly tied to election outcomes, no doctrinal quantum leap is
required to bring delegation structure under the scope of the Voting Rights Act.
Once delegations are recognized as functional governing bodies, a straightfor-
ward extension of existing voting rights doctrine leads us to view legislative
reapportionments as redefining both the state legislature and each local delega-
tion. Both types of reapportionment must be weighed against the requirements
of the Act and scrutinized for the possibility of dilution, although the measure
of dilution may vary.
Suppose, however, that a given legislature has chosen to manage local
government through a different device than legislative delegations. Instead of
creating delegations to manage the affairs of local government, suppose the
legislature has delegated this responsiblity to a specially designated committee
overseeing all local legislation in the state. Or suppose that the state legislature,
in response to a legal challenge against the existing delegation system, replaces
the local courtesy rule with procedures that vest greater power in the state
legislature. Unlike the system analyzed in Part III, in which elections determine
delegation membership, these possible mechanisms fall outside the scope of
changes identified in Presley that have an "impact on the substantive question
whether a particular office would be elective or the procedural question how
an election would be conducted." 470 Under Presley's analysis, these manip-
467. I use the term "rules and procedures" to encompass the whole continuum of rules, practices,
customs, and norms that shape the legislative process and its outcomes. See BARBARA HINCKLEY, THE
SENIORITY SYSTEM IN CONGRESS 5 (1971); Heinz Eulau, Committee Selection, in HANDBOOK, supra note
20, at 221 (citing KENNETH A. SHEPSLE, THE GIANT JIGSAW PUZzLE: DEMOCRATIC COMMIrEE ASSIGN-
MENTS IN THE MODERN HOUSE (1978)).
468. For representative samples of this work, see Thomas M. Boyd & Stephen J. Markman, The 1982
Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A Legislative History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1347 (1983). For
exceptions to the general rule, see the sources cited supra note 196 & infra note 515.
469. The Court characterized the typology as including three kinds of changes in election procedures
(manner of voting, candidacy requirements and qualifications, and the composition of the electorate), and
a fourth category "termed substantive changes as to which offices are elective"). Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 828.
470. Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 832.
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ulations would not implicate voting rights because the delegations would no
longer be functionally-elected governing bodies.
Rather than tinkering with delegation structure, the legislature--or the
delegation itself--could change internal delegation operating procedures in
order to affect the value of the votes cast by delegation members. Black
legislators could be excluded from participating in certain aspects of delegation
work, or delegation voting rules could be manipulated so that the vote of black
members counted for less. These changes also would fall outside the reach of
Presley.
In Part IV, I explore a vision of voting rights that would embrace all
aspects of decisionmaking by legislative delegations and, by analogy, other
aspects of legislative deliberations and policymaking. This Part criticizes
Presley and offers a blueprint for future study of the inner workings of the
political process. Because of their unique status both as functional governing
bodies and as mechanisms for shifting power between local government and
the state, delegations can serve as a lens through which to examine the connec-
tions between voting and governance severed by Presley. The lessons learned
from a study of delegations extend to other aspects of the political process,
teaching us that only a functional view of this process can adequately protect
voting rights. The Voting Rights Act must be amended for this vision to be
fully realized.471
A. Delegation Rules and Procedures
A close look at delegation rules and procedures demonstrates the bankrupt-
cy of Presley's formalistic conception of voting rights. Even if the method of
electing the delegation is fair, black voters may nonetheless be denied equal
access to the political process. The legislative process may be used to manipu-
late delegation deliberations and control the outcome of these deliberations at
two levels: the delegation's internal decisionmaking processes and the state
legislature's oversight of this process.
At the first level, delegation voting rules determine the number of delega-
tion members that must agree before the delegation can approve legislative
proposals; 472 they thus have a direct effect on the likelihood that certain pro-
posals will receive the delegation's imprimatur. Two variants of decision rules
471. See infra note 519 and accompanying text.
472. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text. In some instances, a uniform decision rule applies
to all delegations in the state legislature; in others, individual delegations are free to adopt their own rules.
Whatever the merits of particular voting rules, granting delegations the discretion to adopt their own
decisionmaking rules, and to change those rules at will, can create opportunities for discrimination. Frequent
revision of decision rules, or changes that are made shortly after the election of black officeholders, should
be particularly suspect.
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generally apply to delegation deliberations: simple majority or supermajority
rules.
Although it is impossible to catalog all of the relevant factors, the effect
of decision rules depends upon the racial makeup of the delegation and the
nature of the delegation's legislative activity.473 Typically, supermajority rules
are thought to increase minority influence on governing bodies.4 74 They make
it easier for minority groups to "veto" actions proposed by the majority and
thus may prevent the majority from overriding minority interests. At a mini-
mum, these rules may force legislators in the majority group to barter with
those in the minority group-a process referred to as "logrolling"--in order to
accomplish the majority's agenda. In a legislative body requiring an affirmative
vote of three-quarters of its members, a cohesive minority group that includes
one-third of the legislators can influence the legislative agenda by preventing
the legislature from taking any action if the minority's goals are not taken into
account.
The advantages of supermajority rule for political minorities, however, may
not always be present in the context of racial minorities.4 75 The difficulties
that racial minorities face in the give-and-take of the political process may
make supermajority rules additional barriers to achieving minority political
interests. While these rules promote shifting legislative alliances and coalitions,
not every legislative arena presents opportunities for this kind of interaction.
White legislators may be unwilling to form coalitions with minority legisla-
tors,476 thus skewing the typical advantages of the rule.
The minority-enhancing value of supermajority rules also assumes that
legislators propose similar legislative agendas and are willing to bargain across
a wide range of issues. Where legislators sponsor vastly different legislative
agendas-for racial or other reasons-controversial proposals might garner the
support of fewer legislators. Any increase in the support needed for passage
473. See Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice
Theory, Value Pluralism, andDemocratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121,2198 (1990) ("The appropriate-
ness of choosing particular institutional configurations and decision procedures always depends upon the
specific historical and social context in which the choice is being contemplated.").
474. Power is distributed differently in legislatures that operate by supermajority rules than in those
that employ a simple majority system. David W. Brady & Charles S. Bullock, 11I, Party and Factions Within
Legislatures, in HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 139. For a discussion of the impact of supermajority rules
on political equality, see Howard & Howard, supra note 196, at 1634, 1647 & nn.76, 141. The literature
also discusses the use of supermajority rules in the context of nonlegislative decisionmaking. See Joseph
Jaconelli, Majority Rule and Special Majorities, 1989 PUB. L. 587, 588-89; Richard L. Revesz & Pamela
S. Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme Court, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1109-31 (1988).
475. For a general discussion of the pros and cons of supermajority rules as remedies for voting rights
violations, see Karlan, supra note 196, at 246. For a description of the use of majority voting requirements
in the United States Congress, the Supreme Court and local government activities, see id. at 245-46.
476. See Sanford Levinson, Gerrymandering and the Brooding Omnipresence of Proportional
Representation: Why Won't it Go Away?, 33 UCLA L. REv. 257, 272 (1985) (noting that some unpopular
minorities "find themselves. . . frozen out of practical power in the legislature because no one will ally
with them"). Cf. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985) (discussing
difficulties faced by discrete and insular minorities such as racial groups).
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could make it more difficult to enact such proposals, and lead to deadlock.
When racial issues provoke controversy, supermajority rules favor the status
quo and may undermine the ability of minority representatives to achieve their
legislative goals.'
Because delegations have not been the subject of comprehensive study, the
extent to which discriminatory motives influence the adoption of delegation
rules is largely unknown. The story of the Richmond County delegation,
however, supplies some evidence that the choice of voting rules has been driven
by racial considerations. During a time of racial tension, the two senators on
the delegation abandoned their long-standing practice of requiring both to agree
on legislation before it passed the delegation. The switch from a supermajority
rule (two of two members) to a simple majority (one of two members)
increased the likelihood that consolidation legislation opposed by blacks would
be approved. Similarly, the switch from a unanimous vote rule to a majority
vote rule in the 1960's may have occurred to counter the growing diversity of
delegation membership.
At the second level, the legislature can manipulate the legislative process
that reviews delegation actions, either by creating an exception to the legis-
lature's usual rule barring intervention in delegation decisions, or through other
measures. Whether implemented formally or as a matter of custom or practice,
these procedures can affect both the process of deliberating and the outcomes
of deliberations.
For example, the Richmond County delegation implemented several new
procedures when considering legislation that would have improved black voters'
chances of gaining political power in the City of Augusta. Senator Allgood
substituted a consolidation bill for the ward voting bill that had been supported
by black constituents and passed by the house delegation members. This move
nullified the ward voting bill, and altered the usual procedure whereby local
legislation is first introduced in the house, and then, once approved, is consid-
ered by the senate.479 Senator Allgood also backed a rule change making it
easier for the legislature as a whole to veto delegation actions.48 The status
quo favored white voters, and the new procedures permitted the legislature to
overrule a renegade delegation that might have enacted legislation favorable
to the black residents of Augusta. It is not coincidental that the new rule was
enacted while the delegation debated legislation with potentially significant
racial repercussions.
477. See Operation PUSH v. Mabus, 932 F.2d 400, 408 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1991) (bill to increase voter
registration opportunities in Mississippi received simple majority but not the required three-fifths majority
for passage); Karlan, supra note 196, at 247.
478. See supra note 148.
479. See supra note 166.
480. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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The delegation from Fulton County, Georgia, an area that includes the city
of Atlanta as well as its suburbs, provides a more blatant example of how
legislative intervention can undercut delegation decisions to the detriment of
black voters.48' In 1981, all county delegations in Georgia drafted reapportion-
ment plans for their respective geographic areas. 2 The proposal adopted by
the Fulton County delegation (dominated by black Democrats and white
Republicans) called for nineteen single-member districts and eliminated the at-
large seats that had existed under the previous plan 83 When a number of
reapportionment plans came up for a floor vote, the house approved the plans
drafted by every delegation except Fulton County's. The house rejected the
Fulton delegation's plan as written, and amended it by a vote of 125-28 to
include seventeen single-member districts and two at-large seats.4  The
amended plan was ultimately enacted by the legislature as a whole. 4U During
the floor debate, Representative Bob Holmes, a black member of the delegation,
described the amendment as "an attempt to go around the committee process
and the Fulton County delegation. ''46 A white Republican member of the
delegation noted that "[the house had] sent a clear message to the people of
Georgia that only a few people are allowed in the Georgia legislative pro-
cess .... And they are white Democrats.' 487
The "rules" followed in the post-1990 Georgia state legislative reapportion-
ment suggest that racial factors may still affect the process. In at least one
instance, the house reapportionment committee overruled the proposal of a local
work group and replaced an apparently fair plan for the Dougherty County
delegation with one that clearly diluted the influence of black voters.488
481. Although a court could review the Fulton County reapportionment under classic reapportionment
doctrine, my approach focuses on the fairness of the reapportionment process rather than on whether the
substantive result satisfied the Voting Rights Act.
482. Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494,503 (D.D.C. 1982), affid, 459 U.S. 1166 (1983). The Busbee
decision also details the racially motivated maneuvering that characterized the reapportionment of congressio-
nal districts in the Fulton County area.
483. Because Fulton County had lost population during the past decade, the 24 seats it claimed under
the earlier plan had to be reduced to 19. Of these 24 seats, 21 were elected from districts and three were
elected at large. Beas Cutts, Clash Assured on House Remap, ATLANTA CONST., Aug. 26, 1981, at IA
[hereinafter Cutts, Clash Assured]; Beas Cutts, House, Senate Face Redistricting Decisions Today, ATLANTA
CONST., Aug. 27, 1981, at IA [hereinafter Cutts, Redistricting Decisions].
484. Linda Field, House Tears Apart Fulton Remap Plan, ATLANTA CONST., Aug. 28, 1981, at IA
(reporting that "most black members" and "all the Fulton County Republicans" supported the pure single-
member district plan).
485. By custom, the senate had routinely rubber-stamped the reapportionment plan for the house, and
vice-versa. Cutts, Clash Assured, supra note 483, at IA, 8A.
486. Field, supra note 484, at IA.
487. Id.
488. In the Dougherty County gerrymander, see discussion supra notes 307-29 and accompanying text,
the house reapportionment committee added a "finger district" to the work group's proposal. The amended
plan was adopted by the house, and encountered a section 5 objection from the Justice Department. More
importantly, the work group procedures may have limited the influence of black voters in drafting reappor-
tionments. See discussion infra notes 496-501 and accompanying text.
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Although the holding in Presley would reach the procedures for selecting
delegation members, it would not reach manipulations of legislative rules and
procedures such as those just discussed. Black legislators participated freely
during both the Fulton County reapportionment and the Richmond County
delegation deliberations, but their ability to influence the legislative process was
diminished by altering internal delegation decision mechanisms and manipulat-
ing delegation autonomy. The election of black representatives did not translate
into voting power for their constituents. On the contrary, the legislative process
translates constituent preferences into substantive action,489 and that process
contains numerous opportunities for defeating those preferences.
The empirical evidence about delegations conveys the concrete lesson that,
even when legislative gerrymandering is not blatant,490 legislative rules and
procedures are not neutral phenomena.491 Legislative structures are organized
to elicit and endorse a wide variety of values and preferences, and voting rules
can alter the fora for considering these values and preferences.9 Rules struc-
ture decisionmaking and limit the consideration of legislative proposals.
4 93
Policy outcomes vary with the rules used,494 and changes in legislative rules
489. See Pildes & Anderson, Slinging Arrows, supra note 473, at 2180 (describing legislative structures
as forum where value preferences are elicited and endorsed).
490. Professor Guinier has coined the phrase "legislative gerrymanders" to describe the exclusion of
representatives elected by black voters from legislative deliberations; it captures the close resemblance to
traditional gerrymanders which prevent minority-supported candidates from being elected to office. See
Guinier, Triumph of Tokenism, supra note 195, at 1126 n.242 (also suggesting term "deliberative gerryman-
dering"). Before Presley, several commentators argued that legislative gerrymanders were actionable under
the Voting Rights Act. Karlan, supra note 196, at 240 (excluding black representatives from school bond
proposals); Edward J. Sebold, Note, Applying Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to Single-Member Offices,
88 MICH. L. REV. 2199, n.255 (1990) (excluding minority city councilmember from deliberations between
mayor and city council).
491. See LEWIS A. FROMAN, JR., THE CONGRESSIONAL PROCESS: STRATEGIES, RULES AND PROCEDURES
188 (1967) (arguing that "rules and procedures define the conditions under which the 'game' will be
played"); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 19-67 (1979) (discussing the characteristics of various voting
rules).
492. Pildes & Anderson, Slinging Arrows, supra note 473, at 2180-81 (describing role of United States
House of Representatives Rules Committee in framing terms of legislative debate).
493. Studies of this phenomenon include: STEPHEN K. BAILEY, CONGRESS MAKES A LAW: THE STORY
BEHIND THE EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1946 (1950); JOHN A. FEREJOHN, PORK BARREL POLITICS: RIVERS AND
HARBORS LEGISLATION, 1947-1968 (1974); W. Mark Crain & Robert D. Tollison, Legislative Size and
Voting Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1977); Ronald D. Hediund, Organizational Attributes of Legislative
Institutions: Structure, Rules, Norms, Resources, in HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 321-95; Ronald D.
Hedlund & Keith E. Hamm, Institutional Development and Legislature Effectiveness: Rules Changes in the
Wisconsin Assembly, in COMPARATIVE LEGISLATIVE REFORMS AND INNOVATIONS 173-213 (Abdo Baaklini
& James Heaphy eds., 1977) [hereinafter Hediund & Hamm, Institutional Development].
494. Karlan, supra note 196, at 245-48 (describing impact of supermajority rules on black elected
officials); Douglas Rae & Michael Taylor, Decision, Rules and Policy Outcomes, 1 BRIT. J. POL SCI. 71
(1971) (describing way in which individuals and institutions interact in developing policy); Kenneth A.
Shepsle, Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models, 23 AM. J. POL.
Sol. 27 (1979) (describing the interactions of individuals and institutions in voting); James Steiner, The
Principles of Majority and Proportionality, 1 COMP. POL. STUD. 63 (1971). Proponents of civic republican-
ism also point to the value of legislative deliberations and their relationship to fairer legislative outcomes.
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein,
Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
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and procedures affect interest groups in different ways 95 Thus, legislative
rules and procedures should be closely scrutinized to ensure that minority
voting power is protected.
B. Who Has the Power?
In addition to legislative decision rules, other aspects of the legislative
process have the potential to affect outcomes. The distribution of power within
a political system is closely related to legislative rules and procedures. Indeed,
the potential for wholesale transfers of governmental powers within a single
entity, or from one level of government to another, is perhaps even more
troubling for minority voters than the unchecked opportunities for manipulating
legislative processes. In many respects, these kinds of transfers are easier to
implement than gerrymanders or rule changes but are equally effective at
eviscerating black electoral gains. Again, legislative delegations provide a useful
context in which to examine this question.
Delegations highlight the multiplicity of ways in which the legislative
process can be structured, as well as the variety of locations in which govern-
mental power can be vested. Power over local matters can reside with local
governing bodies, with the state legislature, or with delegations. These bodies
are in turn free to delegate their authority to component structures such as
committees. None of these choices is any more neutral than the decision about
where to draw a legislative districting line, and each potentially has a profound
impact on the real voting strength of black voters.
Consider, for example, the new "work group" procedures employed in
Georgia for drafting the recent legislative reapportionment plan. Rather than
following the previous practice of assigning local delegations the responsibility
to develop initial drafts of local reapportionment plans,4 96 the legislature in-
stead entrusted this task to work groups composed of all legislators representing
the districts included in nineteen designated work areas.4 97 The work groups
were directed to develop new legislative district boundaries for their region
conforming to work area boundaries. If the work group members were in
495. Ronald D. Hedlund & Keith E. Hamm, Conflict and Perceived Group Benefits from Legislative
Rules Changes, I LEGIS. STUD. Q. 181 (1976); Hedlund & Hamm, Institutional Development, supra note
493, at 207-08; Ronald D. Hedlund & Keith . Hamm, Institutional Innovation and Performance Effective-
ness, in LEGISLATIVE REFORM: THE POLICY IMPACT 117-32 (Leroy N. Rieselbach ed., 1978). A contempo-
rary example of the impact of legislative reforms on the legislative process is the 1970's revolt of liberal
Democrats in the United States House of Representatives and the decentralization of power that resulted.
Bruce I. Oppenheimer, Policy Effects of U.S. House Reform: Decentralization and the Capacity to Resolve
Energy Issues, 5 LEOIS. STUD. Q. 5 (1980) (describing impact of reforms on success of energy legislation).
496. Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1982), affd, 459 U.S. 1166 (1983).
497. See ACLU Comment Letter, supra note 307, at 19; House Reapportionment Committee, Work
Area Map and Statistics (adopted May 9, 1991) (on file with author). In most instances, work areas were
composed of more than one county; in one instance, as many as thirty-one counties were placed under the
jurisdiction of a single work group.
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agreement, the proposed area plan was adopted without further review. Where
there was some dispute among incumbents, however, the plan was submitted
to the house reapportionment committee for a deciding vote.
498
In its section 5 objection letter, the Department noted that "the state's 'work
group' system and rules for the members of the house worked to benefit
incumbents and minimize black voting strength."' 9 9 By placing power in the
hands of incumbent legislators (most of whom were white), the system encour-
aged maintenance of the status quo and discouraged the creation of new black
districtsSto Moreover, the new legislative districts were supposed to lie entire-
ly within the work area lines, which themselves fractured concentrations of
black voters. The effect of this arbitrary work area restriction was to reduce the
number of black voters who could be included in certain legislative districts,
as well as to divide incumbent black legislators among work areas so that they
would typically be a smaller percentage of a work group than of a delega-
tion.
5o1
The potential for undermining black voting strength within delegations
themselves is also enormous. Consider the Dougherty County, Georgia delega-
tion, on which black members recently became a majority.5°2 It would be a
simple matter for the legislature to change the rules of the game and vest many
of the powers exercised by the delegation in the hands of a different
entity-such as the committee with jurisdiction over local legislation in the
Georgia House of Representatives.5 3 Presley would impose no voting rights
barrier to such a transfer of power, even if no black legislators served on the
committee (or indeed, if black legislators were deliberately excluded from
committee membership). Presley would not stand in the way unless the transfer
took away all of the powers exercised by delegations.
This result is patently absurd. Imagine a legislative "committee" for Dough-
erty County that exercised the wide variety of powers currently exercised by
the delegation-that is, chose the method of election for the county governing
body; approved annexations and consolidations; passed local options sales taxes;
appointed members to boards and commissions; and so forth. In other words,
imagine a body with the powers described in Part I of this Article, but outside
498. ACLU Comment Letter, supra note 307, at 19.
499. First Georgia Objection Letter, supra note 305, at 3.
500. ACLU Comment Letter, supra note 307, at 19. In objecting to the legislative reapportionment
that resulted from the work group system, the Department of Justice found that other new rules and
procedures "discouraged alternative redistricting plans from being presented and debated." First Georgia
Objection Letter, supra note 305, at 2. Although the Department did not identify the nature of these rules,
it went on to note that "the state often rushed the process in order to manipulate the adoption of plans that
minimize minority voting strength overall." Id.
501. ACLU Comment Letter, supra note 307, at 20.
502. See supra notes 307-29 and accompanying text.
503. On one level, this is simply an expansive variant of the Fulton County reapportionment case, in
which the legislature overruled the decision of the delegation in one instance. Rather than proceeding on
a case-by-case basis, a transfer of power to a committee would completely divest the delegation of
jurisdiction over certain matters.
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of the dilution analysis described in Part III. The composition of this body is
no less disturbing than that of the Dougherty County delegation, yet Presley
would provide no tools for analyzing its impact on black voters.
Looking beyond delegations to other legislative bodies, we discover that
Presley leaves unexamined two other structures in which significant legislative
power is lodged-legislative committees °4 and legislative leadership posi-
tions. Legislative leaders introduce more legislation than their colleagues, enjoy
more success in passing legislation505 and are perceived by their colleagues
as wielding more influence in the legislative process.5 6 Although the signifi-
cance of legislative committees in the decisionmaking process varies from state
to state,07 they exercise a great deal of influence in most jurisdictions. Yet
while the individuals occupying these positions can exercise greater influence
over the process than their numbers would seem to justify, neither the composi-
tion nor the procedures of legislative committees are cognizable under the
Voting Rights Act
508
Although my research indicates that the access of representatives elected
by black voters to committees has not been challenged under the Voting Rights
Act, there are several documented instances in which black representatives have
been excluded. In Louisiana, the decisionmaking processes for the post-1980
congressional redistricting plan effectively excluded the voices of black legisla-
tors. While black legislators did serve on the Louisiana House and Senate Joint
Congressional Reapportionment Committee, no black legislators were appointed
to the ad hoc subcommittees charged with promulgating rules for the design
of the new plan.0 9 When Governor Treen threatened to veto any plan that
created a majority-black district, white legislators convened a private meeting
in the sub-basement of the state capitol, to which black legislators were not
invited.510 The white legislators who attended the meeting drafted a compro-
504. In Presley, the Court announced that "[i]nnumerable state and local enactments having nothing
to do with voting affect the power of elected officials" and gave as an illustrative example "when a state
or local body alters its internal operating procedures, for example by modifying its subcommittee assignment
system .... 112 S. Ct. at 829.
505. DONALD R. MATTHEWS, U.S. SENATORS AND THEIR WORLD 174-75 (1960) (majority party leaders
most effective); Stephen E. Frantzich, Who Makes Our Laws?: The Legislative Effectiveness of Members
of the U.S. Congress, 4 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 409,427 (1979); Hamm et al., Ethnic & Partisan Minorities, supra
note 372, at 186 (leadership and seniority most accurately predict legislative activity and success in South
Carolina and Texas legislatures).
506. CHARLES G. BELL & CHARLES M. PRICE, THE FIRST TERM: A STUDY OF LEGISLATIVE SOCIALIZA-
TION 160 (1975); James J. Best, Influence in the Washington House of Representatives, 15 MIDWEST J. POL.
Sci. 547, 554 (1971); Katherine Meyer, Legislative Influence: Toward Theory Development through Causal
Analysis, 5 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 563, 580 (1980).
507. JEWELL & PATTERSON, supra note 135, at 165 (citing 1982 study assigning committee centrality
scores based on significance of committee to legislative decisionmaking).
508. One of the most powerful critiques of the democratic process is the extent to which the outcome
of the legislative process is manipulated by party leaders and other elites. See Pildes & Anderson, supra
note 473, at 2137-38, 2196.
509. Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325, 330 (E.D. La. 1983).
510. Id. at 334.
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mise reapportionment plan which was formally reviewed by an all-white
conference committee. Once adopted, it became known as the "Donald Duck"
plan for its bizarre configuration, and was later invalidated in a section 2 law-
suit.,"
The reapportionment plan for Georgia's congressional districts followed
a similar pattern. After the senate and house adopted dramatically divergent
districting plans, a conference committee was appointed to resolve the differenc-
es.512 No black legislators were appointed to the conference committee, which
a court later characterized as the "ultimate decision-makers in the congressional
reapportionment process." 513 The Georgia General Assembly ultimately adopt-
ed a plan splitting the politically cohesive community of black voters in the
Atlanta metropolitan area between two congressional districts; this plan was
later rejected by a federal court.
514
For elections to be more than merely symbolic, the legislative process must
provide access to the entire spectrum of interests reflected in the election of
diverse representatives. If the legislative process is flawed, then the election
of representatives is of limited value. A comprehensive examination of this
process is needed to ensure that the voting power of minority voters is equal
to that of white voters.
C. After Presley
The question, then, is how to conceptualize voting so that the right to vote
is part of an extended political process. Before Presley, legal scholars had just
begun to assert that the election of candidates was only a partial means of
achieving the goal of full participation in the political process. These scholars
argued that post-election assertions of influence are a crucial aspect of political
participation and that minority voters must have equal access to that process
511. Id. at 355. For a comprehensive description of the various political and racial machinations of
the case, see Guinier, supra note 369, at 408-11 (implicating Assistant Attorney General William Bradford
Reynolds in "race-conscious effort to assure the re-election of a white Republican incumbent"); Pamela S.
Karlan and Peyton McCrary, Without Fear and Without Research: Abigail Thernstrom on the Voting Rights
Act, 4 J.L. & POL., 751, 770-72 (1988).
512. Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 509 (D.D.C. 1982), affid, 459 U.S. 1166 (1983).
513. Id. at 510. The court found that the Speaker of the House "refused to appoint black persons to
the conference committee solely because they might support a plan which would allow black voters, in one
district, an opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice." Id. The court refused to preclear the plan under
section 5, rejecting as a "cover-up" the "contradictions, illogical justifications and feigned ignorance" offered
by the state at trial. Id. at 515. The court placed much of the blame on two legislative leaders in the Georgia
General Assembly: Speaker of the House Thomas Murphy, and Representative Joe Mack Wilson, Chairman
of the House Permanent Standing Committee on Legislative and Congressional Reapportionment. In a rare
demonstration of judicial candor, the court branded Representative Wilson a "racist," id. at 500, and noted
Speaker Murphy's comment following his speech to a virtually all-white audience, when he joked "[w]ou-
Idn't you love to have a district like that [audience]?" Id. at 510.
514. Busbee, 549 F. Supp. at 499.
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for the value of electing representatives to be fully realized. 515 The Presley
Court rejected a vision of statutory voting rights that would embrace decisions
about how power is distributed in the political system. It expressly held section
5 inapplicable to the post-election phase, and although the Court did not
consider section 2, the case for section 2 coverage is arguably weaker.516
Currently, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
affords the only basis for challenging racial discrimination in the political
process. 517 Plaintiffs alleging a constitutional violation are required to prove
discriminatory purpose.5 8 Because proof of intent is difficult and time-con-
suming,5 9 only an amendment of the Voting Rights Act can fully protect
voting rights in the post-election phase.
An amendment to sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act would permit
courts to examine not only the purpose, but also the effect on minority voters
of various choices allocating decisionmaking authority at various levels of
government. For several reasons, section 5 holds the most promise as a barrier
to discriminatory applications of decisionmaking authority and legislative rules
and procedures. Section 2 could serve as an avenue of relief in non-section 5
jurisdictions, or as an alternative to section 5 in jurisdictions where the rules
515. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 195, at 488 (basic flaw of "preference aggregation" model of vote
dilution, which focuses on electoral outcomes, is that other events "help translate election results into
substantive policy"); Guinier, supra note 369, at 427 ("[A] meaningful right to vote contemplates minority
participation in post-election legislative policymakidg as well as pre-election coalition building and
deliberation"); Guinier, supra note 29, at 1416 (new conceptual approach needed to "ensure meaningful
minority interest representation and participation at both the electoral and legislative stages of the political
process"); Guinier, Triumph of Tokenism, supra note 195, at 1126 (suggesting that "prejudice may simply
transfer the 'gerrymandering' problem from the electorate to the legislature"); Karlan, supra note 196, at
180 (urging courts to "look beyond the voting booth to the council chamber and the 'voting' (decision-
making) that occurs there."); Karlan, supra note 2, at 30 (ability to elect is a "subset" of right to participate
in broader political process). See also Levinson, supra note 476, at 272 ("fair" electoral systems do not
guarantee "fairness" within the legislature); Peter Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering
and Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1363 (1987) (election systems that afford
minority groups ability to elect candidates may nonetheless "waste" minority voting strength where
representatives are excluded from legislative coalitions and alliances). Professor Guinier is the most vigorous
and articulate advocate of this view.
516. See supra note 243 and accompanying text. Before Presley, some commentators suggested that
section 2 should be read to reach all stages of the political process. See Karlan, supra note 196, at 198 &
n.98 (section 2 addresses not only electoral mechanisms but "any practice denying equal access") (citing
H.R. Rep. No. 227, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1982)); Sebold, supra note 490, at 2240 (section 2 enacted
to address situations where "racial politics dominates the political process"). However, no court has
considered its application to the post-election stage. See supra note 29 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the relationship between section 2 and section 5.
517. The Court in Presley suggested that racial discrimination in the political process could be attacked
under a remedial scheme other than the Voting Rights Act, 112 S. Ct. at 832, and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment affords a likely vehicle for such an attack. The Fourteenth Amendment reaches all forms of racial
discrimination whereas the Fifteenth Amendment extends only to the right to vote. See Searcy v. Williams,
656 F.2d 1003, 1010 (5th Cir. 1981), affd sub nom. Hightower v. Searcy, 455 U.S. 984 (1982). The Court
would likely find any discrimination in the post-election phase unrelated to voting and thus outside the reach
of the Fifteenth Amendment.
518. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (proof of
discriminatory purpose required under equal protection elements of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
519. Parker, supra note 228; Soifer, supra note 228; Pamela S. Karlan, Note, Discriminatory Purpose
and Mens Rea: The Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent, 93 YALE LJ. 111 (1983).
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had not changed but the status quo nonetheless discriminated against black
voters.
Under an amended section 5, the burden of demonstrating the absence of
both discriminatory purpose and effect for any change to the status quo would
shift to the submitting jurisdiction. Where courts might otherwise be reluctant
to find that legislative structures discriminated against minority voters, this
burden-shifting device would increase the likelihood that discriminatory changes
would be invalidated. In addition, the section 5 "effects" test would prohibit
any change that diminishes the voting power of black voters. Under this test,
the court could compare the relative influence of minority voters under two
existing procedures, and would not have to answer the more difficult question
under section 2 of how much influence minority voters should have.s2°
Admittedly, measuring the effects of legislative decisionmaking rules on
minority voters is a difficult task. Any measure of effects necessarily involves
the question of how much influence minority voters should have in the legisla-
tive process, as well as difficult comparisons regarding the impact of different
rules in various legislative contexts. Discrimination is a complex and difficult
phenomenon requiring a definition of equality and some consensus about
permissible deviations from equality. It is unlikely that the standard for assess-
ing discrimination will lend itself to the kind of bright line rule for electoral
systems dilution that the Court sought in Gingles, but the absence of a mechan-
ical test does not indicate that courts should avoid a broader examination of the
political process.521
As a practical matter, we should recognize that courts may be tempted to
defer to the choices that governing bodies have made in structuring their
internal processes. These decisions might be viewed as the product of a kind
of expertise that courts lack, or seen as political choices that should be left to
political bodies. Unless courts are convinced that governing bodies have set out
to curtail the political influence of minority voters, they may take a hands-off
approach.
Nonetheless, even this approach would be preferable to Presley's wholesale
abandonment of the inquiry. Although intent is difficult to prove at any stage
of the political process, proving the purpose behind a particular rule should be
no more difficult than proving the purpose of any action. In examining intent,
520. The effects test for both sections is a comparative one that measures the existing election procedure
against a benchmark. The key difference between the two tests is that the section 5 effects tests looks at
whether the change makes black voters worse off than they were before, while the section 2 test measures
the status quo against other alternatives. While conceptually a section 2 effects test could be applied to
legislative procedures, the potentially open-ended nature of the dilution inquiry under section 2, coupled
with the lack of empirical evidence concerning the impact of various decisionmaking procedures on minority
voters, would make this assessment difficult. In the familiar context of vote dilution, the measure of
discriminatory effect under section 2 haunted voting rights litigation for years until Gingles furnished some
clarification, and challenges to legislative structures would face similar problems.
521. In a provocative article, Professor Guinier offers some suggestions for measuring discrimination
in the post-election phase. See Guinier, supra note 29, at 1493-1508.
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courts must necessarily strive to understand complex legislative processes,
including the reasons for the decision and the availability of other alterna-
tives. 522 Legislative structures, like other mechanisms, advantage certain
groups and disadvantage others and it should be the business of the law to
determine when this impact amounts to discrimination.
Perhaps the most persuasive criticism of expanding vote dilution theory for
the purpose of remedying inequalities in the distribution of political power is
that this theory is not a panacea for racial justice. Vote dilution doctrine,
however broadly conceived, cannot even reach many of the pressure points
within government, let alone those that are enmeshed in our political and social
culture.s 3 Money often dictates the outcome of elections at all levels of gov-
emments 24 We are governed by an administration that seems intent on in-
flaming racial passions52 and that has little commitment to remedying inequal-
ity. We live in a country where wealth and power are distributed unevenly, and
where the white majority resists the efforts of minorities to claim these resourc-
es.5 26 Many people have become disenchanted with traditional avenues of
political reform, and voter participation is at an all-time low. 27 Fine tuning
rules of legislative decisionmaking cannot overcome these obstacles.
The solution to this dilemma is obviously beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle.52 The critique, however, applies equally to the other aspects of the politi-
cal process that have been vigorously attacked by voting rights advocates. A
realistic view of political participation must take into account all of its stages.
522. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-68 (1977).
523. For instance, black electoral success has been thwarted by a number of outside sources, including:
other public officials, see EDWARD GREER, BIG STEEL: BLACK POLITICS AND CORPORATE POWER IN GARY,
INDIANA 111-160 (1979); reluctant bureaucracies, see RUFUS P. BROWNING, ET AL., PROTEST IS NOT
ENOUGH: THE STRUGGLE OF BLACKS AND HISPANICS FOR EQUALITY IN URBAN POLITICS 53-61 (1984);
and elites outside of the political system, see GREER, supra at 119-32.
524. For studies of the impact of money on elections, see Ragsdale, supra note 20, at 62 (citing GARY
JACOBSEN, THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (1983)); W.P. Welch, The Effectiveness of
Expenditures in State Legislative Races, 4 AM. POL. Q. 333 (1976).
525. Elizabeth Drew, Letterfrom Washington, THE NEW YORKER, June 17, 1991, at 102,112 (President
Bush's "performance has been nothing less than shameful" in his recent campaign against quotas); Notes
and Comment, THE NEW YORKER, July 1, 1991, at 22 (President Bush is "willing to play the anti-black
race card" in 1988 campaign and civil rights agenda).
526. We have not come so far from the time when Walt Whitman intoned, "is not America for the
Whites? And is it not better so?" Notes and Comment, THE NEW YORKER, July 1, 1991 (quoting 1858 article
in BROOKLYN DAILY TIMES).
527. See Alan Ehrenhalt, The Rise of a Politician Class: Why Voters Don't Matter, WASH. POST, July
21, 1991, at C3. The classic work of Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward explains voter "apathy."
FRANCES PIVEN & RICHARD CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS DON'T VOTE (1988). See also EJ. DIONNE, JR.,
WHY AMERICANS HATE POLITICS (1991). For a discussion of citizens' growing disenchantment with our
political system, see ALAN EHRENHALT, THE UNITED STATES OF AMBITION: POLITICIANS, POWER AND THE
PURSUIT OF OFFICE (1991).
528. The critique applies more broadly to the limits of law in achieving social justice. See Judy Scales-
Trent, A Judge Shapes and Manages InstitutionalReform: School Desegregation in Buffalo, 17 N.Y.U. REv.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 119, 168 (1989-90) (describing 'complicated fabric' of change" including many
government and private sector players).
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Since elections alone cannot provide access to governance, the post-election
phase should be scrutinized.
At this point in time, little is known about the extent of discrimination in
the post-election phase. My hope is that opening it up to scrutiny will provide
a better understanding of the legislative process and the tools that make the
process more responsive to a broad spectrum of interests. Absent this outcome,
the image is one of layer upon layer of governmental structures, each capable
of depriving minority voters of hard-earned gains.
Delegations are a case in point. While the fairness of elections to formally
constituted governing bodies captured the attention of voting rights advocates,
delegations operated in virtual obscurity. As long as legislative reapportion-
ments resulted in fair election districts for the state legislature, the impact of
legislative reapportionments on delegation membership was never examined.
As a result, our understanding of legislative reapportionments and annexations
was cramped and narrow. Opening up the world of delegations reveals a new
dimension of these phenomena. Experience teaches that digging below the
surface of elections will enrich our understanding of the right to vote.
CONCLUSION
Voting rights advocates and courts have too often overlooked questions of
political power. As the Reverend Martin Luther King once said, "The vote is
not the ballgame, but it gets you inside the ballpark. ' '529 Once inside the ball-
park of politics, a group's right to vote may be abridged at many steps along
the way. Minority voting strength can be eviscerated not only by formal restric-
tions on political participation or by the way candidates are elected, but also
by the manner in which political power is apportioned.
Local legislative delegations hold a great deal of political power in the
South. From supervising greyhound racing to selecting local school boards,
local delegations make a host of crucial decisions that affect their constituents'
daily lives. Delegations, along with local legislatures, rule and govern the cities
and counties under their jurisdiction. Yet racial discrimination has infused the
politics of delegations since their inception. For black voters to achieve fuller
political participation, the method of selecting delegations should be subject to
challenge under the Voting Rights Act. By the same token, the Act should be
amended to protect minority voters during the post-election phase of the
political process and to ensure that their ability to speak through their represen-
tatives is not diminished.
529. CHESTNUT & CASS, supra note 106, at 235.
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